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


HISTORY
of
MODERN
SERBIA.





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THE
HISTORY
OF
MODERN SERBIA.

BY
ELODIE LAWTON MIJATOVICS.



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WILLIAM TWEEDIE, 337, STRAND.

1872.

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INSCRIBED,
WITH GRATEFUL AFFECTION,

TO THE

Memory of my Father.

P R E F A C E.

It may be well to state briefly some of the reasons which encouraged me to write this short history of Modern Serbia.

Every one who has travelled recently in European Turkey must have observed the growing influence which the Serbs of the principality exercise over the other Christian populations of that portion of the Ottoman Empire.

This influence is not so much to be attributed, we think, to the community of language, faith, and national traditions which unites them, as to the irrefutable proofs of moral and material strength exhibited by the Serbs in their long struggle for independence, and their continual economical and political progression.

Serbia is the only Eastern State whose finances are

always prosperous. Whilst providing liberally for national education and national defences, her Budget for the last ten years has always had a surplus. These surpluses have formed a pretty fair national treasury.

Serbia is the single European State that has not yet the blessing, or burden, of national debt.

Serbia is, moreover, the only State in the East of Europe that has a large, well-armed, and tolerably organised national army.

And last—not least—Serbia is, in her own way, a Constitutional State, and the only one in the East that has (without perilling its wellbeing by its precipitated progress) progressed steadily, unceasingly, evidently.

We think these facts justify the claim Serbia makes on the sympathies of all who are interested in the decision of the Eastern Question in a sense favourable to Christian civilisation.

The new railway line, Belgrade-Alexinatz-Salonica (forming, in connection with Vienna-Ostend, it is said, the shortest line from London to Bombay), will undoubtedly bring Serbia before long in much more intimate relation to the English public.

A short English History of Serbia appeared to me

desirable, as furnishing probable English travellers in Serbia with some knowledge of the peculiar character of its inhabitants and the genesis of its State.

Since Ranke's "History of the Serbian Revolution" was published many new contributions to this history have appeared. The "Learned Society" of Belgrade has been diligently collecting oral testimonies of the events from eyewitnesses, and has published them in its journal, the *Glasnik*.

The "Memoirs of Prota Nenadovics," one of the chiefs most actively engaged in the revolutionary struggles of the first thirty years, have also been printed.

The year before last a learned Russian, M. Nil Popov, published his highly interesting historical work, "Russia and Serbia," which treats of the relations betwixt these countries from the conclusion of the last century to 1858. M. Nil Popov having been permitted to examine the official documents in the Russian State Archives, his history has an especial value, and to it I am indebted for the evidences of Russian influence in Serbia from 1804 to 1813, as well as those of the conflict between Russian and English influences during the last years of the first reign of Prince Milosh.

A residence of six or seven years in Serbia has furnished me with ample materials for that portion of the "History of Modern Serbia" which is included between the years 1860—1871.*

Vevey, January, 1872.

* A collection of official documents relative to the bombardment of Belgrade has just been published in Serbia. We regret that it appeared too late to be available to us; regret it the more because it contains an extremely interesting and characteristic correspondence between the late Prince and M. Ristits, his Envoy in Constantinople, which would have given our readers a very lucid idea of the position of the Serbian Question at the Constantinople Conference of 1862.

The published documents show clearly that the English Ambassador, Sir Henry L. Bulwer, then rendered important services to the East by having, by his personal influence with the late Prince Michael, prevented the war betwixt Serbia and Turkey.

It may interest our readers, also, to know that Sir Henry L. Bulwer was the first to protest against the organisation of a national army in Serbia, although his objections to it seem to have been done away, in some measure, by M. Ristits' frank explanation that the army was designed to *guarantee Serbia's interior autonomy from all and every exterior aggression.*

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
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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.



HISTORY OF MODERN SERBIA.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

IN the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Serbian kingdom had no reason to fear a comparison with the other monarchical States of Central and Western Europe.

If inferior in a few things to her sister kingdoms she was unquestionably in some other things their superior.

In Serbia, as in other contemporary States, the nation was composed of two distinct classes,—the one *privileged*, the other *unprivileged*.

The privileged class consisted of nobility (*Vlastela*) and clergy, and all the political power was in their hands.

The artisans, miners, tradesmen and peasants (labourers), formed the unprivileged class and possessed no political rights. That the right of assembly was expressly forbidden them is evident from the Serbian laws of the fourteenth century. Besides the tax they paid to the King's treasury they were bound by certain obligations to the proprietors of the lands on which they lived. All lands belonged to the king, the nobility, or the clergy.

These obligations were precisely defined by the laws,

and a comparison instituted between these laws and those of other countries of Europe led Maciejowski to the conclusion that the condition of the land labourers of Serbia was far preferable to that of the same class of men in other contemporary States.

The Serbian kings (who were mostly educated at the Imperial Court of Constantinople or at Venice) gave great attention to the material development of the country. They invited bands of German colonists to settle in the country, and opened many mines. More particularly the silver mines of Novo Brdo (Novo Monte), Kratovo, and Srebrniza, proved rich sources of wealth to them.

A great variety of laws and charters, intended to afford the necessary security to commercial enterprise, and the lately discovered commercial treaties made with Venice and Ragusa, combine to prove how thoroughly the old kings of Serbia appreciated the value of commerce as a means of national development.

The monetary system of Serbia was the same as that of Venice. Even in their external appearance there is a marked resemblance betwixt the Serbian and Venetian coins.

Of the intimate commercial relations kept up between the old kingdom of Serbia and the great Venetian Republic there exist a multitude of proofs in the many old Venetian laws made to regulate the trade with Serbia. Disputes betwixt Serbian and foreign merchants were submitted to a jury of which half the members belonged to the same nationality as the foreigner.

The chief political task of the Serbs in the thirteenth century was to secure a firm footing on the coast of

the Adriatic. The usual title of the old Serbian monarchs was, "By the grace of God King to all Serbian lands and to the *sea coast*." But in the first half of the fourteenth century their policy assumed already a higher and more ambitious flight. Often related by marriage with the Byzantine Court, and generally educated there, the Serbian princes knew all the corruption of the Eastern Empire, and could calculate its weakness. They conquered many of its provinces, and united them with Serbia. When the invasions of the Saracens and, later, those of the Turks became more frequent and dangerous, the Serbian king, Dushan, resolved to take himself Constantinople, and, by uniting the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek nations in the same State, regenerate and re-establish the falling empire. This was, in fact, the only way to repulse successfully the swarming hordes of victorious Mussulmans from the Eastern shores of Europe.

Dushan conquered Epirus, Thessaly, Bulgary, and the greater part of Macedonia, and took the title of "Emperor of the Greeks and Serbians." With an army of 80,000 men he commenced his march on Constantinople in 1355, but died suddenly before reaching the great capital of the East. The army returned to Serbia, and the uncompleted political edifice began to show symptoms of its approaching decay.

The jealousies which existed betwixt the king, the nobles, and the clergy brought on the rapid decline of the Serbian State after the death of the great Dushan. Weakened by internal dissensions the country fell easily a prey to the united attacks of its external enemies.

The Serbian kings desired always a centralisation

which was ill to reconcile with the feudal tendencies of the nobles. The fullest expression to this royal work had been, indeed, given by Dushan, who framed a code by which the hitherto unprotected people were guarded against the oppressive exactions of the tyrannical and wealthy nobles.

To diminish the influence of the hereditary aristocracy Czar Dushan introduced an aristocracy of public service and Court dignity,—an aristocracy of personal distinction. For this purpose he instituted the order of St. Stephen.

Dushan died, as we have said, ere he had solved the problem of interior development which he had set himself as a task. After his death the reins of government fell into hands far too weak and unstable to carry out successfully the vast schemes of the great Emperor. The Regent, who governed Serbia during the minority of Dushan's son, was a man of low birth, and this, as well as his boundless ambition, gained him the illwill and opposition of the feudal nobles. The Regent, Voukashin, though a man of unquestionable energy, failed to conquer this opposition, and Serbia, already well advanced in the path of civilisation, fell back again into an anarchy which even the choice of a ruler who was (though himself of low birth) allied by marriage to the royal blood of Dushan failed to arrest.

During this reign of internal disorder the Ottomans aggressed Serbia. On the field of Kossovo, one of the largest plains in the western half of the Balkan Peninsula, the opposing armies met. On the one side, the fanatic soldiers of Murat I.; on the other, the demoralised army of Prince Lazar,—an army predestined to defeat by the discord and egotistic ambition of its leaders.

On the 15th of June, 1389, was fought that brilliant but bloody battle in which the Serbs lost their king and Serbia ceased virtually to be a kingdom.

She retained, it is true, yet some fifty years her own nominal rulers, but the true instinct of the people led them to mourn over the "fatal field of Kossovo" as that on which was dealt the deathblow to their national independence.

During the whole fifteenth century, Serbia struggled to retain some slight shadow of freedom; but the Ottoman power crushed down surely, if slowly, the once so enterprising and flourishing State.

The Serbian ruler, George Brankovics, looked in vain for help in Austria, Hungary, and Venice.

There seems to have been at that time a prevalent opinion in Europe that the Turks would never seek to penetrate those countries beyond the Danube and the Sava; and that the Mahomedan invasion was a special scourge God sent to punish the Eastern peoples for their denial of the Papal supremacy.

Sigismund, Emperor of Germany and King of Hungary, offered to send succours to the Serbian ruler on the condition that prince and people accepted the Roman Catholic faith. But George Brankovics knew his people too well to dare to promise such a thing in their behalf. Later he received some succours under the leadership of Hunyady, but not sufficient to enable him to repulse effectually the Turks. In his old age he had the pain of seeing his two sons blinded by the conquerors, and was compelled to consent to the marriage of his daughter Mara with the Infidel Sultan Murat II.

Mahomet—the son of Murat and Mara—on ascend-

ing the throne of Turkey, claimed, also, that of Serbia by "right of succession," being the grandson of the deceased despot, George Brankovics.

The Turkish army occupied the land in the name of Sultan Mahomet II., and Serbia sunk down into a mere Turkish pashalik.

Many Serbian writers lay some stress on the fact that Serbia fell under Turkish rule, finally, by "right of succession" rather than by right of conquest. Be that as it may, it is certain that, partly owing to the many wars during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, partly, or chiefly, in consequence of wretched administration, Serbia, at the end of the sixteenth century, was in a most unhappy condition. There was no security for life, honour, or property. The constant extortions of money and forced labour were insupportable, and the passage of so many large armies through the land, on their way to Hungary, had changed the once so fertile and blooming country into a desert. And the proverb, "where a Turkish horse passes no blade of grass will grow," seemed literally the truth at that time in Serbia.

But the heaviest impost on the Serbs was the compelled gift, every seventh year, of their children to be trained for Janissaries. The yet vivid remembrance of the glory of old Serbia contrasted the more bitterly with the present degradation; and only the secretly cherished hope of speedy redemption enabled the Serbs to endure the iron rule of the oppressor. As the Turks were careful to permit no man of sufficient character and ability to influence materially his countrymen to remain amongst them, the Serbs were compelled to look

to the neighbouring Christian nations for encouragement and consolation.

Multitudes of young men left Serbia to seek homes in Hungary and Dalmatia, and there, as volunteers, fought with the Austrians against the Turks. These were the so-called *Uskoks* who, especially in the north-west of the Balkan Peninsula—first in the service of the Venetian Republic, and later in that of the Hungarian kings—played a rôle sufficiently important to find in the renowned “Paolo Sarpi, Theologian of Venice,” their historian.

Whilst a part of the people thus struggled against their national enemy under foreign standards, another part drew themselves back into the least accessible recesses of their native mountains, and, under the name of *Hyduks*, waged a fierce guerilla warfare against the Turks. In the many projects published in Germany, in the first half of the sixteenth century, for expulsing the Infidels from Europe, mention is often made of the adaptability of Serbia for the great common battleground. Serbia long hoped that Austrian succours would enable her one day to throw off the yoke of her oppressor.

An embassy from Vienna to Constantinople passed through Serbia in 1530, and one of its members noted in their books of travel that the Serbs seized eagerly every possible occasion to express their hope that the “great Imperial Christian army” would come speedily to free them from the tyrannic cruelties of their Infidel rulers. But, seeing that the Christian Emperor sent only embassies and never armies, they lost their last lingering hope of Austrian succour. It is somewhat

remarkable that Austria never could retain long the sympathies of the Serbs.

So early as the sixteenth century she availed herself gladly of their hostile disposition to the Turks, and Uskoks and Hyduks made some valuable military diversions in behalf of Austria: but even then a certain fatality attended the intercourse of the two countries.

During the seventeenth century the Serbs, exhausted and disappointed, saw no hope of escape from their home miseries but in self-exile; and it was thus that Austria and Hungary obtained, in the Serbian emigrants, a living rampart greatly needed betwixt them and the fanatical Janissaries. Grown up in increasing, though unavailing, warfare with the Turks, and hating them with a burning and undying hatred, the Serbs supplied the very best material possible for a boundary guard to repel the Infidel invaders.

On the invitation of the Emperor Ferdinand, and lured on by solemn assurances of religious freedom and national self-government, the Serbian Patriarch Charnoyevics led, in 1694, 36,000 families across the Danube, and colonised the lands of the Banat and the so-called "military frontier."

To-day the Serbs regret sincerely this wholesale emigration, for these families went from the very heart of Old Serbia, a region of great strategetic and economic importance, as it abounds in silver mines and (being on the direct route from the Adriatic to Constantinople and Salonica) had many cities and towns. The Turkish Government quickly replaced the emigrated Serbs with

Albanians, a wild race, hostile to all attempts at civilisation.

The eighteenth century was rich in promises which ended only in more bitter disappointments. Whenever the Austrian armies crossed the Danube they were joined by Serbian "Free Companies" eager to fight against the common enemy. But, at length, finding that Austria, despite her many brilliant successes, was always compelled to relinquish her conquests, the Serbs, in despair, resigned themselves to their unhappy destiny.

The nineteenth century dawned on the Serbian people as gloomily as the eighteenth century had closed.

They had long ceased to be proprietors of their own land.

Sultan Mahomet II. divided it amongst those of his warriors who had most distinguished themselves in their battles with the *giaours*. These new landlords were called "Spahis." The Serbs were considered as *Coloni* in their lands, and, besides having to render a great number of personal services, they were obliged to give their "Spahis" the tithe of all their produce (corn, fruit, hay, cattle, poultry, &c.) in the best case. Very often they were forced to give the seventh part; sometimes even the *third* part of everything.

They had to pay also, besides the "*harach*" to the Sultan, a sum more or less heavy to the governing Pasha, and give "*bakshesh*" or "*peshkesh*" (presents) to the rough men who came to collect the taxes.

Often the tax collectors and their followers regaled themselves at the expense of the poor peasants, and, before going away, extorted a yet heavier tax called "*shvakaliza*," viz. the payment for the trouble the Turks

had given themselves to eat the Rajah's bread and mutton.

Four centuries had elapsed since the fall of Serbian Independence on the fatal field of Kossovo.

The people seemed almost resigned to their wretched fortunes. Austria, so well situated and so able to help them, had raised their expectations only to disappoint them, and of Russia they knew comparatively little.

At that time the Western Powers of Europe scarcely existed for the Serbs.


They had accepted the Sultan as "Czar," and hoped from his goodwill the only alleviation of their miseries.

In the early years of the century the Governor of Belgrade was a noblehearted old Turk, Mustapha Hadgje Pasha. He kept the Spahis in order, and prohibited and punished any acts of violence to the poor. He was the only Turkish Pasha who obtained, or deserved, the sincere respect of the Serbs, and they, contrasting gratefully his mild rule with the exacting cruelty of former Pashas, called him expressively "the Mother of the Serbs." This title, touching in its exceeding simplicity, remains enshrined in the Serbian annals of the Revolution, and Hadgje Mustapha Pasha, who passed away like so many thousands leaving no trace in Turkish history, has left a lasting memory in Serbian tradition.

Serbia was never so near prosperity since it became a Turkish province as under his paternal rule. Protected from the wilful oppressions of the Spahis the Serbs began to revive a little; they paid cheerfully the taxes and worked on patiently, not even dreaming of revolution.

BOOK FIRST.

KARAGEORGE.



BOOK I.

KARAGEORGE.

CHAPTER I.

THE comparatively happy condition of the Serbs under Mustapha Pasha's humane government was suddenly and unexpectedly changed.

It had been arranged, in the last treaty of peace between Turkey and Austria, that the Janissaries should not occupy the Serbian fortresses on the Austrian frontiers.

The Governor of Serbia, the energetic and politic Bekir Pasha, fulfilled this stipulation, and compelled the Janissaries to retire into Bosnia and Bulgaria. Accustomed to live dissolutely and extravagantly at the expense of others, the Janissaries joined Pasmandgee Oglu, an insurgent leader in arms against the Sultan. The Turkish authorities found it difficult to put down this rebel chief; but, in order to weaken him, a firman was sent from Constantinople, which declared that the Muftis had decided that a treaty made with Giaours was not binding on the Faithful, and, therefore, the Sultan permitted the expelled Janissaries to return to the Pashalik of Belgrade.

Taking eager advantage of this permission, bands of

these wild soldiers hurried back into Serbia, especially to Belgrade, where they soon carried out their design of murdering old Mustapha Pasha and seizing themselves the reins of government. Hadgje Mustapha was ordered to send his son, Dirvish Beg, against the revolted Pasha of Vidin; the Beg, however, had scarcely quitted the Belgrade fortress at the head of the greater part of the garrison and a number of Serbs, before the Janissaries took possession of the fort and imprisoned the Pasha. The rebels compelled the old man to send an order to his son to dismiss the Serbians, and leave instantly with his Turkish soldiers the Pashalik. The Dirvish Beg obeyed implicitly these orders, but failed thereby to save his father's life. The Janissaries put the old man to death in the Castle of Belgrade, and began to govern the unhappy province on their own account.

This revolt of the Janissaries was headed by four chiefs, called Dahis: Kuchuk Ali, Fovchich Mehemed Aga, Mulah Yusuf, and Aganli.

Their first work was to divide the Pashalik into four parts, each part again into smaller ones, and then to establish in each village guardhouses. They organised, in short, a centralised military government, which rendered hopeless any attempt at insurrection on the part of the Serbs, and drained completely their few yet remaining resources. Affairs became still worse when, as the rumours of the revolt in the Belgrade Pashalik spread, bands of cruel and lawless men hurried to Serbia from Albania and Bosnia. The more desperate and reckless the adventurer the better his chance of gaining

possession of some luckless canton or village to impoverish for his personal benefit.

A reign of unexampled anarchy and tyranny began. It may be truly said that a band of brigands had taken possession of the unhappy land, and plundered and burned according to the capricious suggestions of their cupidity and cruelty.

The end of the year 1801 saw Serbia a prey to a systematised Vandalism, which fell all the heavier on the people because it succeeded so immediately the gentle government of Hadgje Mustapha.

As a natural consequence of the intensity of the tyranny under which they lived, the braver Serbs fled again into their mountains and became Hyduks. But bands of straggling guerillas, without union and without any definite plan, could not effect anything against the resolute and regularly organised Janissaries. In this juncture the Serbs demanded counsel from their landlords, the Spahis, who themselves had been expelled by the revolted Janissaries from Serbia.

The Spahis recommended strongly the sending of a petition to the Sultan, complaining against the Janissaries. The Serbs followed this advice, and sent a petition containing this passage: "If thou art still our Czar, help and save us from this tyranny: if thou art no longer our Czar, and if thou canst not help us, let us know, that we may hide ourselves in the forests or spring into the rivers."

To this petition of the Serbs the Spahis added a relation of their own wrongs, and demanded aid from the Sultan in putting down the rebellious Janissaries. Through the medium of the Spahis the Serbian petition

reached safely Constantinople, and a reply to it came at length in the form of a firman, which enjoined the Dahis to conduct themselves more humanely and "as faithful servants of the Sultan; for, if they did not, an army would be sent against them to compel their obedience—an army of men of a different nation and a different religion, who would treat them as no Turks had ever yet been treated."

The Dahis believed the Serbs to be the proposed instruments of the Sultan's vengeance on them, as Serbian soldiers had been already employed to put down the rebel Pasvan Oglu. They resolved, therefore, to render the threatened enemies innoxious by putting to death at once all the principal men. They sent accordingly commissioned murderers throughout Serbia to kill all mayors of towns or villages, all chiefs of cantons, all priests and monks; in short, every man likely to possess any influence over the people.

The wholesale massacre commenced, but the rumours of the first murders coursed yet more speedily through the land than did the fleet horses of the messengers of death.

Within a few days the most remote nooks of Serbia re-echoed with the tidings that the Dahis had resolved to kill every male Serb older than seven years, and the terrible news met everywhere the same response, "If we must die, at least we will die like men!"

It needed no longer the Sultan's firman to raise the people against the Dahis; the Serbs rose of their own will *en masse*. The extreme of desperation awakened the instinct of self-preservation, and in the presence of death they commenced their resolute struggle for life.

CHAPTER II.

IN the village of Topola, in the Schumadia, in Central Serbia, lived at that time a man named George Petrovics. Tall, stalwart, with a brow on which was legible the resolute, intelligent energy that gained him respect among his people, he was also singularly morose and taciturn. These qualities gained for him, from the Turks, the epithet *Kara George* (Black George), and under this name he belongs to the history of his country and his age.

As a volunteer in the Austrian service, in the last war with Turkey, he had learned something of military discipline, and on his return to Serbia he had succeeded in gaining the goodwill of his countrymen notwithstanding his gloomy and reserved demeanour.

A detachment of Janissaries hurried to Topola to put him to death, but the tidings of their errand had preceded them, and Karageorge, at the head of a small band of peasants hastily collected, repulsed the Turkish soldiers. Then he set fire to the guard-house in the village, and called on the neighbouring Serbs to rise up manfully against their tyrannical oppressors.

At the same time, in the Canton of Valjevo a certain Jacob Nenadovics (whose father, the chief of the Canton, the Turks had recently killed) excited his neighbours

also to take up arms, and thus, in two places at once, the Revolution broke out.

The news of the rising in the Schumadia and the Valjevo Canton convinced the Serbs in other districts that the rumoured Turkish project of extermination was true, and that their only hope of safety was in a general rising up in self-defence.

Some hesitated, fearing that the movement would be considered as a demonstration against the Sultan, but Matfej Nenadovics, the Chief Priest of the Canton Valjevo, whilst buying powder in Austria, met with a Spahi who had been expelled by the Janissaries, and persuaded this man to return with him to Serbia to assure the people that the Sultan had really sent a firman to Karageorge authorising him to fight against the rebellious Janissaries. The Spahi added that the "great Czar, the Sultan," would speedily send Dirvish Beg, the son of Hadgje Mustapha, with soldiers and cannons, to aid the Serbs in putting down the rebels.

The Spahi went about among the people, assuring and encouraging, and thus aided materially the commencing Revolution.

The Turkish guardhouses were everywhere taken possession of, and burnt down, and the guards killed or dispersed.

The Turks resident in the interior of the country hurried for refuge into the cities or fortresses as soon as the news of the "rising of the Rajas" reached their ears. Thus, as if by enchantment, the land seemed cleared of Turks, who had gathered all in the fortified places.

In the commencement of the insurrection the Serbs

chose Karageorge as their leader. He hesitated long before he accepted the honourable but dangerous post offered him by his countrymen, fearing that his passionate and gloomy nature might lead to some dispute with the other Serbian leaders, and thus imperil the safety of the whole people. But the Serbs felt that at such a critical time his stern taciturnity was rather a virtue than a vice, and preferred to act under his command, as he had already led some volunteer detachments in the last war of Austria against the Turks. So Karageorge accepted the leadership and published a proclamation calling on the whole Serbian nation to rise against the Dahis. He rejected decidedly all proposals for peace, although Aganlee, one of the four Dahis, went personally to try to treat with him. Aganlee promised that the Janissaries should hereafter refrain from all acts of tyrannical violence against the Serbs, and that the guardhouses should not be re-erected in the villages. He offered besides to Karageorge personally five hundred purses, together with an estate in Austria, if he would go there to live "after he had quieted the people."

But the Serbs had learned from centuries of suffering what faith might be put in Turkish promises, and were resolved to expulse all Dahis and Janissaries from Serbia before they could consent to be "quieted."

The Revolution began in the first days of February in the year 1804.

By the end of February the Serbs had become bold enough to attack the Turks even in the fortified towns. On the 28th February Karageorge attacked Rudneek, a town in Central Serbia; on the same day Mattej Nena-

dovics took, and burnt down, Valjevo, a town in the north-west. On the same day, also, Jacob Nenadovics defeated a Turkish detachment on the west frontier near the Drina. But after these simultaneous successes the chiefs were compelled to give their attention to other things. The people were without arms, without ammunition, without money, and the leaders themselves had no definite idea of the real strength of the nation. Therefore they looked abroad for foreign aid in their hazardous struggle with their powerful and ancient enemy.

The Chief Priest, Mattej Nenadovics, crossed over to Austria to buy arms and seek counsel from his friends there—some of them being officers in the Austrian service. On their recommendation he wrote a petition to Archduke Charles, and another to the Archbishop of the Hungarian Serbs. Nenadovics, in his petition, laid great stress on the fact that the Turks had sought especially to kill all Serbs who had served as volunteers in the Austrian armies during the war of 1787. He asked Austria to furnish the Serbs with munition and officers. In his simplicity the Chief Priest demanded “at least as many Austrian soldiers to aid his countrymen as Serbians had aided Austria in the war with the Turks.”

Archduke Charles sent an answer to the effect that Austria, being now at peace with Turkey, could not support the Serbs against her, but would, however, do her utmost to reconcile them with their enemies. At the same time the Serbian Archbishop in Hungary sent them the present of an iron cannon; and Priest Nenadovics

engaged a German—who had served somewhere as cannonier and was ready now to become the first artillerist of Serbia.

Karageorge convoked the Skupshtina (National Assembly) in a village a few hours distant from Belgrade. There, arrangements were made for supplying the soldiers with arms and ammunition. Some tradesmen who had commercial intercourse with Austria formed a company for military supplies.

All chiefs commanding Serbian detachments on the Sava and Danube were empowered to make contracts for arms, and to pay either by cash or by bills drawn on Karageorge. During the Skupshtina the Austrian General Gyeney, by the orders of his Government, tried to reconcile the Turks and Serbs, and for that purpose invited (end of April) both Turkish and Serbian leaders to a meeting in Semlin, an Austrian city on the Danube opposite Belgrade.

On this occasion the Serbs defined their demands under the following heads—"That the Dahis should leave Serbia, and the Government be conducted by a Pasha nominated directly by the Sultan: that all the new imposts hitherto levied by the Janissaries should be abolished, and only such taxes be paid hereafter as were fixed by the Sultan's firman of 1793: that courts of justice should be established in all cantons: that the municipalities should choose their own mayors, who should thereupon be confirmed by the Belgrade Vizier: that they (the Serbs) should have perfect liberty in building churches and monasteries: that the people should choose their own chief, through whose hands

should pass all communications between the Sublime Porte and the Serbian nation."

Whilst this conference was meeting in Semlin it was noticed that some houses in the Vrchar quarter of Belgrade were on fire. The Serbian chiefs, concluding that the Turks had aggressed their camps treacherously during their absence, broke up the conference, and thus concluded prematurely the attempt at reconciliation.

CHAPTER III.

WHILST occupied diligently in collecting arms from all quarters and in gathering together as many men as possible, the chiefs sent to Constantinople the same conditions of peace they had prepared for the Semlin conference.

The Turkish Government—seeing that the Serbs had obtained possession of all the principal places of the interior and were on the point of besieging the fortresses of Belgrade and Semendria, and fearing that the news of the Serbian victories would excite the other Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire to revolt—sent Bekir Pasha, Vizier of Bosnia, to Serbia with some 6,000 soldiers to force the belligerents to make peace before affairs assumed generally a yet more threatening aspect.

Bekir Pasha stopped on the left shore of the small river Kolubara, Karageorge being already on the opposite shore with a force about twice as large.

Karageorge sent to demand what were the Pasha's intentions, and Bekir Pasha replied by asking what the Serbs desired. These declared their willingness to remain loyal subjects of the Sultan, but at the same time their determination not to be governed any longer by the Dahis and Janissaries.

The Pasha had previously invited the Dahis to an

interview, but they were afraid to accept the invitation, and, instead of doing so, persuaded the Austrian General in Semlin to attempt once more to bring about a reconciliation between them and the Serbs. This second attempt failed however, because the Serbs demanded that Austria should guarantee the peace, and Austria declined to assume such responsibility. So the Dahis, seeing the threatening aspect affairs were assuming, fled secretly from Belgrade to the island fortress, Ada Kalé.

Bekir Pasha, thus freed from the Dahis, sought immediately to pacify the Serbians. To effect this object he considered it necessary to have Karageorge put to death, but, fortunately for the Serbs, the order was unsuccessful. Baffled in this, he, to reinstate himself in the good opinion of the Serbs, consented to give up to them the Dahis, and wrote an order to this effect to the Commandant of Fort Ada Kalé. Furnished with this, and with the firman which proclaimed the Dahis as insurgents, a party of Serbs obtained entrance into the fort, and, during the night, surrounded the house in which the Dahis had sought refuge. Having shot the rebellious Turks the Serbs cut off their heads and carried them to the Pasha. But with the death of the Dahis the insurrection did not end, neither did the command of the Belgrade fortress fall into the Pasha's hands. The Janissaries still kept possession of it, and Musa Aga (the brother of one of the killed Dahis) made an inroad, at the head of a large number of Bosnian Turks, into the north-west of Serbia in order to avenge his brother's death. He succeeded in taking Schabatz,

but was soon expelled from it and driven across the Drina.

Bekir Pasha seemed to think at first that there was no need to hurry the arrangements with the Serbs; but when the newly-nominated Governor of Belgrade, Suleyman Pasha, began to ally himself with such Turkish citizens as desired peace, Bekir Pasha thought it best to secure for himself the merit of pacifying the country and concluded a treaty on these conditions: That Karageorge, as national chief, should govern the land, and a yearly tribute of half a million piastres be paid to the Porte; that Serbian courts of justice should be established; that no Turks should reside in the Serbian villages; that Turkish taxgatherers should be dismissed, and the taxes collected by the Serbian mayors; that a certain yearly sum or stipendium be paid to the Pasha of Belgrade; that Turks should pay for all wares bought from Serbs in ready money; that the garrison of Belgrade should be half Serbs and half Turks; that Karageorge, for the due maintenance of order, should have a standing guard of five hundred men.

Bekir Pasha forwarded this treaty to Constantinople for confirmation, but recommended a little delay in returning it. Notwithstanding, however, his politic advice, a reply arrived quickly from Constantinople to the effect that all the desires of the Serbs would be complied with, but only on condition that they at once laid down their arms and returned to their homes. The Serbians' response to this stipulation was the closer siege of the Belgrade fortress, which was still in possession of the Janissaries. Bekir Pasha went to pass

the winter in Bosnia without having pacified either Janissaries or Serbs.

During this first year of the Revolution the Serbs took a first step to a nearer relation with Russia. The then Archbishop of the Hungarian Serbs was a certain Stratemerovics, a highly-educated man, who exercised great influence over the Serbians in the Turkish provinces as well as in Austria. From the very commencement of the insurrection he had aided the Serbs, not merely with advice, but with supplies of ammunition and arms. It was surmised that the Austrian Government urged him to use his great authority over the insurgents to induce them to place themselves under its protection; but he considered it against the interests of the Serbians to do this, because none of the promises made to the Hungarian Serbs had been fulfilled, and at this time the Jesuit propaganda was in full activity in Austria. Therefore, instead of urging them to seek Austria's protection, the Archbishop wrote a memorial on the Serbian question, and sent it to the Czar through the confessor of the Grand Duchess Olga, wife of the Palatine Joseph. The views exposed in this memorandum may be considered as those of the leading Hungarian Serbs as well as of the Archbishop; therefore it may be interesting to notice them.

Stratemerovics showed what benefits Russia would derive from the re-establishment of the Serbian State, "her most natural ally," and declared that neither Greeks nor Poles could be so truly the friends of Russia as the Serbs. He showed how salutary would be the liberation of the Serbs from Turkish rule, but did not

think it well that they should be entirely independent. He wished, rather, that they should remain an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire and pay a regular tribute to the Porte, but enjoy at the same time their inner autonomy and have their own ruler. Stratemerovics said the Serbs had been so long under Turkish administration, and were so simple and uncultured, that a republican form of government was unsuitable for them; therefore he preferred the monarchical form, and thought a Russian Grand Duke would be the most fitting ruler (especially as he could govern them through a lieutenant-governor), and only some three or four thousand soldiers would be requisite to keep order in the country. If no Russian Grand Duke would accept the sovereignty of Serbia, the Archbishop recommended the election of some Protestant Prince who would pledge himself to have his children educated in the orthodox confession. He denied that the European equilibrium would be disturbed by such an arrangement, because just in the same degree that Turkey was weakened Serbia would be strengthened, so as to be fully able to replace Turkey in the balance of power in Europe.

This memorandum was taken to St. Petersburg by the Archpriest Samborski, and given to the Minister of the Foreign Office, Prince Adam Czartoriski, who, however, shortly after, gave it back to the priest.

M. Nil Popov seems to have some ground for his assertion that, "knowing well the character of Prince Czartoriski, we are quite justified in believing that he never showed to Czar Alexander the 'Memorandum' of Archbishop Stratemerovics."

Another paper, however, of less diplomatic pretension, found a surer way to the Court of St. Petersburg. During the stay of Bekir Pasha in Serbia, an Austrian Serb named Peter Novakovics came to the Serbian chiefs. Novakovics had been a cavalry officer, and his wife had been lady-in-waiting to the late Grand Duchess Olga. This man showed the Serbian leaders the advantage it would be to them to send to the Czar a deputation that could explain to his Imperial Majesty the present condition and the needs of Serbia. The chiefs accepted the suggestion and wrote a long petition, in which they counted up particularly all the churches and monasteries the Turks had ever demolished in Serbia. They sent this by a secret deputation, which was received in St. Petersburg courteously enough, but Prince Czartoriski declared that Russia could do no more for Serbia than bring her claims and complaints to the knowledge of the Porte. He said frankly that Russia could not violate her treaty with Turkey for the sake of Serbia, and advised them to send their petition to the Sultan.

In consequence of the Prince's declaration, the Serbs wrote another petition to the Porte, repeating most of the points of the former, but, instead of stipulating for the recall of the Dahis, they demanded now the withdrawal of *all* Janissaries and that the Spahis should not return to Serbia, but the taxes due to them be collected by the chiefs and sent to them; and, lastly, that the nation should have freedom of export and import, and pay no customs.

This "petition" was sent to Constantinople by special messengers, and, at first, affairs seemed to go on favour-

ably, as the Porte, disturbed by the insurrection of Ali Pasha of Janina, and the ambitious designs of Mehemet Ali of Egypt, showed an inclination to satisfy the demands of Serbia.

But the emphasis with which the Russian Ambassador supported the Serbian petition was interpreted to the Porte by the French Ambassador as being the result of an understanding betwixt Russia and Serbia, as the latter country could assist the former in the war which was preparing all the more effectually the freer she became.

Pashas and Beys were there, too, in great abundance, to urge the Porte to refuse any concession to the Serbs, and the Ottoman Government concluded by seeking to impose harder conditions than any former ones. Instead of the expected news of peace, the besiegers of Belgrade heard that Bekir Pasha was advancing with a large force from Bosnia, and Hafiz Pasha with an army from Nissa. The Serbs stopped Bekir Pasha's advance by taking up a strong position on the Drina, and gave battle to Hafiz Pasha by Cupria (in September), beating him so thoroughly that he himself remained a prisoner in their hands.

This success had a great moral value. It was the first time that the revolutionary soldiers had encountered the forces of the Sultan. The impulse this victory gave them enabled them to take Semendria, and besiege more hopefully Belgrade. Russia pretends that she sent to Galatz twenty-four ships, containing many cannon and a large quantity of ammunition, for the Serbs, but no one in Serbia heard anything of this valuable present, and, if it was sent, it never reached Serbian hands.

CHAPTER IV.

IN this year, 1804, so propitious to Serbian arms, the Serbs did not confine their activity exclusively to the battlefield. The greater their prospect of being freed from Turkish invaders, the greater need they felt of a national interior organisation. Until now the military chiefs had filled also the offices of judges and police; but it was evident that such a state of things could not be long endured.

The position of Leader Karageorge was also ill defined. He bore the title of Chief Leader; but what was his position with respect to the other chiefs? Was he civil as well as military governor? These questions occupied greatly the Serbs, who—by nature unusually jealous of the advancement of their co-citizens—did not like to leave all civil and military authority in the hands of Karageorge.

The first suggestion of the organisation of a permanent body to take the greater part of the legislative responsibility came from Russia.

The first Serbian deputies sent to St. Petersburg were told that it would be highly beneficial to form a "governing Senate," and, in the National Assembly convoked by Karageorge in 1805, Archpriest Nenadovics introduced a proposition for the institution of a Senate, and Karageorge, with the rest of the Assembly, accepted

the proposal, and left it to the Archpriest to select the senators and be their president.

At first Nenadovics chose only six senators, and the conduct of affairs was divided amongst them. One had the charge of military affairs; another, of the national finances; a third, of church and educational concerns; the fourth, of justice; the fifth, of police; and the sixth, of foreign correspondence. The Senate began its operation by appointing three men in each canton to form a court of justice.

Soon afterwards orders were sent to the Custom officers on the rivers Sava and Danube to send each month to the Senate their accounts and cash. Thus the Senate began to form a States-treasury.

The natural result of the new institution was to lessen the importance of Karageorge and diminish his authority. In many cantons the idea gained ground that the Senate was the governing power of the State, and Karageorge only the Commander-in-chief of the Army.

This was shown clearly when Karageorge convoked the Annual National Assembly. Many division chiefs declined to obey the summons, because they considered the Senate alone had power to convoke the Assembly. Disunion and discord showed themselves, and, in face of the threatened external danger from the Turks, the Serbs could not conceal from themselves that the greater peril of internal discord menaced them also. The Assembly decided that whilst the war lasted the tribute to the Porte should not be paid; that the direct taxes should be paid into the State treasury, not only by the Serbs, but by the Turks residing in Serbia; that a

standing army of 40,000 men should be kept; that desertion and marauding should be punished by death; that the fortress of Belgrade should be more closely invested; that the fortress of Semendria, now in Serbian possession, should be repaired and fortified; and that Karageorge should have illimited powers over the army.

Meanwhile the Serbs sought diligently for alliances and succours abroad. Petitions were sent to Russia and Austria asking for their intervention, but neither Russia nor Austria were able in those days—those of the battle of Austerlitz—to give any aid.

Prince Czartoriski certainly informed the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople that the Serbs were about to send another petition, but he added that he “desired merely to communicate the fact to the Sublime Porte, Russia being as amicably disposed to Turkey as to Serbia.”

It was notorious that Prince Czartoriski only did this much because he feared that the Serbs would appeal to Napoleon for protection if they heard that Russia took no interest at all in their affairs.

M. Popov quotes part of a letter of the Prince, in which he says: “If the Serbs are compelled to choose between ruin and French protection, it is easy to guess which they will choose.”

In 1806 the Serbs, though fighting against the Turks, had as yet no desire for entire separation from the Ottoman Empire, no ambitious dream of a completely independent State.

This may be clearly seen in a letter written in 1807 by Karageorge to the Prince-Bishop of Montenegro. Karageorge invited the Vladika to invade Bosnia, and

thus make a diversion in favour of Serbia, and added that as the Serbs were fighting with rebellious Turks who were in arms against the Sultan they (the Serbs) had a right to expect some favour from the Porte. He wrote as if the Pashas of Vidin and Nissa (with whom he was in conflict the whole year) had not been ordered by the Sultan to act against Serbia, but were merely auxiliaries of the rebel Janissaries who held still the fortress of Belgrade.

The idea that the nation should obtain every internal liberty possible without breaking the external bonds with Constantinople was the basis of all political action during the government of Karageorge, as it was also later under the reign of Milosh Obrenovics I.

Had Karageorge been able to carry out this idea as consequently as did Milosh probably he would himself have founded the new Serbian State, but Karageorge was as weak in the council chamber as he was bold and successful on the battlefield.

Brave and resolute as general, as diplomatist he yielded too readily to the influence of those who understood how to avail themselves of the weak points in his character.

At the close of the year 1806 war was declared between Russia and Turkey, and the Porte, on the advice of the French Ambassador at Constantinople, agreed to fulfil all the demands of the Serbian Government on condition that a few thousand Serbian soldiers were sent to aid in the war against Russia. But, early in the year 1807, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, General Michelson, sent a letter (addressed to

"Karageorge, to all military chiefs, and the Serbian nation in general"), in which he, praising their known courage, invited them to let him know the strength and condition of their armed force, and where it could best effect its junction with the Russian troops. He added that it would be well if they could besiege Vidin—"if you once obtain Vidin, Serbia will be completely independent, and it will be henceforth beneath her dignity to pay any tribute to the Porte," wrote the politic general.

The Serbian leaders did not hesitate about joining their forces with the Russians, but it was difficult to explain to the mass of the people why they were about to fight against the Sultan. The Serbs liked to choose their own chiefs, but they were accustomed to know, over those chiefs, a Czar able to defend them from all external foes.

Therefore the leaders thought it necessary to assure the people that, though they would fight against the Sultan, they would still have the protection of a powerful Sovereign, inasmuch as the great orthodox Russian Czar had undertaken to protect Serbia.

In order to reassure the people the Senate requested that a Russian agent be sent to Serbia. The Turkish agents who had been sent to treat about peace with the Serbs, seeing how much Russia was agitating, pressed more urgently for a decisive answer and for an explanation of the intentions of the Government. They declared that the Porte was willing to accede to all the Serbian demands contained in the petition sent to Constantinople, and that all the dependence of Serbia

on the Porte should consist in the payment of a yearly tribute of 2,500 purses.

But the Senate, influenced by the promises of the Czar, asserted that Serbia was already independent and would no longer pay tribute to Turkey, neither would she take up arms against her Russian allies.

The answer was clear enough; as declared allies of Russia, the Serbians were at open war with the Turks.

Immediately after the departure of the Turkish envoys, the Serbs sent a deputation to the Russian headquarters to explain their wishes to the Commander-in-Chief.

A singular feature in these demands was a request that a Russian official should be sent to preside over the Serbian Senate to aid it in its work of national organisation.

General Michelson recommended his Government to accede to this demand. "It is, without doubt," said he, "of great importance to us to have a man there who can direct the Serbian intelligence for our benefit, and, if the war should be prolonged, the Serbs will prove certainly very needful and efficient allies." But, as the general could not act without the consent of his Government, the fulfilment of the Serbian wish did not come very quickly. However, whilst the affair was in discussion in St. Petersburg, the general, in the name of the Czar, sent to Karageorge a sword bearing the inscription:—"*To the defender of the faith and the fatherland.*" A somewhat similar sword was sent to the Vojvode Milenko, who, with a detachment of Serbs, was moving to join the Russian General, Isayev.

In the meantime their friendship for Russia had involved the Serbs in serious trouble. The Pashas of Bosnia and Vidin received orders to invade Serbia and annihilate the whole Serbian army. Rumours were spread throughout the country that the Turks were ordered to put to death indiscriminately all men, women, and children. To meet the threatened danger the Serbs arose in yet greater force; more than 60,000 men were speedily under arms.

The Bosnians first attacked the Serbs, but were repulsed across the Drina, and followed almost to Sarajevo. As it was apprehended that the Bosnian Rajas would rise in revolt on seeing the success of the Serbian army, the Bosnian Vizier asked succours from the French Marshal, Marmont, then occupying Dalmatia. It is said that the Serbs also sent to Marmont, expressing a hope that he would not permit his troops to aid the Turks against a nation fighting only for its own freedom. Be that as it may, Marmont sent succours to the Vizier to the amount of 3,000 men, and the Serbs were defeated with great loss and pursued across the Drina. There, however, having received reinforcements, they made a stand, and beat the Turkish army so thoroughly that 5,000 men, including some French officers and artillerists, remained on the field.

In the south-east the Serbian troops were also victorious—they repulsed the Turks and invested the fortress of Nissa. In the midst of these successes the Vojvodes began to wonder why the Russian army moved so slowly that it never came to a junction with the Serbian. At length, however, the two forces

united and beat a Turkish detachment of 5,000 men. Much more important events meanwhile had occurred in Belgrade.

In June the Russian Agent, M. Rodophinikin, came to Belgrade, and brought two letters and some 5,000 ducats from the Russian Government. One letter was addressed to the Serbian Senate; the other to Karageorge.

In the letter to the Senate it was stated that M. Rodophinikin was sent to examine the wants and wishes of the Serbs, "to help you to form an administration after your own wish, and to prove that the powerful Ruler of all the Russias has taken you under his protection."

M. Rodophinikin had secret instructions to assure the Serbs that the Czar would use all occasions to help them when once he had proofs of their willingness to conform in all things to the initiative of the Russian Government, "whose exertions tend, as all the world knows, to the general benefit!"

A few weeks after the arrival of the agent, Marquis Paulici came, from the Russian headquarters, to Karageorge, and concluded with him a convention as to the relations of Russia and Serbia. (27th July, 1807.)

The Serbs demanded that they, in the name of Czar Alexander I., should be allowed to organise an administration conformable to their national usages and customs, and requested "that their new State should stand under the protection of the Czar, who would have the nomination of all military and civil officers; who would be pledged to maintain Russian garrisons in the fortresses

on the Sava and Danube; who would see that the Russian governor sent should bring money enough; who would have Serbia supplied with arms and ammunition, and send Russian engineers and physicians to Serbia."

One of the more important stipulations on the part of the Serbs was that the Russian landholding system should not be introduced among them, but the peasants remain free proprietors of the soil.

M. Nil Popov says that the Convention contained also an article expressing the entire devotion of the Serbian nation to the Czar, and its complete confidence in him, and promising that all clauses and conditions he might hereafter see fit to insert in the Convention would be accepted by it. This Convention is a striking evidence of the diplomatic incapacity of Karageorge. Serbia, on the eve of independence, through the weakness and ignorance of her chiefs, was degraded to the condition of a simple Russian province.

CHAPTER V.

HAPPILY, perhaps, for Serbia the fortunes on the battlefield changed, and the enthusiasm of the Vojvodes for Russia was considerably damped by the Peace of Tilsit, in consequence of which an armistice was concluded between the Turks and Russians. It is true that Russia demanded in the treaty that the Turks should cease hostilities on the eastern frontier of Serbia, but she neglected to stipulate anything about the western and southern frontiers. The Russian troops, despite the representations of the Serbians, left Serbia and retired on the Dniester. Turkey collected and concentrated her forces on the south-east of Serbia, and the people became greatly alarmed, more especially when a Turkish flotilla showed itself on the Lower Danube.

Vainly the Senate wrote again and again to the Russian headquarters to demand succours. The people, uncertain as to the relations of their leaders with Russia, became dissatisfied, and compelled the chiefs to convoke a National Assembly.

In this Assembly a peasant came forward and spoke to Karageorge :—" We acknowledge thee for our chief ; —we obey thy orders ; but thou art not our Czar ! We demand to know *who* is our Czar ? for our people are being slaughtered and the Russians are nowhere to be seen ! "

With much difficulty Karageorge succeeded in explaining that the Russians had not abandoned Serbia, though they had retired for the present.

This first experience of the Russian protectorate was hardly one likely to impress favourably the people, however it might be conducive to the private interests of their chiefs. The glittering of a Czar-presented sword, the donation of pictures to churches, the acquisition of long-coveted longed-for private treasures, however attractive to military and priestly leaders, could not reconcile the peasant to the prospect of his smoking homestead and his ravaged and desolated household.

Another incident, in itself insignificant, had some influence over the feeling of the mass of the people towards Russia. The Serbs had suffered much from phanariot Greek priests, and entertained a decided antipathy to Greeks. The Russian Agent was a Greek, his interpreter was a Greek, and, on coming to Belgrade, he kept up continual intercourse with Archbishop Leontius, who was also a Greek, and at that time the most unpopular man in Serbia.

But, notwithstanding his obnoxious nationality, M. Rodophinikin soon obtained a great influence over the Serbian chiefs as well as over the Senate; Karageorge, incapable of any independent policy, surrendered himself unreservedly to the influence of the Russian Agent. He believed thus to advance best his own and the people's interests. In his simple honesty he confided implicitly in M. Rodophinikin's assertion—that "Russia desired only the good of Serbia, and would leave it to

her to choose the means she judged best to obtain her wishes and advance her prosperity."

M. Nil Popov quotes the very words used by Karageorge on the occasion of a visit made by him to the agent :—"The Sultan offered me two hundred thousand piastres only to leave Serbia and go to reside in Austria. I would not accept the offer, because I would not desert my brothers. Afterwards the Sultan offered amnesty and freedom to all Serbs, and a free inner administration, reserving for himself only the suzerainship. You advised me to refuse this, and I have done as you counselled me. Now the whole destiny of Serbia depends on our Czar Alexander, and whatever you order will be fulfilled, but I give you my word that Karageorge will not suffer Turks in this country. Here they can come only across his dead body!"

The Serbs gave shortly other proofs of their reliance on M. Rodophinikin and their devotion to the Czar. The Turks, finding that the discussions over a treaty of peace with Russia made very slow progress, thought it advisable to reconcile themselves with the Serbians. The Porte sent agents to Belgrade to arrange the conditions of peace with Karageorge and the Senate. M. Rodophinikin, however, contrived that only such Serbs as were completely devoted to Russia should come in contact with the Turkish Envoys and that he himself should be invited to assist at the conference.

At that time Russian diplomacy was considerably trammelled by that of France, and M. Rodophinikin advised the Serbs to accept the clemency of the Sultan on condition that the French and Russian Emperors also

guaranteed the peace. The Serbian leaders and the National Assembly (which had been convoked to deliberate over this important question) agreed so unhesitatingly with the counsel of the Russian Agent that he considered the moment propitious for the settlement of other internal affairs. On his advice the Assembly resolved that the administration of the country should be entrusted to a "Senate"; that all Serbia should be divided into cantons; that foreigners could not hold land in Serbia; that Serbia stood under the Russian protectorate; and that her organisation should resemble in a great measure that of Moldavia and Valachia.

What was understood by the last clause, it is difficult to decide—except it meant that Serbia should be a vassal State of the Sultan like the two lands named. But all these decisions neither aided Serbia in her interior consolidation nor increased her exterior security.

On the contrary: with the increase of the influence of the Russian Agent Serbia seemed to grow weaker and weaker.

There were men dissatisfied with the direction which the relations with (or rather *against*) Turkey assumed; there were Vojvodes who desired the continuance of the war with the Sultan, and others discontented with the conduct of Karageorge and the decisions of the Senate.

Foremost amongst the discontents were Jacob Nenadovics (who was, after Karageorge, the most popular and influential Vojvode in Serbia) and Milenko (who had received at the same time as Karageorge the present of a sword from the Czar).

The Vojvodes were especially dissatisfied with the

President of the Senate, whom they charged with extreme stubbornness and rapacity. They upbraided him with enriching himself in irregular ways, at the expense of the nation.

Many people, however, ascribed all the discord and dissatisfaction to Russian influences, and regretted more and more the alliance with Russia. Many Hungarian Serbs, tradesmen who supplied the army, represented how much better it would be to seek Austrian aid.

It was difficult to convince Karageorge of the truth of these assertions, but an occurrence came shortly to disturb his confidence in the St. Petersburg Government.

During the last treaty with Turkey a certain Bishop Axentius came from Vidin to Belgrade, and had, together with Archbishop Leontius, frequent private interviews with M. Rodophinikin. People, who noticed that the agent often visited the archbishop by night and entered by a private door, asked themselves what business "these three Greeks" had to transact together which required such frequent and secret intercourse. Rumours arose that "the three Greeks" were planning the sale of Serbia to Turkey.

In these circumstances Karageorge acceded to the wishes of the Hungarian Serbs, and had a letter written to Archduke Charles exposing the deplorable condition of the Serbians, and demanding that Austria should sell them a certain quantity of arms. Before despatching this letter Karageorge showed it to M. Rodophinikin, who, greatly surprised, tried every way to dissuade him from a step which he stigmatised as "absurd." He represented how greatly it was against the interests of

Austria that Serbia should be a free and independent State. He assured Karageorge that Russia would supply Serbia with all needful arms without payment, and that, therefore, it would be purely throwing money away to buy them from Austria. But this time Karageorge turned a deaf ear to all the eloquence of the agent and the letter was sent to the Archduke, who, fortunately for Russia, answered that Austria could not abandon her neutral policy, but would not, however, prevent the *private* export of arms to Serbia.

To-day it is difficult to trace the windings of the manifold intrigues so rife at that time in Serbia, but it is evident enough that all discords and jealousies amongst the leaders were zealously fomented by Russian promises and Russian gold. So that, with a Turkish army threatening continually the frontiers, Serbia could not consolidate and nurse her strength.

M. Rodophinikin sought constantly secret interviews with Karageorge, and contrived to fill the simple honest soul of the brave soldier with suspicions. The first meetings were in the house of Chardakli (he who had urged the Serbs to seek Russian protection); but afterwards the agent invited the teacher of Karageorge's son to reside in his house, and in this way found frequent opportunities to see the First Chief without exciting remark.

Mladen, the President of the Senate, had been elected to his high post chiefly through the influence of the Russian Agent; but the latter, notwithstanding this, began soon to excite Karageorge against him. In truth, this Mladen was a rapacious rich man—very unpopular

among the people, although he had, thanks to his gold, devoted partisans enough.

Prince Prozorovski wrote to Karageorge, warning him against "some wicked men he had about him, who sought only their own advancement;" and a Committee, formed to restore estates to such Turks as had embraced Christianity, discovered that Mladen and another senator had taken possession of some of these lands for themselves or their friends. Karageorge in great indignation ordered all the lands to be restored directly to the Turks, their former owners.

Thus commenced a conflict betwixt the Serbian Leader and the President of the Senate. Mladen, together with some senators, his friends, sent a formal complaint against Karageorge to the Russian Agent, who thereupon assumed the rôle of mediator.

Rumours were rife that the Chief Leader desired the ruin of the President, and that the President was at the head of a conspiracy against the life of the Chief Leader.

It is a fact that Mladen and his colleagues wrote to Prince Prozorovski demanding the removal of Karageorge from the head of the Government. It may be too bold an assertion to say *all* these intrigues had their beginning in the house of the Russian Agent, nevertheless this was at the time the general impression in Serbia. Prince Prozorovski wrote to Mladen advising him to work harmoniously with Karageorge, and showing him how badly a State must be governed where the chiefs of the executive and legislative powers are opponents.

Austria evinced some unquietness at this time at the

great influence Russia exercised in Serbia, and Karageorge often received letters showing the great advantages he would derive from Austrian protection. Under the pretext of arranging commercial treaties between the two countries, the Austrian General, Sipchen, met Karageorge, and tried to find out the exact mission of M. Rodophinikin. As Karageorge gave evasive answers the general spoke more openly, and proposed that Serbia should come under Austrian protection. He represented how insufficient the protection of Russia must be, owing to the distance of that country from Serbia. About this time Archduke Louis chanced to visit Semlin, and during his stay there a commission was appointed to discuss a treaty with Serbia. This commission declared that Austria would recognise Karageorge as Prince, and give Mladen, the President of the Senate, the title of Count; and that even Archduke Charles would come himself, with all needful supplies, and free Serbia. But the Serbs must first formally demand Austrian protection.

M. Rodophinikin, who was aware of all these movements, wrote an answer, in the name of Karageorge and the Senate, declaring that the Serbs were greatly surprised to receive such a proposition; that they, who had fought till now for their national freedom, could not consent to fall under the rule of Austria; and that, even if they would consent, such a treaty could not be entered into without the consent of the Russian and French Emperors.

Evidently this affair affected Russia unpleasantly, for she demanded explanations in Vienna. The Austrian

Government professed ignorance of the whole thing, and said it was probably the work of some petty generals on the frontier. The excitement the business created in Russia is clearly to be seen from a dispatch of Prince Prozorovski to Count Roumyanzoff, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna. The passage in question runs thus: "I find the conduct of Austria disgusting, and her cunning cowardly; and I cannot help concluding that the Vienna Cabinet intends to draw us into a conflict with Turkey, and perhaps also with France. Austria may succeed in persuading the one and the other that our intention is to annex Serbia, if not worse. The pretext that our protectorate of Serbia makes her virtually a Russian province is such an evident fallacy that it does not need refuting."

After gaining this advantage over Austria, M. Rodophinikin gained another yet over Turkish diplomacy. The Turks sought to divide the Russian and Serbian Governments, so as to make peace with only one of them.

In October of the year 1807 the Turkish and Serbian plenipotentiaries met, and with the latter came M. Rodophinikin in disguise. The Turks declared that the Serbs, if they stood alone, would gain terms ten times more advantageous in treating with the Porte; but if, after all, they desired a foreign guarantee, they should allow the Porte to choose betwixt France and Russia. But the Serbs, on the suggestion of M. Rodophinikin, broke off suddenly the conference with the declaration that they could not treat for peace without the permission of the Czar, and that they would anyway need guarantees, and, as such, preferred the Russian and French Emperors.

CHAPTER VI.

THE armistice lasted through the winter (1807-8), and all this time the Russians were busily occupied with the question how the Serbian Government should be organised.

The correspondence between Prince Prozorovski and M. Rodophinikin on this subject is highly interesting.

Prince Prozorovski declared it was impossible for Russia to annex Serbia since she lay on the right shore of the Danube, and it was his opinion she ought to be free from the Turks, and have her own ruler under a Russian protectorate. But he asserted it to be an utter impossibility to restore the Serbian State to its former power and reinstate its ancient boundaries.

M. Rodophinikin's "Memoir on the Serbian Question" contained a clause to this effect: the political and commercial agents of no foreign Power besides Russia should be permitted in Serbia. He supported this peculiar opinion by saying "that all foreign agents could work against Russian purposes." On this proposition Prince Prozorovski made the following remark: "If we acknowledge Serbia as an independent State, I do not see how we can prohibit her receiving foreign agents. But it seems to me we could thus arrange the matter, that no agents should be received without the

consent of the Russian Imperial Court, under whose protectorate Serbia stands."

On the article of M. Rodophinikin's Memoir, wherein he says, "It is natural for Austria to combat Russian influence in Serbia," Prozorovski remarked: "It is very important that Russian influence in Serbia should take deep root and be strengthened; it would be useful especially in the event of war between Russia and Austria, as it would serve as a restriction on the latter State, and even might prevent her declaring war. Turkey will then be, so to speak, under the administration of the Russian Court."

Whilst recognising the necessity of Serbia having her own ruler, M. Rodophinikin could not decide whether it would be better that the ruler be hereditary or elective. Prozorovski proved very clearly that it was needful the ruler should be hereditary, because by the election of the ruler there would be always an open door for the influence of other European Courts on Serbia. But in order that the powers of the ruler might be limited, and that he might be restrained from acting injurious to the interests of Russia, Prozorovski found it needful that the presidency of the Senate should be invested in the Serbian Prince and the Russian Consul.

Prince Prozorovski and M. Rodophinikin agreed, however, in the opinion that Russia should not mix herself in the interior administration of Serbia.

We are bound to add, that Czar Alexander (at least after M. Nil Popov's assertion) declared that it was not to be expected that the Serbian Senate would consent

to the presidency of the Russian Agent. This assertion is probable, for if M. Rodophinikin could deceive himself about the impression his presidency of the Serbian Senate would make in Europe, the St. Petersburg statesmen could scarcely entertain any illusion on the subject.

Whilst the Russian diplomatists were thus occupied with debates on the organisation of the Serbian Government, the discord betwixt the Serbian chiefs assumed each day a more threatening character. The aspect of things must have been gloomy enough when Rodophinikin found it necessary that Karageorge should go to pass some months in the Russian headquarters, and that Mladen, the Senate President, and Miloje, one of the more influential senators, should be banished from Serbia.

These projects were conducted very secretly by M. Rodophinikin, but somehow Mladen got wind of them, and managed to excite Karageorge's anger so greatly against the agent, that he ordered the arrest of his confidential friend, Archbishop Leontius, and directed the Senate to investigate his late proceedings. At the same time, the First Chief and the Senate sent a representative hostile to the agent to St. Petersburg. Prince Prozorovski did not, however, permit the Serbian deputation to reach its destination.

It would be doing an injustice to Serbia to overlook the attention she bestowed, in the midst of these external and internal struggles of 1807, on the momentous question of national education.

It is true the Serbs could not appreciate education in

its highest sense, but they had sensibly felt all through their long struggle for independence the misfortune of having so very small a number of even indifferently educated men. Arms and ammunition could be bought, brave men were always there ready to die for their country, but Serbia possessed very few men indeed capable of organising a Government, or filling the position of diplomatic agents at foreign Courts.

The number of Serbs who could read and write was extremely small.

It was almost an absurd thing for the Government to decree, as it did under Rodophinikin's influence, that only men who could write should be eligible for higher State offices, seeing that more than twenty years later the majority of the most important positions in the Government were occupied by men who could hardly sign their names.

This need of "writing" men was most felt when the first general census was undertaken in 1807. It is scarcely necessary to say this census was made very imperfectly indeed.

This glaring practical want, as much as the influence of Obradovics (who was not only the "most learned Serb," but a really educated man), decided the Senate on founding the first Serbian schools—the High School in Belgrade and some lower schools in various other cities or towns.

Almost all the men who played a *role* of any importance in Serbia from 1820 to 1850 were scholars in the first Belgrade High School.

Besides giving this attention to education, the Senate

tried to promote commerce, and reopened some mines, more particularly those of copper and lead.

With respect to trade, there remain statistical data from which the conclusion may be drawn that the export of Serbia represented the value of £170,000 and the import only £32,000. But, of course, the difference of this balance is to be covered by what the Serbs paid for arms, ammunition, and other military requisites which were incessantly although secretly imported from Austria.

CHAPTER VII.

WITH the beginning of the year 1809 hostilities recommenced.

Early in the spring Prince Prozorovski announced to the Serbian Senate that the Russian army was about to cross the Danube, and that one of its divisions would try to reach Serbia by Vidin.

In the middle of April the Serbs attacked the Turkish army, which had taken position on their southern frontier, and beat it, driving it back to the fortress of Nissa, which they prepared to besiege; but the Turks went round them, crossed the frontier, and advanced on Deligrad, a fortified position from which the Serbs many times already had repulsed them.

At the same time 10,000 Albanians passed the southwest frontier of Serbia, and Ibrahim Pasha of Bosnia invaded it on the west with a force of 12,000 men. The Serbs fought bravely by Deligrad, repulsing the Turkish stormers repeatedly. After having thoroughly beaten the Bosnian army and driven it back across the Drina (end of July), they collected the largest force they could in the neighbourhood of Cupria and resolved to give battle there to the Turkish main army, which was advancing toward the heart of Serbia. The battleground chosen is a great plain. The Serbian army consisted almost entirely of infantry, but the Turks had a large

number of good cavalry and their artillery was commanded by English officers.

The Serbs lost the battle (13th August) notwithstanding most desperate fighting, and during the night retreated across the Morava towards the interior of the country. Then the Turks returned with full force against Deligrad, where but a handful of Serbs had remained as garrison.

Eight full days the Turks stormed—eight full days the Serbs defended themselves heroically; not until the last Serb and the rampart fell did the Turks go in to occupy the place. During these eight days before Deligrad some 7,000 Turks were slain.

The Serbs were proud of the heroic resistance of the small garrison, but they had so often succeeded in repulsing the Turkish attacks on Deligrad that the news of its fall produced great consternation.

Many families went over immediately to Austria. All the East of Serbia was open to the Turks after the fall of Deligrad and the defeat of Cupria, and the inhabitants of these districts hurried in crowds to Belgrade, carrying alarm into the West. In truth, the situation of Serbia at this moment was exceedingly critical, and Karageorge sent letter after letter to the Russian headquarters, entreating that an army be sent across the Danube to threaten the Turks and force them to retreat. But promptitude and energy were qualities not to be found at this time in the Russian headquarters. Prince Prozorovski had died suddenly, and the commanders-in-chief were being constantly changed.

In these disheartening circumstances and amidst the

general panic which had seized Belgrade, M. Rodophinikin thought it prudent to leave the country. Even if he had carried out this decision in an open and dignified manner his departure at such a time would still have alarmed the Serbians; but the peculiar way in which he chose to depart heightened indescribably their dismay.

One evening M. Rodophinikin invited Archbishop Leontius and a few influential Senators and Vojvodes to make a short promenade with him in the neighbourhood of the city. With these persons he walked on the shore of the Danube, and suddenly, as if urged by a momentary caprice, proposed that they should take a row on the river. They all took their places accordingly in a large boat, and when they were in the middle of the stream the agent's secretary ordered the rowers to cross over to Panscova, a city on the Hungarian shore.

Then M. Rodophinikin declared to his companions that Serbia was in the greatest peril, and that within two weeks the Turks would be in Belgrade. He consoled the Senators, who lamented that they had left their houses without making the slightest preparation for the security of their property, with the assurance that the Czar would amply compensate them for any losses they might sustain.

The news that M. Rodophinikin had, so to say, run away from Serbia produced a great sensation. The people hurried more than ever to get their families safe in Austrian territory.

Karageorge, hearing of the chaos in Belgrade, came there quickly and had great trouble to stop the mass

emigration of the citizens. The Serbian leader, freed from the pernicious influence of the Russian Agent and indignant at his cowardly desertion, displayed again all his ancient energy, and established his authority as First Chief of the nation. He issued a proclamation to the effect that the peril was by no means so great and imminent as it appeared ; that the Turks, who had failed to conquer Serbia in spring and summer, could certainly not conquer it in autumn with a winter campaign before them.

The calming effect of the proclamation was greatly aided by the news that the Russians had crossed the Danube, and that the Turks were concentrating their chief forces in Bulgaria. A considerable number of Turkish soldiers remained still in Serbia—but their movements were paralysed by the uncertainty of the fortune of war in Bulgaria.

M. Rodophinikin could scarcely justify his flight by the Turkish successes, so he declared to his Government that the discords amongst the Serbian chiefs were absolutely unbearable, and that no one in Serbia heeded his counsels any longer. Parties opposed to Russian influence assured Karageorge that the agent charged him with intriguing against his life, and letters sent to Belgrade from Archbishop Leontius seemed to corroborate this assertion.

The Archbishop wrote, from the Russian headquarters, that the Serbs would receive no succours from Russia so long as Karageorge remained their First Chief.

The continued dissensions of the Serbian leaders gave new nourishment to the rumours of the conspiracy against M. Rodophinikin's life.

Mladen's opponents spread diligently the news that the Czar would have sent succours if the Senate-President, in his ambitious desire to govern without foreign interference, had not excited Karageorge against the agent.

The leader of the Russian party was the venerable old chief, Jacob Nenadovics, who declared to Karageorge that *he* could no longer keep his stand against the Bosnian invasion, and begged therefore that Mladen, or some one able to help himself without Russian aid, should be sent to take his place.

This party soon obtained the supremacy, and forced Karageorge to remove Mladen from the Senate and nominate Jacob Nenadovics in his stead. A new deputation was sent at once to Russian headquarters to demand that troops be sent to Serbia. As the chief of this deputation Milan Obrenovics, Vojvode of Rudneek, was appointed, and one of the deputies chosen was Milenko, Vojvode of East Serbia. This Milenko (who, it will be remembered, received a sword from the Czar at the same time as Karageorge) declared that he knew nothing either of Karageorge or the Senate; that he had up till now been fighting against the Turks on his own account, and that he would send his own secretary to Russian headquarters to request succours.

M. Rodophinikin and Archbishop Leontius prepared a very cool reception for the Serbian deputies, and even succeeded in convincing the chief of the deputation, Milan Obrenovics, that he ought to leave the party of Karageorge. When the news of Milan's abandonment reached Karageorge he sent another agent to Bucharest. But had the Russian Commander-in-Chief

not been changed, probably the new agent would have done as little as the old.

Count Kamenski, the new Russian Commander, saw that the divisions among the Serbian chiefs quite paralysed their action against the common enemy. He wrote accordingly a friendly letter to Karageorge, the "Chief of the Serbian Nation," and sent Rodophinikin away from headquarters. Some of the deputies returned to Serbia, but Milan Obrenovics remained to accompany the movements of the Russian army.

The spring of 1810 advanced, hostilities were about to recommence, and yet the Serbs saw no signs of immediate aid arriving from Russia. In these circumstances the Austrian party gained ground, and Karageorge, with the consent of the Senate, sent again to Vienna to ask succours.

When the Russians heard this they sent at once a detachment of troops to Serbia. The chief of the detachment, General Isayev, wrote, whilst still in Valachia, to the Senate reproaching it for not sending earlier the Serbian army to join him.

This letter impressed the Senate so much that they would have hurriedly sent an army to meet the Russians, but Karageorge insisted on waiting until an answer arrived from Vienna, and could not conceal his disappointment when the envoy returned with the response that Austria could do no more than offer friendly counsels and—a single staff officer!

Nothing remained, therefore, but to make the best possible use of the "protectorate" of the Czar. Of course the Russians were not pleased with this coquetting

with the Vienna Cabinet, as it showed clearly how little real root Russian influence had taken in Serbia.

Count Kamenski thought it necessary to write a long letter to the Senate, exposing in detail all the good offices Russia had done to Serbia during the last three years; he added that the Serbs must not forget these benefits, for only through keeping them in grateful remembrance could Serbia hope to achieve her independence. He recognised Karageorge as ruler, and concluded by the words:—"Russia expects that the Serbs will give her considerable aid in the coming struggle. If they do not, a sad fate awaits Serbia; therefore the Senate must explain itself explicitly."

The result of the refusal from Austria and the reminder from Russia was a resolution of the Senate (taken after some discussion), that hereafter only Russian protection should be sought, and the Serbian forces should support the Russian army during the war.

In June the Russian and Serbian troops took some fortified places in Serbia which the Turks had occupied the last year. But they could not take proper advantage of these successes, because the chief strength of Serbia was directed against Rechid Pasha in the south, and one division encamped on the Drina ready to repel any Bosnian invasion. The Bosnians, who had boasted so much of their intention to occupy Serbia, were long enough before they sought to realise their threats, and it was currently believed that they delayed because they feared a coalition of French and Austrian troops in favour of Serbia. In this case the reports of Karageorge's letter to Vienna, and of a deputation sent to Marshal Marmont

in Dalmatia to express their friendly disposition to the French Emperor, did the Serbs good service. The Bosnians believed the French and Austrians would immediately invade Bosnia if they invaded Serbia, and so the movements of the Bosnian army were arrested until an order came from Constantinople to the Vizier to proclaim throughout Bosnia that the Sultan was in friendly relations with the French and Austrian Emperors, and that every one who hesitated to fulfil the Sultan's commands would be severely punished.

Thereupon the Vizier advanced to the Drina, but no further. He contented himself with preventing the Serbs from concentrating their forces on the eastern battlefield. Meanwhile the hostilities continued, and the Serbs, aided by Russian troops, gained some important victories, especially one by Loznitza, where a Turkish force of 30,000 men was signally defeated on the 6th October.

On this occasion the Serbs were supported by a detachment of Cossacks. These victories and the presence of Russian soldiers in Serbia, strengthened very much the influence of the Russian party, and Karageorge saw his own decrease in equal ratio; many chiefs of more or less importance became alienated from him and joined the ranks of his opponents. He saw no hope of aid except from Russia, and yet he believed her dealings with him were disloyal in the extreme.

Milan Obrenovics, formerly the intimate friend of Karageorge, came back from his long stay in the Russian camp his open and declared antagonist, and commenced at once to agitate against him. A complaint was made out against Karageorge, and subscribed by

Jacob Nenadovics, Milenko, and other prominent partisans of Russia. These Vojvodes avowed openly their desire to see a great number of Russians in Serbia in order to lessen the importance of Karageorge. The majority in the Senate resolved to send an address to St. Petersburg, thanking for the succours sent during the year, and praying that some Russian detachments should remain always in the country.

Karageorge opposed very much the last clause in the address, but remained in the minority, and the Senate was so confident that its petition would be complied with that it ordered at once quarters to be prepared for the expected troops.

Mladen learned through the secretary of Milan Obrenovics the intrigues against Karageorge and himself, and warned the First Chief against them.

This secretary was ordered to follow Milan to Bucharest, and a few days after his arrival there, Milan died suddenly. The enemies of the First Chief and of Mladen declared that Milan had been poisoned by their order, but it is difficult to believe a man of Karageorge's character would stoop to so vile and cowardly a method of freeing himself from an enemy. Mladen's character, however, was not such as to repel the suspicion with equal promptitude; and at this time Mladen stood by the side of Karageorge as his evil genius. At all events, the sudden and mysterious death of Milan cast a dark shadow over the Serbian nation, and from that moment began the fatal conflict betwixt the families of Karageorge and Obrenovics.

Mladen's position not being at all improved by

Milan's death, he planned a sort of *coup d'état*. He proposed to detach all the more influential Vojvodes from the nation by bringing them into the Senate, and the men who should supply their places were no longer to be called Vojvodes, but were to be all equal and receive their orders only from the First Chief, the Senate, or the Commander appointed by the First Chief and Senate. Any one who refused to consent to these arrangements should be ordered to leave the country. As it was resolved to bring these propositions before the National Assembly, the opponents of Karageorge pressed much that the Russian troops should take up their quarters in Belgrade before the meeting of the Assembly. The troops were, however, prevented by the snows and frosts from arriving in season, and the Assembly accepted the propositions of Karageorge. Three of the chief Vojvodes, whose position was more closely affected by the measure, did not even come to the Assembly, and of those present three only opposed it.

Among these three stood Milosh Obrenovics.

After the Assembly was dismissed the Russian troops arrived, and with them two resolute opponents of Karageorge, Vojvodes Milenko and Peter Debrnats.

Karageorge would not allow the Russian detachment to occupy the fortress, but permitted them to be quartered in the city. As the simple presence of these soldiers could not abrogate the decisions of the National Assembly, Jacob Nenadovics accepted the post of Minister, and reconciled himself with Karageorge and Mladen.

The First Chief succeeded in conciliating the greater number of his opponents, but Milenko and Peter Debrnats demanded to retain their former rank of Vojvodes, or else be permitted to return to their homes, and, as these requests could not be granted, they were exiled.

The contest concluded with the strengthening and re-establishment of Karageorge's influence, and he was now (in 1811) the actual chief of the new State. He had a council of six ministers, and the Senate formed a Supreme Court of Justice. The administration of the country had made thus a great step forward to centralisation.

But one important disadvantage of the new measure soon showed itself. The most experienced Vojvodes had been withdrawn from their old commands to take their new places in the Legislative Body sitting in Belgrade; and thus the guardianship of the frontiers was entrusted to inexperienced, and, in many instances, unpopular men.

Happily the Turks, occupied by the Russian army, did not attack the Serbs during the years 1811-12.

A formal armistice betwixt Turks and Serbs did not exist, but an armistice *de facto* did. Indeed, there were rumours that the Porte was about to propose a treaty of peace to the Senate, and the military chiefs on the frontiers were accordingly directed to declare that they could give no assurance of Serbia's intentions until they received instructions from Karageorge, who would himself have first to consult the "Great Alexander" on the subject.

But the victory of Kutuzov over the army of the Grand Vizier changed quite the aspect of affairs.

In Bucharest peace conferences began to be held, and Karageorge, in order to remind the Russian Government of the obligations to Serbia, and of the duty which therefore devolved upon it to regard also her interests in the proposed treaty, informed it of the conditions formally proposed to him by the Porte. Turkey had offered Serbia a position similar to that of Valachia and Moldavia, and proposed to acknowledge Karageorge as Prince of Serbia.

Karageorge declared emphatically that he had rejected these tempting offers, simply because he would not make peace independently of Russia, and therefore it was now Russia's duty to remember Serbia when she dictated peace to Turkey.

From the tone of this letter it is evident that Karageorge had a sinister foreboding how little account would be made in Bucharest of the true interests of Serbia. What Russia really did to secure the welfare of her faithful ally may be seen from the eighth article of the Treaty of Bucharest (28th May, 1812), which reads thus: "Though there is no doubt of the benevolent and magnanimous dispositions of the Sublime Porte with respect to Serbia—a nation from old time subject to Turkey, and paying tribute to her—yet, taking into consideration the participation of the Serbs in the last war, it has been found needful to lay down special conditions for their security. Consequently, the Sublime Porte will pledge itself to pardon the Serbs, and give them a general amnesty for all past acts against her. If the

Serbs have constructed fortresses in their land during the last war in places where formerly there were none, these fortresses must be demolished as superfluous, and the Sublime Porte will occupy all fortresses and fortified places where were formerly stationed cannon, ammunition, and other military requisites ; and in these places she will leave such garrisons she herself deems advisable. But these garrisons will not limit any rights of the Serbs as subjects. The Sublime Porte, moved by sentiments of compassion, will take such measures as she, in conjunction with the Serbs, thinks needful for the security of the Serbian nation, and grants them on their petition such alleviations as she has granted her subjects in the archipelago and other places, and will so work that they may feel her magnanimity. She will allow them an independent internal administration, but fix herself the amount of tribute she is to receive from Serbia. All this the Sublime Porte will arrange with the Serbian nation."

The Serbs longed heartily for peace, but *such* a peace did not in any way answer their expectations. After fighting and struggling through nine long years of hardship and privation to free their country from Turkish invaders, after so much bloodshed in order to obtain possession of the fortresses, after so many victories, and whilst just tasting something of the sweets of independence, must they again accept the position of a tributary Turkish province ? Worse still, must all their fortified places be given up again to the Turks ?

What dismayed the Serbs more especially, was the

fact that the advantages gained by the Turks were defined so precisely, whilst their own were left involved in a vague indefiniteness that was justly alarming. The Sultan's *clemency* (?) was promised them; and, as a pledge of this "clemency, an autonomy as in the archipelago, and *other places*!" And even this was to be decided hereafter betwixt themselves and the Turks!

This last clause was a double-edged blade which the Turks knew how to wield to their own advantage to the cost of Serbia. The proclamation in which Karageorge announced to the people the conclusion of the peace showed clearly the uneasiness and want of confidence of the Serbian chiefs, for it directed that the army should *not* be dismissed until the return of the two deputations sent: one to "the Protector who has cared for us until now, and now therefore will not desert us;" and the other to Constantinople to "bring a clear definition of our future position," to quote the words of the proclamation.

All the late prospects of an improved position of Serbia seemed done away by Napoleon's Russian campaign. The French Ambassador in Constantinople urged the Porte to break the treaty of peace with Russia. The Porte was unwilling to do this, but she knew very well that she could now construe as she pleased the Article VIII. of the Bucharest Treaty with regard to Serbia. Therefore she newly appointed Grand Vizier abruptly declared to the Serbian deputies that he had no intention to *treat* with the Serbs, but that they must instantly, without any delay, give up their arms, and be satisfied with such conditions as Russia had made for

them. On the ground of the very same article of the Treaty by which the Serbs were claiming additional rights, the Grand Vizier demanded that they should trust themselves completely to the CLEMENCY of the Sublime Porte, and give up not only their fortified places, but also their arms!

Such was the marvellous elasticity of the Article No. VIII. of the Treaty of Bucharest!

The Serbs, finding themselves abandoned to their own resources, and seeing the Turkish forces closing on their frontiers, declared that they were willing to submit upon two conditions: that they might retain their firearms, and that the Spahis, who more than nine years ago had been expelled from Serbia, should not return.

But the Porte would not hear of any conditions, so nothing remained to the Serbs except to submit themselves to the long-proved "*clemency*" of the Turks, or to fight to the last.

Naturally, after their experience of Turkish mercies, they decided on the latter alternative.

CHAPTER VIII.

IN the spring of 1813, the National Assembly prepared a plan of defence. The Archbishop ordered public prayers for the success of the Serbian arms, and Karageorge gave out a proclamation in which he says : " The Turks are trampling upon the treaty of peace made with the Protector of Serbia, and wish not only to take the cities and fortresses, but even to exterminate the nation by killing the males from seven years old and upward, converting the women to Islamism, and colonising the Serbian lands with a different people."

Karageorge encouraged the people by comparing their present condition to that in which they were before the outbreak of the revolution, and asserted that they were in a position to fight with the Turks yet full two years.

Still the Serbian army looked with gloomy forebodings to the prospect of meeting alone the whole Turkish forces which had been contending a few months back with the Russians. The moral tone of the soldiers was not heightened by the fact that young chiefs were now in command of all important positions.

Serbia had never been in a more critical position. Ali Pasha was marching from Nissa with 60,000 men ; the Pasha of Vidin was approaching the eastern frontier with a force estimated at another 60,000 ; and the Vizier of Bosnia was at the head of 130,000. Probably these

estimates were overrated, but it was notorious that the Porte had been concentrating her forces lately in the north-west provinces, in order to be ready should she find it profitable to listen to the suggestions of the French Ambassador, and make a diversion in favour of Napoleon by attacking Austria.

Whether the estimated strength of the Turkish forces was overrated or not, there could be no question of its great superiority in numbers to that of Serbia.

The Serbs lost battle after battle, and the depression which followed naturally the repeated defeats was deepened by the fact that Karageorge for two full weeks was nowhere to be seen among his soldiers. He was lying sick and almost alone in his native village of Topola; all reserves having been sent to the battlefield. When only a little recovered, he was hurrying to join his troops, by the route of Schabatz, when news reached him that the little eastern army was in extreme peril. Returning quickly to encourage these soldiers, he was met by the tidings of the total defeat of the different Serbian detachments and their retreat everywhere before the enemy. He encountered crowds of fugitives hurrying to the Sava and Danube, and all his exertions to arrest them were unavailing.

The southern army under the command of Mladen was thoroughly defeated and scattered. The inhabitants of the neighbourhoods nearer Austria crossed the rivers in wild panic, and those of the interior concealed themselves in the mountains and forests.

Karageorge, conjointly with the Senate—on the advice of the Russian Agent, M. Nedoba—wrote a petition to

the Grand Vizier, begging for an armistice of six weeks in order to prepare new proposals for their submission. But the Grand Vizier would not hear of any armistice, and advanced all ways.

Meanwhile the news reached Karageorge in Belgrade that the last rampart on the Morava had fallen, and that the forces which had defended it had been completely routed and destroyed. Karageorge, without army, without any prospect of succour, had not even soldiers enough remaining to defend the fortress of Belgrade. True, Milosh Obrenovics, with a force of 2,000 men, was hurrying from Schabatz to Belgrade, but the Turks with their good cavalry arrived before him, and finding the fortress empty occupied it.

On the 4th December, just two days before the Turks reached Belgrade, Karageorge, with the Russian Agent, M. Nedoba, crossed over the Sava to Austria, and the Senate followed quickly in their steps, leaving the nation without a leader and the country without a government. Thus the Turks were left absolute masters of Serbia.

After Karageorge's flight the position of the Serbs was worse than it had been even after the fatal field of Kossovo. The victory of Kossovo cost the Turks dear, and Bajaret with an exhausted army dared not go immediately to occupy a State which had existed so many centuries. At the time Karageorge crossed the Sava, leaving the discouraged soldiers without commander and the terrified people without a chief, the Turkish army was passing triumphantly over Serbia taking ample revenge on the Rajahs for the nine years during which they had stood up against them.

Intoxicated with victory, the Sultan's troops came not to subdue a revolted people, but to exterminate them.

A few miles in advance of the bloodthirsty conquerors crowds of horrorstruck fugitives were rushing towards the shores of the Sava and Danube, and thick clouds of smoke and flame marked the route taken by the enemy.

Ruins and heaps of dead remained to bear witness where the Mussulman soldiers had passed by.

Once more could be read legibly in blood-red characters the ancient legend:

“Where a Turk passes no grass grows.”

BOOK SECOND.



MILOSH OBRENOVICS.

BOOK II.

MILOSH OBRENOVICS.

CHAPTER I.

IN the midst of this "Reign of Terror" happily *one* Serbian chief believed that flight at this moment was but a coward's policy. In the wild whirl of the universal panic *one* man remained cool enough to comprehend the real condition of affairs, and courageous enough to carry out the suggestions of his prudence and patriotism.

When the terrorstruck Serbian leaders collected themselves on Austrian territory they found that one of their number failed them.

MILOSH OBRENOVICS *had not deserted his country in her darkest hour.*

It would be difficult to realise the feelings of the runaway Vojvodes when they found one of their comrades missing. It is a fact that they sent the old chief Jacob Nenadovics to bring Milosh over to them.

Milosh, however, answered all the representations of Nenadovics as to the risk he ran by remaining, with the simply noble words:

"I will not desert the nation. How can I go away

and leave my wife and children to be sold by the Turks?"

So he remained, and from that time was the actual chief of the nation.

The Serbs (after they had recovered from the first panic and recognised the impossibility of flight now that the Turks had occupied all the ferries and crossings of the rivers) looked gratefully and trustfully for counsel to the single leader who had scorned to desert them in their hour of peril.

The Grand Vizier was also impressed with the conduct of Milosh, especially when he calmly laid down his arms and declared that the nation would return to its allegiance to the Sultan.

The Grand Vizier needed a man able, by his authority and influence, to aid him in quieting down the excited people and restoring something of order among them. Milosh accepted gladly the *rôle* of mediator, and persuaded all the inferior military chiefs to lay down their arms.

The Grand Vizier soon afterwards left the country, leaving the government in the hands of Suleyman Pasha, by birth a Bosnian and a man of very cruel character.

Milosh's influence with the new Pasha, as well as with the nation at large, grew day by day.

Acting as mediator betwixt the grasping Governor and the suffering people, he redeemed many times Serbian prisoners from the Turks; an act regarded by the Serbian peasants as one peculiarly expiatory and soul-saving.

Suleyman Pasha was a man of extremely luxurious habits, and he was in continual need of money to support his lavish expenditure.

Milosh found means to supply him with the sums he needed, and thus contrived to obtain more concessions for Serbia with gold than he could have done with iron and blood.

All his life Milosh Obrenovics was distinguished by a sort of innate perception of the characters of those with whom he associated, and in his first interview with Suleyman Pasha he had tact enough to touch directly the susceptible part of his character.

The Pasha was exhibiting Milosh to his suite, and, in order to contrast more distinctly his present docile and respectful bearing with his bravery on the battlefield, exclaimed, "Look at him ! How quiet he is now ! And how many times have I been compelled to retreat before him on the field of battle ; and once even he wounded me !" Thereupon Suleyman Pasha showed a wound he had received in one of the late engagements.

Milosh, not in the least confused, said in a tone of quiet approval, "If I have wounded the arm I will make a golden one !"

From that time Milosh stood well with the Turkish leader, who had a great respect for one so sure of being able to replace wounded arms of flesh with good golden ones.

In the Belgrade fortress, however, there were Turks who doubted greatly Milosh's promises of submission, and who watched with jealous eyes the growth of his popularity. They succeeded in persuading the Pasha to

refuse him permission to leave the castle, keeping him as a sort of guarantee for the loyalty of the Serbs.

But Milosh was not idle, though compelled to remain in apparent inactivity. He was planning a new Resurrection of Serbia, and in his deep-laid schemes for its success he manifested a marvellous clear-sightedness and energy. He took on himself to determine the right moment for the explosion, and would not permit any one to thwart his projects or disturb his calculations. This was proven clearly when, a very short time after the Turkish reoccupation of Serbia, a certain Hadgjee Prodan made an insurrection in the south. Milosh himself went to put down the premature movement which threatened to endanger all his slowly-ripening and success-promising designs, and he did this with a resolute and unshrinking hand. The whole future of his country must not be put in peril by a few hot-headed and imprudent men, however unquestionably sincere their near-sighted patriotism might be.

Leaving Milosh preparing a new revolution, let us glance at the fortunes of the Serbs who had, in the most critical moment, left Serbia.

The Austrian authorities did not permit the chiefs to remain together, and the Russian Agent, Nedoba, feared lest advantage would be taken by Austria of Karageorge's unhappy position to estrange him from Russia. In his last interview with the fallen chief he urged him to be faithful to the Czar, and not be tempted by any allurements Austria might hold out. On all subsequent opportunities he impressed the same warning counsel on him.

Karageorge was not only separated from his Vojvodes and Senators, but also from his family. He was compelled frequently to change his place of abode, and, at length, was sent with his eldest son to Gratz, in Styria. When asked, as he was often by the Austrian authorities, where he would prefer to live, his answer was invariably : " In Russia."

It was asserted that Prince Hohenzollern, Governor of Styria, promised that he should be created Prince and restored to Serbia (which might, also, be enlarged by the addition of Bosnia and Herzegovina), on condition that he pledged himself formally to accept the protection of Austria, and remain a faithful vassal of the Emperor.

But Karageorge touched the star of St. Anne which shone on his breast, and answered simply and proudly : " I shall be faithful to Him whose order I wear !"

From that time during the rest of his residence in Austria he was treated somewhat harshly. But the Russian Government arranged, meanwhile, that he should be permitted to take up his residence in Russia, and thither he was followed afterwards by all the other Serbian exiles who preferred to live in that country.

In September, 1814, Karageorge, accompanied by many ex-Senators and Vojvodes, arrived in Russia, where a good annual pension was allowed them.

From that moment he was in reality lost to Serbia, though he made a brief appearance there, and left to the country a dark and unhappy memory.

Milosh shared at that time the general confidence of the Serbs in the resistless power and sympathetic goodwill of " Orthodox Russia." When the Congress of the

great Powers met in Vienna (1815), Milosh sent there the arch-priest Mattej Nenadovics, to beg the Czar to help Serbia. A letter of Milosh to Nenadovics is extant, in which he simply and impressively represents the unhappy condition of Serbia, and indirectly reproaches Russia for having sacrificed her. He writes to Nenadovics: "Do not excuse yourself by the plea that you have no money for the journey. If you have no money, go on foot and beg on the road! Suffer hunger and misery as we are doing here, but go to Vienna! Go and see the glorious Russian Czar, who, we are told, has helped so many strange nations, and see and let us know if he has really and entirely given us up!"

Nenadovics went to Vienna, and there remained some five or six months; going from the Representative of one great Power to another, begging for help.

But his endeavours were all in vain. The Emperor of Austria received him, indeed, and promised to make such representations in Constantinople as should stop the revengeful policy of the Turks in Serbia; but he refused any other aid. The Czar would not even receive him, although he went, day after day, to one or other Russian diplomatist, begging that they would help him to an audience.

At last Count Bulgakoff declared to Nenadovics, in the name of his Government, that Russia was in such circumstances at present, that any help she could give Serbia would rather injure her than otherwise. Upon this Nenadovics observed that Serbia was afraid of offending Russia if she took any steps without her. "No," replied Bulgakoff, "you will not offend her; the

circumstances are such that you must work alone and for yourselves."

This simple answer, though it produced at first a mingled feeling of consternation and indignation in Serbia, had, nevertheless, salutary effects. Milosh and his co-patriots knew that they could not reckon on any foreign succours, and began to count up more diligently their own and their country's resources. Milosh had, in fact, been long secretly preparing a general insurrection of the people, and the Turks merely precipitated the explosion.

Having noticed many signs of repressed agitation in the country, and having, besides, on the occasion of the late rash attempt of Hadgje Prodan, been strikingly convinced that the Serbs had *not* given up all their arms, they resolved to compel them to relinquish them.

The entire country was searched carefully, and all possible means used to force the people to betray the hiding-places of those iron treasures. But no Serb would willingly avow where he had concealed his weapons, so in almost every village the emissaries of Suleyman Pasha applied some kind of torture to extort confession. The horrors of this search are too sickening to be lingered on willingly. Men and women flogged to death, or made to suffer the unspeakable agonies of death by hunger or thirst; hanging by the feet with the head thrust in a sack filled with ashes; stretching on the rack; impalement; roasting alive! These frightful atrocities would be utterly incredible, were they not proven by the names of the victims and the days and places of their martyrdom. It is an undisputed fact

that Suleyman Pasha, the Governor of the Belgrade Fortress, about this time impaled at once 170 Serbs who had been compromised in the late disturbances, and this in flagrant violation of the solemn pledge he had given to Milosh, when he (Milosh) undertook to subdue them, that they should be all unconditionally pardoned.

The brutal Turk had the arrogance to impale these unhappy men on the ramparts directly facing the Austrian city of Semlin, whereupon the Austrian General wrote to the Pasha that such ferocious exposition was an insulting offence to the neighbouring Christian State, and that if the Pasha did not quickly remove the sufferers Austrian soldiers should come and do it for him. The Pasha thought it prudent to remove the poor wretches, but only to set them up again on the opposite battlements. Milosh succeeded, however, in buying from Suleyman the lives of some of his compromised and imprisoned countrymen.

Nevertheless the bloodthirstiness of the Turks seemed to increase in proportion to their growing fear of another insurrection, and the life of Milosh himself appeared to hang only on a thread. Had Suleyman Pasha been less avaricious of gold and the countless luxuries it could procure, the Serbs might have lingered on under Turkish misrule another century, until another Milosh Obrenovics should have arisen to plan with consummate coolness, and carry out with unflinching energy, daring schemes for their liberation. Milosh knew perfectly in what imminent peril he lived, but happily neither his ready wit nor courage failed him. We will relate yet one little evidence of this.

One day, when the decapitated head of a guerilla chief, named Glavash, was brought to the fortress and stuck up on the wall to awe the people, a Turkish soldier said to Milosh who looked on, "Now comes the turn for your head!"

Milosh answered quickly, "My head I sacrificed long ago, and this head that I wear is a stranger's!"

But he took the involuntary hint given him of the approaching danger, and saw that it was time for him to act. Spring was coming, and with it the possibility of taking the field, but how was he to get out of the fortress, watched as he was by a multitude of cruel and suspicious eyes? Nevertheless, get out he must, and that speedily, to encourage and arouse the suffering people.

The problem seemed dangerous and difficult to solve; but Milosh Obrenovics was not one to be discouraged by the apparent impracticability of a path it was needful he should tread.

"Craft and courage" were the devices with which he entered the lists against the cunning and cruel oppressors of his countrymen.

In the commencement of the year 1815, Milosh bought, for a very high sum, from Suleyman Pasha, sixty Serbian prisoners, and, having paid immediately half the price agreed on, declared his inability to pay the rest unless he was permitted to cross over to Austria and sell some oxen to make up the payment.

The Pasha, always greedy of gold, gave the required consent, and Milosh hurried, not to Austria, but to the interior of Serbia.

By the church of Tarkovo there was a meeting of the people ; it was Palm Sunday, and Milosh, having held a council with some of the influential villagers, went and dressed himself in his costume of Vojvode. Having done so he showed himself to the assembled Serbs full armed, and with the national flag in his hand.

His bold greeting, "Here am I! and here you have war with the Turks!" was responded to with shouts and sobs of enthusiasm, mingled with rough embracings and hasty prayers. Then every one sought out hurriedly his hidden weapons, and SERBIA STOOD UP AGAIN ARMED, IN OPEN REVOLT AGAINST HER CRUEL OPPRESSORS.

That was on Palm Sunday, 1815.

The first attacks were directed against the small garrisons of places in the interior (such as Rudneek, Chachak), and were quite successful. Then the news came that Kyaya Pasha had left Belgrade with an army of 12,000 men, and was burning, killing, and pillaging every place and person on his way. Some were terrified by the tidings, and advised already the relinquishment of all ideas of revolution. They talked of the country being completely ruined if the hopeless attempt to resist the advancing Turks was ventured on. One by one the discouraged soldiers stole away, and each morning Milosh found less men around him than he had reckoned on the previous night. This utter discouragement of the people, so much worse than anything he had dreamed of when he had—in his enforced quietude in the fortress—weighed the little means he hoped to have at his disposal with the seemingly overwhelming forces of the

enemy he was resolved to defy and, if possible, to conquer, at length began to tell upon even his resolute spirit. It is said that he was discussing sadly with his subordinate chiefs the advisability of relinquishing, for the present, the apparently hopeless campaign, when his wife Lyubitza, then young and very beautiful, came forward and exclaimed in a tone of bitter irony, "Have you already delivered the country, that you talk of retiring?" Whether she really uttered these words or not, neither Milosh nor any of his Vojvodes denied in after years that it was Lyubitza who sent them to the battlefield to meet Kyaya Pasha's great army.

They did not wait until the Turks came, but went boldly forward to meet them, and took up a position on the left bank of the Morava, on a gentle slope called Lgubitch. There they made a fortified camp, and were fortunate enough to gain some additions to their little force.

They fought there with the soldiers of Kyaya Pasha and beat them, doing wonders of impetuous valour. But, of the 3,000 Serbs who went that morning to the battle, the evening came only to 150 living men.

Milosh was also successful in an attack he made on a fortified position the Turks occupied by Palesh, a little place two or three miles from the Sava.

Valyevo, a rich and important city, had been invested by the Serbs almost immediately after they rose to arms, but had not yet been taken. After the victory by Palesh, Milosh went to Valyevo, and asked the Vojvodes who commanded the besieging force what they were waiting for. Somewhat ashamed by the implied reproach on

their inactivity, they replied, apologetically, that they were waiting for him.

"So," he retorted quickly, "you have been waiting for *me*? Then let us work at once, for *I* have no one to wait for, since neither Czar nor King will come to my help!"

They stormed the place (which was surrounded by a simple fortification of pallisades), and soon forced the Turks to evacuate it and retreat across the Bosnian frontier.

Some zealous Vojvodes were about to pursue them, but Milosh stopped them, saying: "Let them go in God's name! I should be very happy if all of them would but leave us." Whatever faults might be charged on the great leader, wanton cruelty was not one of them. Besides, his farseeing prudence already counted on the time when it would be better for the little army of Serbs to come to terms with a powerful enemy defeated, but not uselessly embittered.

The army of Milosh was victorious in many different conflicts in Posharevatz, Karanovatz, and other places, and in a comparatively short time only the fortresses remained in the hands of the Turks. His victories shone out all the brighter since he treated the conquered enemy with remarkable humanity, and thus favourably distinguished himself not only from the Turkish commanders but from former Serbian leaders.

When, after a battle, his men brought the captive Mussulmans before him, he generally allowed them to go free out of Serbia, and restored to them what had been taken from them. Many of them he helped with

money to enable them to leave the country. As we have said before, this genial chief was gifted with a prudent humanity or humane prudence, which aided him singularly in the fulfilment of his self-allotted task.

When he took the fortress Ujitza, where a large number of Turks were found, he maintained the strictest discipline among his troops, and saw the women and children escorted safely, with all their portable effects, into Bosnia.

These women, as they dispersed, carried everywhere with them the most grateful remembrances of the humane kindness of the Serbian Chief. "Now we see that the religion of Christ is better than that of Mahomed. The Turks spare neither old nor young, women nor children, but the Serbs have treated us as if we were really their sisters!" Such were the exclamations with which the liberated captives spread the fame of the "magnanimity" of Milosh throughout Bosnia.

CHAPTER II.

NEVERTHELESS a cloud was gathering which boded no good to the Serbian revolutionists.

Ruschid Pasha approached with a large army from the west, and the Grand Vizier, Marashli Ali Pasha, came at the same time from the south with a considerable force, threatening vengeance and annihilation.

Milosh hurried first to the Drina, as the *avante-garde* of the Bosnian army had already passed that river, and succeeded in repulsing the enemy, and taking a great number of prisoners; amongst them the Pasha who had commanded the detachment. Milosh treated the captured leader with great distinction, and, after regaling him generously, and discussing amicably with him the Serbian claims, presented him an Arabian horse and a purse of money, and permitted him to return to Bosnia with all the soldiers who had been taken prisoners with him.

The Vizier of Bosnia thought it advisable to delay for the present any further hostile demonstrations, and sent to invite Milosh to an interview, to discuss the conditions on which the dispute between the Porte and Serbia could be pacifically arranged.

At the same time, the Grand Vizier, having heard of the Serbian victory and the humane treatment of the prisoners, also invited Milosh to a conference to treat of peace.

Milosh went himself to meet Ruschid Pasha, and sent one of his Vojvodes to confer with the Grand Vizier.

Ruschid Pasha promised a general amnesty and the immediate removal of the Governor of Belgrade, Suleyman Pasha, against whom the Serbs complained bitterly on account of his extraordinary cruelty. But he stipulated, in return for the amnesty and removal of the obnoxious governor, that all arms should be given up.

The Grand Vizier, who wished to obtain for himself the honour of having tranquillised the Serbs, declared that he did not require the giving up of the arms. "On the contrary," said he, "the Serbs may carry cannon in their belts if they will and can." He demanded nothing but their immediate submission to their sovereign, the Sultan, and promises of future tranquillity and obedience.

Milosh accepted the proposals of the Grand Vizier, and allowed him to pass to Belgrade with some 7,000 men, and even supplied the Turkish force with the necessary provisions. Then he sent envoys to Constantinople to assure the Porte of the future good conduct and loyalty of the Serbs, and to beg for the promised firman of amnesty, and the settlement of the Serbian claims.

With respect to the amnesty there was no difficulty, more especially as the Russian Ambassador reminded the Porte that the Treaty of Bucharest guaranteed the peace with Serbia, and therefore any hostile demonstration on the part of the Ottoman Government was a manifest violation of the treaty. So the amnesty was sent, but as to her political rights Serbia had to content

herself with a provisional arrangement, by which Milosh was recognised as the actual Chief of the Serbian nation but the fortresses continued still in the hands of the Turks. Justice in the cities was to be dispensed by a court composed equally of Turks and Serbs, and taxes were to be imposed by the Serbian National Assembly, and levied by Serbian officers.

This was a basis on which a certain degree of order and peace could be established ; and meanwhile Milosh would have leisure to extend and develop his projects for the prosperity and liberty of the country. He had already agents permanently residing in Constantinople, and importuned the Porte unceasingly for further and more liberal concessions.

But Serbia had hardly had time to taste the blessings of her newly-acquired tranquillity before Karageorge made a sudden reappearance in the country. This was in 1818. Russia was suspected of having connived at this ill-timed return, for it was her traditional policy to keep the waters troubled in all Christian nations under Ottoman rule. In this case she might well deem it to her advantage to have a more ductile man than that of Milosh Obrenovics at the head of the Serbian State when she anticipated her future conflicts with the Porte.

Those people who hold the Russian Government guiltless of any active participation in the scheme for Karageorge's return, assert that it simply permitted him to go to some Hungarian baths for the sake of his health, and that he took advantage of being there to cross the Danube suddenly to Serbia. They assert that Karageorge whilst

in Hungary joined the cause of the Greek Hetaerists, and, on their suggestion, went to make a revolution in Serbia in order to facilitate their movements in other parts of European Turkey. It is evident that Karageorge, whilst seeking to excite the Serbians to revolt, ignored entirely the position of Milosh and all the advantages his personal heroism and prudent policy had secured to his country.

Before Milosh himself received the news from the Mayor of Semendria of Karageorge's arrival there, the Austrian authorities had already communicated the fact to Marashli Ali Pasha, who was residing at that time in Belgrade, and had also intimated the possibility that a secret alliance might exist betwixt Milosh and Karageorge.

The Pasha sent for Milosh and represented to him all the mischief which must come on Serbia if the peace was again disturbed. He declared that he should hold Milosh responsible for all disorders which might arise, and informed him, at the same time, that he had resolved to send at once a thousand horsemen to capture, or kill, Karageorge and all the Serbs he might succeed in gathering round him:

Milosh wrote to the Mayor of Semendria, Vuitza, reproaching him with his illadvised reception of Karageorge, and ordering him to do his utmost to persuade the ex-chief to leave Serbia. He sent also a courier to Karageorge, imploring him to go away and not bring new dangers on his unhappy country.

Karageorge refused to listen to any representation of the miseries his stay would cause. He considered him-

self always the First Chief of the Serbian people, and had great hopes in the success of his rash enterprise.

In his unreasoning confidence he summoned Milosh himself to appear before him. Vuitza found that he was placed in a very difficult position, since Milosh justly reproached him with being the cause of the dangers which menaced the peace of the country, and the Pasha threatened to send a force of a thousand delhis to put to death Karageorge and all who supported him. Karageorge could not be persuaded to relinquish the ambitious projects which had brought him, so inopportunately, back to a country he had deserted in the hour of its greatest need.

Finding himself thus fatally embarrassed by his own imprudence in receiving the ex-chief into his house, Vuitza resolved at last to avert the dangers menacing himself and the country by a bold, and, it must be admitted, an inexcusable act. Forgetful of his duty as host, and his old friendship for Karageorge, he killed him as he slept. This assassination has been ascribed to the ambition of Milosh Obrenovics, but the majority of the Serbian people held him, and hold him always, quite guiltless. Many of those, indeed, who believed that the "First Chief" of the first Serbian Revolution was in reality put to death by the order of Milosh, considered that the critical position of Serbia at that moment, and the ex-chief's unreasoning and impetuous character, fully justified the fatal deed.

The question is too grave and delicate to be lightly treated, but, without attempting to defend Milosh from

the dark imputation, we may be permitted to say that the latest writers on Serbian history, such as M. Nil Popov in Russia, and Laveley in France (see *Revue de deux Mondes* for December, 1869), deny that the great Serbian chief was in any way implicated in this murder.

Nevertheless, though the death of Karageorge was, unquestionably, the result of his own wilful persistence in remaining in Serbia after he had been made fully acquainted with the dangerous impolicy of his doing so, we can never sufficiently regret that the blood of the "Chief Leader" of the first Serbian Revolution was disloyally shed, by a Serb, on Serbian ground.

CHAPTER III.

As early as the year 1817 Milosh commenced an active correspondence with Baron Stroganoff, the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople. Stroganoff was well inclined to Serbia, and often aided the yet inexperienced Serbian Chief in his diplomatic essays. But Milosh, whilst conciliating always the good graces of the Russian Ambassador, sought to gain directly from the Porte concessions for Serbia, or rather what he called the "restitution of political rights due to Serbia since the Treaty of Bucharest." Stroganoff reproached Milosh very sharply for seeking to be recognised by the Porte as hereditary Prince of Serbia. Even after the National Assembly had solemnly proclaimed him such in the autumn of 1817, the Russian Ambassador persisted in speaking of him until 1820 as M. Obrenovics.

About the middle of the year 1820 the Sublime Porte sent a firman to Serbia recognising Milosh as Prince, conceding that the yearly tribute to be paid to the Sultan should be arranged between Turkish and Serbian plenipotentiaries, and restricting the residence of Turkish authorities in Serbia to the principal cities on the Austrian frontier. The bringer of this firman was instructed to give it into the hands of Milosh after he and the chief Serbian magistrates had signed a paper, declaring that they were perfectly satis-

fied with the firman, and would not petition for further concessions.

The Turkish Commissioner was exceedingly astonished to find that the Serbs were far from being satisfied with the firman. Milosh boldly declared that "to pray to God and to petition the Sultan" ought to be freely done at any time, and he would not pledge himself to renounce what he held to be the unalienable right of every one. He added, that "though the firman must be considered as an evidence of the Sultan's magnanimity, still the Serbs could only be satisfied when all those rights were confirmed to them which were stipulated for in the Treaty of Bucharest." Advancing prudently step by step, Milosh sought unceasingly to place the Serbian question on an international basis.

After the departure of the Commissioner, Milosh convoked the National Assembly, and it was resolved that a new deputation should be sent to Constantinople. The Serbian envoys arrived about the time of the bloody massacre of the Greeks, in the spring of the year 1821. The Turkish authorities were deeply preoccupied by the Grecian revolutionary struggles, and the Serbian deputies were kept fully four years and a half under Turkish surveillance, unable to do anything in furtherance of their mission, and yet not permitted to return home.

About this time died Marshli Ali Pasha, who had been induced to make one concession after another to Milosh for the sake of the money he required to satisfy his luxurious tastes. His place was filled by Reim Effendi, a stern and incorruptible man, who treated

Turks and Serbs with the same strict justice. The presents the Serbian Chief sent him on his arrival were rejected, and every similar attempt Milosh made to propitiate him signally failed. He acted conscientiously according to his instructions, which were not to infringe any concession already made to the Serbs, but not to make any new ones.

Milosh, finding that he could not at present gain any fresh advantages for Serbia in Constantinople, and that he had nothing to hope from the weakness of the Pasha of Belgrade, turned all his thoughts to the consolidation of internal order and the development of the natural resources of the country. Two or three attempts to shake his power or to share it were successfully put down. The peace and comparative order which followed his fortunate rising in 1815 had helped greatly to revive Serbian trade and agriculture. The increasing export of cattle and swine soon made a rapid improvement in the economical condition of the country. The finances also began to improve as the customs levied on the Austrian frontier (which Milosh had bought from the Turks) produced a continually increasing revenue. The direct taxes (which Milosh had also purchased from the Turks for a round sum far beneath their real worth) flowed quietly and increasingly into the national Treasury. Milosh had enriched himself by buying from the Pasha some revenues on his own account, as well as by participating largely in exports of cattle and imports of salt.

The cattle trade he was compelled to abandon, because his partners abused his name greatly in transactions in

the interior of Serbia, but the trade in salt he could not give up so easily, as he had made a convention with Valachia, whence the salt was imported.

Most of the men who played afterwards important political rôles in Serbia laid the foundations of their wealth either whilst in the service of Milosh or as his partners. Among these we may mention the brothers Stojan and Alex Simics, Petroniyevics, Vucsics and Misha Anastasiyevics.

Milosh regulated the income of the priests, and established a theological seminary to prepare young men for preachers and teachers. He founded also some normal schools, and encouraged both teachers and pupils by his attendance at the annual examinations, and by giving recompenses to those with whom he was satisfied. In the year 1826 he instituted the "Senate," with which body he designed to share the legislative power.

The endeavours of Milosh to consolidate Serbia were greatly impeded by her uncertain position towards the Porte, and the agitations organised by the disappointed Hetærists in conjunction with Serbian Vojvodes residing now in Russia. All these disturbances Milosh successfully prevented or put down, and at length, with the aid of Russia, the position of Serbia to the Sublime Porte was settled and defined.

The new Czar, Nicholas, desired to find a "*casus belli*" against Turkey in the spring of 1826, and proposed certain demands to the Sultan Mahmoud. This was immediately after the destruction of the Janissaries; and, as the Turkish military forces were in a wretched state of organisation (or *disorganisation*), the Porte

yielded to the Russian demands, and the Convention of Inkerman was signed on the 25th of September. By the fifth article of this Convention the Sultan pledged himself to fulfil scrupulously the Treaty of Bucharest, and to confirm to the Serbs all rights and privileges secured to them by that treaty, which rights and privileges "*Serbia indeed had fully deserved by her proven loyalty to the Porte.*"

Thereupon Milosh was invited to send a Commission to Constantinople to examine in detail, in conjunction with Turkish Commissioners, the conditions and stipulations on which the inner autonomy of Serbia should be granted.

But the Serbian deputies were unable to do anything, for they found the Turks greatly excited against Russia; and, shortly afterwards, the Battle of Navarino dispensed them from the necessity of fulfilling the late treaty. Instead of being called to co-operate in arrangements relative to the Serbian autonomy, the deputies were arrested.

In the commencement of 1828 Russia declared war against Turkey, and Serbia was thereby placed in a very difficult and dangerous position. Happily Russia sent to counsel Milosh to remain neutral; and went so far as to refuse to admit Serbian volunteers into the Russian army.

The Porte, immediately after the declaration of war, sent to demand from Milosh new promises of loyalty, and exacted an oath that Serbia should keep peace. Milosh's brother, Yephrem, carried the required assurances to Constantinople. Milosh consented readily

that Turkish garrisons in Serbian fortresses should be strengthened, but he opposed energetically the passage through Serbia of a Bosnian force of 35,000 men, which was destined to act against the Russians on the Danube.

It is also said that he organised a conspiracy in Sarajevo which retained all the Bosnian troops at home. He unquestionably contrived, one way or other, to keep Mustapha Pasha and his Albanians so long from the theatre of conflict that, when he appeared there, the war was already ended.

The movements of the Russian forces were at first slow, and their successes inconsiderable; so Milosh considered it wiser not to wait the issue of the conflict before he entered into new direct treaty with the Porte relative to the settlement of the Serbian question. In this he proved himself moderate enough, since he desired only the confirmation of the inner autonomy, and of the frontier lines already recognised by the Treaty of Bucharest. Just then, however, the Porte was otherwise occupied, and declined to treat with him on this question. Shortly afterwards the fortune of war proved itself so favourable to Russia that, the same year (19th September, 1829), the Porte was compelled to accept the conditions of peace dictated by the Czar, and which were accordingly signed at Adrianople.

By the sixth article in this treaty the Porte pledged itself to fulfil the demands of Serbia without further delay.

Towards the end of September, 1829, Hussein Pasha, Governor of Belgrade, received a firman declaring that,

in conformity with the stipulations of the late treaty, the Sultan was determined to fulfil strictly the articles of the Treaty of Bucharest relative to the Serbian nation which, by its loyalty, had fully merited this proof of the Imperial magnanimity. The firman recapitulated briefly the history of the Serbian dispute, and declared that the six cantons which formerly belonged to Serbia should be restored to her; her inner autonomy recognised, as well as her right to freedom of confession and the choice of her own ruler. The privilege of compounding for different taxes payable to the Porte by the payment of one tribute, was also conceded.

This firman was solemnly communicated to the National Assembly in January, 1830, and, at the same time, a letter from Count Nesselrode, conveying the assurance of the Czar's satisfaction with the conduct of Serbia during the late war, was read. Milosh himself received as present a portrait of the Czar set in diamonds.

This firman was a most important document, since it consecrated, internationally, the political rights of Serbia.

There were great rejoicings in Serbia when the news spread that the Sultan had granted an autonomy as well as given back the six cantons, that is, territory larger than one-third of the present principality. Every one acknowledged that these gains were the result of Milosh's prudent policy; and he took advantage of the grateful enthusiasm of the country to strengthen his authority. But in doing so he took a course which marked well the genial character of the man. When he exhibited to

the National Assembly the Sultan's firman confirming the national rights and restoring the lost territory, he proffered also his resignation. He made a long speech, enlarging on the benefits which must accrue to the country from the recent concessions of the Porte: dwelling, briefly, on what he had himself done to influence the Porte to these concessions; explaining the reasons which had led him to convoke a commission to frame civil laws for Serbia, on the model of the Code Napoleon, but to be adapted to the special peculiarities of the country and people; and, finally, recapitulating in detail the attacks which had been made on him and on his government, he concluded his discourse with the information that many millions of piastres were in the National Treasury, and then begged them to accept his resignation and choose another Prince.

Of course the Assembly protested earnestly that they desired no other chief; enthusiastically proclaimed him the "father of the fatherland!" and took, voluntarily, fresh oaths of loyalty to him and his successors.

An address full of thankful loyalty was sent to the Sultan, and one also to the Czar—"the magnanimous Protector of the Serbian people!"

CHAPTER IV.

SERBIA may be said to begin her new political existence with the year 1830. She could now devote herself, without constant dread of outward aggression, to the development of her interior resources. Very much, indeed, had still to be done. The autonomy, recognised in principle, in detail was undefined, and Milosh sent again a deputation to Constantinople to try to settle finally the question of rights and privileges. The then Russian Ambassador in Constantinople was badly disposed towards Serbia, and, encouraged by this, the Porte tried as usual to misinterpret and restrict the promised concessions. But Milosh (by large sums of gold lavished unsparingly on the higher Turkish dignitaries and arriving even to the Sultan himself) contrived to secure the favour of the Porte; so that, with the Hatti-scheriff defining in detail the privileges conceded,—one confirming himself as Prince, and declaring the princely dignity hereditary in his family—was sent to Serbia.

The more important clauses of this Hatti-scheriff were, "That the Porte had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Serbia; that the Serbian Prince had a right to keep a standing army for the maintenance of order; that Turkish soldiers should remain only in the fortresses; that the Turks resident in the

cities and country places were to leave Serbia immediately after they had sold, or received compensation for, their non-portable property; that the Prince should govern the country with the aid of a Senate, of which the members were to be nominated for life and only to be dismissed from their office if convicted of having conspired against the Sultan or the laws of the country." This last clause was fruitful of great evil to Serbia in the succeeding thirty years. The seventeen senators were always jealously seeking to circumscribe the Prince's power and to increase their own; a prince of energetic character must necessarily therefore come in conflict with them, and a prince of weak will as necessarily become their tool.

One of the greatest advantages this Hatti-scheriff secured to Serbia was the enforced departure of the Mussulmans from her cities;—a departure more especially desirable as regards the capital city of Belgrade. However, an apparently insignificant event (which occurred after most of the Turks had already disposed of their houses and lands) stopped the exodus, and retained for a long time in the chief city of Serbia a never-ceasing element of discord.

Hussein Pasha, Governor of Belgrade, (who had undoubtedly rendered Milosh great services, and as undoubtedly been abundantly rewarded for them,) chose to demand the further advance of a quarter of a million piastres. Milosh, thinking he had already paid enough, and believing himself assured now of all he wished to obtain, declined to fulfil the demand.

The enraged Pasha at once stopped the carrying out

of the provisions of the Hatti-scheriff with respect to Belgrade, and commanded the Turks not to leave the city as he considered them part of the garrison of the fortress. So the Turks remained until 1862, when a scene of carnage came to prove the absolute necessity of their removal.

Milosh tried all means in vain to induce the Porte to fulfil its engagement. The dispute had already assumed a menacing aspect when the Porte suddenly proposed to leave the decision of the question to the Czar. To the great surprise of Milosh and his countrymen, Nicholas decided in behalf of the Turks.

This decision of the Czar was explained in a variety of ways by the astonished and disappointed Serbs. Some declared that the independence with which Milosh had urged the claims of Serbia and Constantinople had displeased Russia; others, again, ascribed it to the traditional policy of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg: that of putting every possible hindrance in the way of the free development and consolidation of Serbia. Others fancied it was a bribe offered to the Porte in anticipation of the proposed treaty of Balti-Liman. Milosh himself never forgave Russia for recognising thus the right of the Turks to remain in Belgrade; he appeared to regard it as an evidence of the little genuine goodwill Russia felt for Serbia, a nation struggling bravely and perseveringly for an independent political existence.

The Russian historian, Nil Popov, confesses that Milosh was not looked on very kindly by the Court at St. Petersburg. He was held to be too ambitious and

resolute to submit quietly to the suggestions, so like commands, of the Russian Cabinet. They "feared that he would secure for Serbia a position like that of Moldavia and Valachia, and that, having once obtained freedom of internal legislation, he would aspire also to an independent foreign policy."

When the Serbian envoys went (1830) to St. Petersburg to thank the Czar for his support of Milosh's claims in Constantinople, M. Rodophinikin, the former agent in Serbia, expressed his surprise at the success Milosh had obtained in his attempts to have himself acknowledged hereditary Prince, and confessed that this success was not regarded with a very pleasant eye by the Russian Government. The Czar admitted the envoys to a special audience, and condescended to say, "You have now a hereditary Prince; I congratulate you! But you must also have a Constitution, for that is the soul of a good administration." These words—of such singular import from the lips of a man like Nicholas—inaugurated a new epoch in the history of modern Serbia, an epoch of agitation and intrigue which terminated with the exile of the dynasty Obrenovics, but not with the establishment of the desired Constitutional Government.

CHAPTER V.

THE rights of Serbia were confirmed, Milosh was recognised, first by Austria, then by Russia, and afterwards by the other Great Powers, as hereditary Prince, and he could truly say, in his speech at the opening of the National Assembly in 1834, that, the peace of Serbia being no longer threatened from without, it was time to work assiduously and earnestly at the settlement of financial, administrative, and judicial questions. "We must seek to convince Europe that we are not a horde of bandits, but a people desirous of, and deserving liberty!"

These noble words seem, however, to have met with less hearty response in the hearts of the men to whom he spoke, than those in which he assured them of the "final" and complete banishment from Serbia of all cruel and tyrannical "Spahis" (that is, landlords on a large scale to whom the peasants paid a tithe of all agricultural produce and cattle, being themselves regarded as simply farmers of the land).

When the Sultan ordered the Spahis to leave Serbia, the money hitherto paid to them was included in the annual tribute to the Porte. The villagers began to believe that their condition would not be very materially improved if, instead of Turkish, Serbian Spahis held the lands. They had heard a rumour, which had some

appearance of probability, that a number of wealthy Serbs (such as Simics and Petroniyevics) had been so much pleased by the luxurious life of the great land-owners in Valachia, that they would be delighted to institute a similar system of large proprietorship in Serbia. Stojan Simics had succeeded in inspiring a good many influential Serbs with his own admiration of the splendid style of living of the Valachian Boyards (large estate holders), and an attempt was in fact made to induce Milosh to introduce the system into Serbia, but the great chief, recognising the flagrant injustice and bad policy of such a division of land, repeatedly and resolutely refused to entertain the project. It was this attempt that induced him to declare so energetically before the Assembly that such a system should never be established in Serbia.

Simics and his party regarded this refusal as a confirmation of the ambitious designs charged against the Prince. They said that he desired only to reign despotically, and a rich and powerful aristocracy would undoubtedly be a check upon him. Finding themselves placed in a position which compelled them to abandon their ardent longings for the life of Valachian Boyards, or to seek in some way to get rid of this uncompromising and independent ruler, and not being prepared to give up their cherished designs, they gathered together and organised a number of discontented spirits like themselves. Thus they formed soon an opposition sufficiently strong to enable them to begin the struggle. First, they complained to the Russian Agent in Bucharest, Baron Rickmann, that the Prince sought

ambitiously to free himself from subjection to the Porte, and from the, to him, oppressive protection of Russia.

It was not difficult to bring evidence to corroborate their assertions. Had not Milosh, against the known desire of Russia, sought for and obtained the title of Hereditary Prince? Had he not bought up all the tolls on the Sava and Danube for Serbia? Had he not recently obtained permission to send political agents to Moldavia and Valachia, and to hoist an especial Serbian flag on Serbian trade ships? Had he not also, by a special arrangement with the Patriarch of Constantinople, made the Serbian Church quite independent?

Every European statesman knew that Russia desired to extend and confirm her "protection" over all the provinces of European Turkey with a farsighted view to future annexion, and that an independent policy in any of these provinces must be jealously watched by her Cabinet, and kept in due bounds by a skilful system of opposition. Therefore it was a matter of course that the discontented Serbs found the Russian Agent ready to assist and counsel them in their attempts to check the too prosperous career of the "ambitious" Serbian Prince.

It must be admitted that, latterly, Milosh had really ruled like a despot. He could have said, at least as truly as Louis XIV., "*L'état c'est moi!*" His friend, Vuck Karadgits, the collector and editor of Serbian national songs, said to him: "You, yourself, are the entire Government! When you are at Kraguejevatz, the Government is there; when you are at Posharevatz, the

Government is at Posharevatz ; when you are on a highway, the Government is also on that highway."

As the Prince did after his own pleasure, the servants and courtiers of the Prince considered they had a right to do the same, and Milosh had to bear the responsibility of many despotic deeds of which he knew nothing, and which were totally incompatible with his real character, and unworthy of his great name.

Milosh's absolute rule did not estrange from him the hearts of the majority of the Serbian nation, but it certainly prepared many of them to listen more readily to the temptations and disloyal suggestions of his powerful enemies. The Prince's friends attempted repeatedly to warn him of the dangers which menaced him, but it happened that he was just then greatly disposed to regard favourably the very men who were pointed out as leaders of the opposition. He hoped, too, to improve the condition of things by appointing a committee to draw up a code of criminal and civil laws. Urged by the anxiety of his friends, as well as by the growing signs of discontent among the people, he promised to convoke speedily a National Assembly to deliberate on the framing of a Constitution. Unhappily he delayed continually to convoke the Assembly. And this delay served as a new weapon against him in the skilful hands of his opponents, who already charged him with seeking to keep in his own hands the entire government of the country.

Agitation succeeded agitation; the enemies, and would-be rivals, of Milosh gathered recruits on all sides and by all means, but, as yet, the necessary unity to insure

success failed amongst them. An occasion soon offered itself, however, by which they were able to combine and organise the many discontented parties.

The Princess Lyubitzza, the wife of Milosh, had consented to be godmother to a boy of Stojan Simics, and the child's father gave a fête in honour of the event. The feast was held on an estate which had been presented to Simics by Prince Milosh, and was attended by nearly all the influential Serbs. Here it was arranged that as many men as could be gathered should appear armed at the next National Assembly, and compel the Prince either to resign or give a Constitution. But the servants who attended the Princess Lyubitzza got some inkling of the plot, and persuaded some of the conspirators to give information of it to the Prince. Finding themselves discovered, the leaders of the complot decided not to await the meeting of the Assembly, but to act at once. They collected a number of armed peasants and marched to Kraguejevatz. It is said that one of the leaders, Petroniyevics, was obliged, to combat the disinclination of the people to act against the popular chief, to assert that Milosh was not only a despot but a disregarder of holy days and fasts; a man, in fact, who had drawn down God's anger on Serbia by his contempt for religion. The recent bad harvests were quoted as evidences of the displeasure of Heaven.

Hearing that a revolution had broken out, Milosh sent for Vucsics to take command of the regular troops in Kraguejevatz, and empowered him to take what steps he thought necessary to put down the insurrection.

It was fortunate for Milosh that the great mass of the

people were really devoted to him. This was shown when Petroniyevics began to harangue the crowds of armed men who had assembled; he attacked Milosh violently, and said it was high time he was got rid of. The people murmured so loudly against this discourse that Petroniyevics saw fit to alter his tone, so he protested that nothing was intended to be done against the Prince personally, but only against the persons who surrounded him.

Luckily for Milosh no real union existed amongst his antagonists. Some desired only to menace him in order to obtain the Constitution, whilst others recommended his being deposed. One indeed went so far as to require that he be put to death.

Mileta (the most powerful of the conspirators, because he had the greatest number of followers) wished nothing more than the grant of a Constitution, and was opposed decidedly to anything being done against Milosh himself.

That the power of the Prince should be limited by a Constitution was at this time the common desire of the Serbs, and Vucsics himself willingly lent his support to the party who required this.

The Prince, through Vucsics and his secretary, gave the people a solemn assurance that the National Assembly should be convoked, and declared that materials were already collected to enable that Assembly to frame the required Constitution. On this the insurgents expressed themselves satisfied; the leaders made an oath of fidelity to Milosh, and he, on his part, assured them that he forgave them all they had done against him.

The result of this movement (known by the name of

"Mileta's Revolt") was that the Prince ordered at once a Constitution to be worked out. This task he committed to his secretary, Davidovics, a man educated in Vienna and greatly in love with French institutions. In his project of a Constitution the legislative power was vested in the Prince and the Senate; but financial laws could not be promulgated without the consent of the National Assembly, which was to be convoked every year. The Assembly, also, should have the right of proposing laws. Personal liberty and security of property were guaranteed; any slave who trod on Serbian ground was declared free.

On the whole this first Constitution was distinguished by many liberal ideas, but it contained many inconsequences which must necessarily have produced, sooner or later, a conflict between the different powers of the State.

This project was accepted and proclaimed by the National Assembly (3rd February, 1835), and the Prince, as well as the Representatives, swore obedience to it. An address, full of assurances of loyalty, was voted to the Prince, and accompanied with the present of a sword of honour and a golden goblet.

At last it seemed that all discontents were done away, and that nothing stood in the way of the so-needed consolidation of the young State. And so it might have proved had not Serbia had the unusual good fortune of having one Emperor as "Suzerain," and another Emperor as "Protector."

CHAPTER VI.

DURING the framing of the Constitution Prince Milosh said often to his Secretary, "What will Russia and Turkey think of it?" and seemed to be particularly pleased with the answer that, the Constitution being a purely internal affair, Russia and Turkey could not possibly have anything to say to it, or, at least, against it.

This was also the opinion of the Senate and of the majority of the people.

After the Constitution was proclaimed Milosh sent copies of it to the Porte and the Russian Ambassador. But the news of its having been granted had already reached Constantinople, and the Austrian Ambassador had explained its real character and protested against it. The Serbian Agent informed Milosh that the Russian Ambassador and the Porte were exceedingly displeased with him for having granted it. Russia announced her intention to send a special Commissioner to examine into the state of things in Serbia, and the Porte demanded official explanation from Milosh about the reforms he had introduced, and required that he should immediately withdraw a Constitution which was incompatible with the principles of the Turkish Empire, and which no European Cabinet could approve.

Milosh could not accustom himself to the limitation

of his power by the Constitution, and therefore very willingly acceded to the demands of Turkey and Russia, demands supported also by Austria. A decree deprived Senate and Ministers of their newly acquired prerogatives, though the Prince at the same time appointed a new Committee to make a project for a new Constitution. But the decree supplied, nevertheless, his watchful opponents with another formidable weapon against him.

When the new project was ready, Milosh sent it by special messengers to Constantinople, that it might be amended by the Porte and the Russian Ambassador. But the envoys were put off with the assurance that nothing could be done until the Russian Commissioner went to Serbia, and sent a report of the condition of things there.

Baron Rickmann, formerly Russian Agent in Bucharest, was the Commissioner appointed. He had learnt to despise heartily the Valachians, and considered the Serbs some degrees lower even than they. Whilst in Bucharest he had listened eagerly to the complaints of the discontented Serbs, and reported on them to his Government. Stojan Simics had disposed him against Milosh, and his dislike was increased by a witticism the Prince could not refrain from uttering when he heard of the appointment of Rickmann as Commissioner, and which, of course, reached swiftly and surely the person affected by it.

Nevertheless the Prince received the Baron with all due honour as Imperial Commissioner, though Rickmann, from the first, arrogated to himself the character

of judge, demanded the immediate appointment of men able to explain to him everything relative to the last year's disorders, and enquired curtly what had induced the Prince to give a Constitution.

One of the men who were chosen to aid the Baron in his investigations left a journal of the conferences, in which it is stated that the Commissioner received them very sharply, and wondered how the Serbs had dared to compile, from all kinds of Republican theories, a Constitution which could not do other than greatly displease both the Sultan and the Czar—the Suzerain and the Protector of Serbia. How dared they thus scatter the seeds of a revolution which could do no one any good? What would they gain by the Constitution? It was not needed, and must be done away with. Still their Imperial protector, being sorry for them, forgave them their spirit of revolt, and also this freak of a Constitution, but only on condition that the Prince annulled everything that had been done at the Assembly of February. The impression produced by Rickmann's demeanour on the Serbs was very powerful, but Prince Milosh ordered them to declare to the Commissioner at the next conference that he might frame himself a Constitution such as he thought needful for Serbia, seeing that the one framed by the Serbs did not please him.

The Baron maintained his assertion that Serbia needed no Constitution, for had she not already "the Bureau of the Prince for Foreign Correspondence and a Court of Justice? What more could be required?" He was told that "the Bureau of the Prince" consisted

of five simple secretaries, and the "Court of Justice" was but a simple court, from which the people desired to be able to appeal to higher courts; that the people required a regular Administration, and a clear distinction made betwixt executive, legislative, and judicial powers; and that, for all these reasons, a Constitution was necessary. Upon this he declared that he had no instructions to discuss such questions, yet still repeated his assertion that there was no need of a Constitution.

Baron Rickmann conducted himself with singular arrogance toward the Prince, and reproached him with being the single cause of all the discontent and disorder in the country. He demanded also the dismissal of the Secretary who had framed such a Constitution.

Milosh asserted his dignity as Prince of Serbia, and maintained the right of the Serbs, since their inner autonomy had been guaranteed by Russia, to make whatever Constitution suited them.

The Baron persisted in his refusal to give in writing his suggestions and opinions, and, at last, Milosh declared he would make no changes until he had been himself to Constantinople, and conferred personally with the Russian Ambassador.

Before Rickmann left Serbia he had, with the Prince's consent, a conference with the Senators and some other men of influential position and character. These he upbraided with their late opposition to Milosh; at the same time, however, charged them to be loyal and faithful to the Czar and the Porte. He said if they were not so, the Czar would not only cease to protect them,

but even unite with the Sultan to compel their submission.

Rickmann had, also, some more private interviews with Simics and other antagonists of the Prince, but what passed at these confidential sittings did not transpire, although it was remarked that the opponents of Milosh acted after the Baron's departure as if they were well assured of Russian support.

In 1832 the Grand Vizier invited Milosh to visit Constantinople, but the Prince's friends dissuaded him from the journey. However, when the invitation was repeated in 1835, he decided to accept it at all hazards.

In the latter years Milosh had grown almost avaricious in his endeavours after economy, but he did not grudge any expenditure necessary to ensure his making a brilliant and imposing appearance in Constantinople. Indeed, his journey thither was a great success. The honours with which the Turkish authorities (especially the Pasha of Vidin, Ali Hussein, and the Pasha of Rushtschuk, Abdul Raim,) received him made a vivid impression on the Christians in Turkey. The Turks extended their courtesies so far as to allow Christian deputations, led by their priests, to greet Milosh at different points of his route. Greater distinction still awaited him in Constantinople, where Sultan Mahmoud received him in solemn audience, and gave him his portrait in diamonds, and a costly sword and mantle of honour. The Sultan took the Prince with him frequently in his carriage, and once, when they visited the arsenal, made him a present of six cannons.

On taking leave of the Sultan, Prince Milosh received six orders, to be distributed among his followers according to his own judgment.

During his stay in Constantinople the Prince met, occasionally, the Russian Ambassador, Butenyeff, and the latter had a good opportunity of watching him and analysing the good and evil features of his strong and original character. Milosh had brought in his suite many persons who had industriously calumniated him to Baron Rickmann, and who were very ready to point out to the observant Ambassador the many failings of their chief. Doubtless the very honours which the Sultan lavished on him helped to sharpen at once their eyes and ears. (Ambition and envy are two very excellent bloodhounds, and rarely fail to run down their prey, at least if it is too daring or too unwary.)

It was to be expected that the brilliant sojourn of the Prince in Constantinople would only tend to widen and deepen the breach betwixt him and his discontented subjects, though on his return home he was greeted most cordially by the mass of the people. But he himself was a changed man. He abandoned in a great measure his patriarchal mode of government; did not claim any longer judiciary powers, and gave up entirely his private commercial enterprises. Knowing that his new line of conduct afforded no real ground of complaint, and feeling himself strong in the loyalty of his people, he directed his Secretary to write a history of the late disorders, to be published first in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, and, from it, translated for the Serbian official paper.

This exposition of the manifold intrigues of the Serbian chiefs embittered them exceedingly against Milosh. One of the most important of them, Simics, went to Valachia, and there declared that he was simply a Turkish subject, and would not return to Serbia, as he considered his life to be in danger on account of the Prince's ill-feeling towards him. He took a house in Bucharest, and acted as a go-between between Baron Rickmann and the Serbian malcontents.

Shortly afterwards Simics was joined by George Protics, who, as President of the Belgrade Court, had been guilty of abuses, and, to escape punishment, ran away from Serbia. This Protics was a very bitter and resolute foe to Milosh, and had loudly demanded his putting to death at the time of the outbreak. He wrote a long list of complaints against the Prince to the Russian Cabinet, and sent information to the Porte that the Prince had friendly relations with the rebel Ali Pasha of Janina, and with Mehemed Ali, Pasha of Egypt. He charged Milosh with intriguing to place himself at the head of a general insurrection of the Eastern Christians, and asserted that for this object he was diligently collecting arms and other military requisites.

In Constantinople the revolutionary intentions of Milosh gained easy credence, but Protics painted him in colours so black that it was impossible not to see an enemy's hand in the work, especially when he assured the Porte that the Serbs would gladly pay double tribute and give up Belgrade to the Turks if only Milosh could be compelled to abdicate.

CHAPTER VII.

WHILST Bucharest was thus gaining the doubtful fame of being the centre and hotbed of Serbian conspirators, Prince Milosh was occupied in establishing more direct relations with the different European Governments. During his stay in Constantinople he had endeavoured to persuade the Representatives of the Great Powers to send agents to Serbia. England and France were the first who declared their willingness to do so, but Austria, who had soonest recognised the princely dignity of Milosh and greeted the new Prince with a high order, was the first that really sent a diplomatic agent to Serbia, in the person of a certain Major Mihanovics.

Prince Metternich understood how to forestal the Russians, and it seemed as if Austrian influence would gain a secure footing in Serbian territory.

Russia was ill-pleased that Austria had sent an agent to Serbia, and that England was preparing to follow the example; but, for all that, or perhaps because of that, she would not for the moment appoint one herself, and seemed content with such reports as the malcontents supplied to her agent in Bucharest. But, if she did not send an agent, she considered herself no less authorised to interfere in the internal affairs of the country.

The conflict of parties over the Constitution had afforded her a very good pretext for intervention. We

have already seen how her agent, Baron Rickmann, sought to convince the Serbs that they required no Constitution, how the Prince's opponents persisted in demanding one, and how Milosh himself recognised the necessity of it in a country so harassed by external and internal intrigues.

As Russia continued to express her dissatisfaction with the present Constitution, the Prince demanded repeatedly that she should propose one herself, and at length his request was complied with, but in a quite unofficial form.

At the end of the year 1836 the Prince received from his agent, M. German, in Bucharest, a paper headed "Basis for the Serbian Constitution," but the paper had neither signature nor date. German wrote that this paper had been given to him by Baron Rickmann with the recommendation that a Constitution should be framed upon it. As an interesting curiosity we may quote the introduction of this extraordinary document. It runs thus:—"The Imperial Court must make an absolute distinction betwixt the political and administrative parts of the Constitution. With respect to the political part, the Imperial Cabinet finds it advisable to reject it thoroughly, as the political rights which Serbia possesses are declared, and sufficiently guaranteed, by the treaties and firmans of the Porte, and therefore it is not necessary that they should be proclaimed again by a Constitution. Therefore it is the will of the Imperial Cabinet that the project of the Constitution should limit itself strictly to the administration of the country. With this view the Imperial Ministry has prepared this

‘Basis’ on which the project of the Serbian Constitution should be made.”

It goes on to define the spheres of action of the Senate, and of the different Ministries of Finance, Justice, and Education. Then it treats of the appointment of a Civil List for the Prince; the proclamation of security of person and property; the abolition of tithes; and freedom of trade. (This freedom of trade had been already proclaimed by the Convention of Akerman.)

Prince Milosh was disagreeably surprised with the form and contents of this “*basis*.” He recalled at once his agent from Bucharest to explain to him the matter more in detail. German told him that the Czar was much dissatisfied with the framing of the Constitution, and did not desire that Serbia should have one, but, as Milosh urged it so incessantly, he, the Czar, permitted him to frame one, but only on the “*basis*” now sent to him.

Milosh exclaimed: “So! a Constitution which makes no mention of Serbian arms or flag? which says nothing of a National Assembly?”

The Prince saw clearly that this “*basis*” was intended to limit his own power, for if National Assemblies were permitted he, being so popular, would be sure to be supported by them in his conflicts with the Senate. Without an Assembly an appeal to the nation became impossible, and Milosh preferred to govern without a Constitution rather than accept one on the Russian “*basis*.” On the advice of German he wrote to Count Nesselrode saying that he, at last, was convinced of the

soundness of the advice which the Imperial Government had sent him through Baron Rickmann, and now *he*, also, saw clearly that Serbia had no need of a Constitution. This proceeding of the Prince was a great mistake, and his enemies took advantage of it to impress the notion on the people that Milosh—in his mad passion for autocracy—had rejected the Constitution which the Czar, wishing to guarantee the liberties of the Serbs, had sent to him.

At this critical moment—when Milosh's rejection of the Russian "basis" had laid him so imprudently open to the secret machinations of his powerful enemies,—English influence, for the first time, began to show itself in the affairs of Serbia.

The first step taken by the English Government in Serbia was a very good one. By appointing a direct agent England seemed to acknowledge that Serbia did not need the medium of the Sublime Porte in her communications with Foreign Powers; and this, in itself, was a delicate flattery to the Serbian Prince and the young State. Then the choice of the appointed agent, Colonel George Hodges, was a singularly happy one. The Serbian journals had published many details (translated from German papers) of the heroic conduct of the Colonel as chief of an English Legion in Portugal during the conflict for Don Pedro, and thus had secured for him beforehand the sympathies of the people.

Nil Popov describes Hodges as a man of great personal beauty, and of exceedingly attractive manners. Prince Milosh received him with the distinction due to his mission and his military fame, and appointed him

as residence a building once intended for the use of the Senate.

Colonel Hodges found the Prince favourably disposed for the reception of English influence.

Russia's constant interference with the internal affairs of the country, and her evident wish to limit the power of the Prince in the interest of his most inveterate opponents, could not fail to weaken his attachment to her.

Milosh felt assured that he was perfectly right in repudiating all Russian intermeddling with the home policy of the Government, but he knew that such repudiation was very hazardous to himself personally, as it placed very formidable weapons in his enemies' hands. Therefore he looked about for some external support in the threatened peril.

Colonel Hodges, seeing the position of affairs, encouraged the Prince to persevere in his efforts to emancipate himself from the so often oppressive influence of Russian policy.

M. Nil Popov states that Colonel Hodges stimulated Milosh in his autocratic government, but this assertion is refuted by everything that is known about the kind of counsel the Colonel gave the Prince. The English Agent was perfectly aware that the conspirators had one very serious and genuine ground for their complaints—this was the Prince's evasiveness on the subject of the Constitution.

The English Agent in Bucharest watched closely the intrigues of the Serbian malcontents, and reported thereon to the English Ambassador at Constantinople,

Lord Ponsonby, who, in his turn, communicated the details to Hodges, in order to enable him to orient himself sooner and better in Serbian affairs. Thus the Colonel knew all about the malcontents and their various schemes, and could weigh their chances of success. He recognised the magnitude of the dangers which threatened Milosh, and saw that they were much greater than the Prince himself imagined or suspected. He drew, therefore, the attention of Milosh to the perils which menaced him, and declared that England would not permit any interference with the internal affairs of Serbia. When the Prince questioned England's ability to help efficaciously, "being so distant," the agent repeated his assertion, that his Government was determined not to suffer Russia to interfere with Serbia's internal affairs, and would not allow a system of Administration unsuited to the country to be forced upon its Prince. He added that England's moral influence being quite sufficient to prevent this, she reserved for extreme cases her material power. As to the "distance," Hodges assured Milosh that England had lent material aid to countries far more distant from her than Serbia, but he admitted frankly that she promised help only on condition that he (the Prince) remained faithful to his obligations to the Sublime Porte, considered her interests as his own, and held every one as an enemy of Serbia who was an enemy to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Milosh hesitated, for the reports sent him from Constantinople represented the Russian influence as being much stronger there than the English. Meanwhile the

Prince's enemies exploited to their own advantage his friendly relations with the English Agent. They reported that he had deserted the Czar, and, in order to remove even the shadow of a ground for this report, Milosh avoided for some time any private interviews with Colonel Hodges, though his physician, Dr. Kuni-berto, went secretly to confer with him on the part of the Prince. The partisans of Russia soon learned this, and sought to remove the Doctor.

The malcontents were in correspondence with the Prince's brother, Yephrem, and as the Austrian Consul, Mihanovics, was paying attention to Yephrem's daughter Anka, with the desire to marry her, he was used as an instrument against Kuniberto.

The Consul wrote to the Prince charging the Doctor with being a carbonaro, and demanding that he should be sent out of Serbia, as he was connected with men who were conspiring against Austria.

Instead of complying with the Consul's demand, Milosh exerted his influence with the Vienna Cabinet to obtain his recall. Yephrem resented this step, as he wished that Mihanovics should become his son-in-law.

Meantime the malcontents were sleeplessly active in working for the Prince's overthrow. One of them went to St. Petersburg and sent a written complaint to Czar Nicholas, in which he charged Milosh with being "a tyrant and the enemy of Russia." But, as this paper bore only the signature of the bearer, he received a notification that it could not be attended to, unless a large number of signatures were appended to it.

But the signatures were difficult to obtain, and so the

leaders of the malcontents sought to compensate for the smallness of the number by getting Milosh's brother to sign the complaint against him. They cajoled Yephrem with flattering prospects of being chosen himself Prince of Serbia if his brother could be compelled to resign.

Consul Mihanovics undertook to forward the paper of grievances safely to St. Petersburg; but Russia, meantime, appointed a vice-consul in Orsova (chiefly to watch more closely the events in Serbia), and the document was entrusted to his care. Shortly afterwards Colonel Hodges received information that Russia was about to send an extraordinary agent to Serbia, and he sent this news to the Prince, who was then in Kraguejevatz. Colonel Hodges's communication was to the effect: that in November a Russian Agent would arrive, charged with the organisation of such a movement against Milosh as must compel him to abdicate, or at least leave him only the semblance of power, and added that the Prince's enemies were far more numerous and powerful than he (the Prince) imagined, and would certainly be able to overthrow him, despite his popularity among the people, unless he by timely concessions could disconcert their plans. The Colonel told the Prince also that the Governor of the Fortress of Belgrade, Ussuf Pasha, had been sent to Belgrade to support the intrigues, and that there were many persons zealously seeking in Constantinople to prejudice the Sultan against him.

Colonel Hodges recommended the Prince to proclaim immediately a Constitution, ensuring inviolability of property and person, so that no Serb could be arrested

except on the mandate of the Court of Justice, which must explain the cause of the arrest; the abolition of torture and of *corvée* (except for the construction of State roads); and lastly, freedom of trade. He advised the maintenance of the National Assembly with its rights of voting on financial laws; but proposed, besides, the institution of a permanent body as Senate, the members of which should be nominated by the Prince for life. The Colonel counselled urgently a reconciliation of the Prince with his brother Yephrem, in order to withdraw so dangerous an opponent from the ranks of his enemies.

The English Agent gave this advice as his own private opinion, but added that the English Government would support the Prince on the condition that his project for a Constitution contained the first four clauses he had mentioned.

This well-meant counsel of the Consul availed nothing, for Milosh could not keep secret the advice he had received, and the next day all the persons about him knew of the letter. Thus the news reached quickly the Prince's antagonists, who precipitated their movements so as to allow him no time to follow the prudent suggestions of the English Agent.

From Orsova, where some of the leading conspirators had gone to give the Russian Vice-Consul the petition against Milosh, a memoir was forwarded to the Porte, charging the Prince with being the enemy of the Turkish Empire, with dreaming of a great Slavonian Kingdom, and with making great preparations to fulfil this dream. He was charged likewise with supplying

the Bosnian and Albanian rebels with money; with being the instigator of all the Raja agitations; with bad treatment of the Turks resident in Serbia; with encouraging the emigration to Serbia of discontents from various other parts of the empire; and finally, with assuming to himself the right to put down disorders and insurrections in the principality without asking the co-operation of the Pasha of Belgrade.

As M. Nil Popov finely remarks, the malcontents must have forgotten that they were also Serbs when they enumerated as crimes such acts as even foreigners of impartial judgment could only regard as proofs of the patriotism of the accused Prince.

The memoir sent to St. Petersburg charged Milosh with being entirely devoted to English interests, and quite under the influence of the English Agent; and added that the continuance of such a state of things must speedily put an end to all Russian influence in Serbia, since the Prince dismissed from the State service all persons he believed to be loyally disposed to Russia.

About the middle of October the Serbian Agent in Bucharest reported that an aide-de-camp of the Czar Nicholas, Colonel the Prince Dolgoruky, was coming to Serbia on an important mission to Milosh.

This news rejoiced the conspirators greatly, as they considered it the first step to the Prince's overthrow, and it made the Prince himself unquiet enough to desire, through the medium of Dr. Kuniberto, some advice from the English Agent. Colonel Hodges recommended him to speak, in all intercourse with

Prince Dolgoruky, with great respect of Russia as the Protectrice of Serbia, but to assert that this protection gave her no right to interfere in the internal government of the country. The Colonel repeated that Great Britain was ready to defend the right of Serbia to conduct her own internal administration against all the unjust pretensions of Russia.

Milosh's friends urged him anxiously to proclaim as law the four clauses Colonel Hodges had suggested as the basis of a Constitution ; but it was already too late. Prince Dolgoruky was expected daily, and a hurried proclamation of new laws on the eve of his arrival would have been at once undignified and suspicious.

The demeanour of the Russian Envoy was an agreeable contrast to that of the Baron Rickmann.

Prince Dolgoruky, a man of high breeding, scarcely permitted a syllable to transpire as to the real reasons of his visit, and treated the Serbian Prince with the greatest deference. He was instructed to show how fatal his reliance on the influence of England would be to the real welfare of Serbia, and to counsel the quieting of the discontented party by the grant of a suitable Constitution. Before he spoke to the Prince on the latter subject, he asked the Director of the Prince's Bureau if the proclamation of inviolability of person and property, the abolition of *corvées*, and the control of the Treasury by the Senate, would not be acceptable to the country. The Director assured him that no Serb, most certainly not the Prince, had anything to say against such a step, and then Dolgoruky wrote, with the help of the Director, a form of decree embodying almost the very

same points that Colonel Hodges had suggested to Milosh as the groundwork of the new Constitution.

When Dolgoruky had a second interview with Milosh, he said that he had travelled through Serbia and found the people contented, and trade and education progressing, so that he was convinced of the injustice of the accusations made against him by his enemies, and should think it his duty to report the real condition of affairs to the Czar, who would doubtless be satisfied if Milosh engaged to fulfil strictly all treaties to which the Imperial signature had been appended.

In the Hatti-scheriff of 1830 it was arranged that a Senate should be instituted in Serbia, and the Czar insisted on the execution of this Hatti-scheriff. It was necessary, therefore, that a Senate should be immediately established, to be composed of members appointed for life, and no laws could in future be proclaimed until they had received the approval of this body.

Dolgoruky gave a list of the names of the persons whom the Czar desired to have appointed Senators, and then proceeded to state what was the chief object of his mission. Enlarging emphatically on the great services Russia had rendered Serbia, he declared that, having thus obtained the right of protecting Serbia with armed hand, the Imperial Government could not permit any other Power to arrogate to itself the same right. He hinted that the Prince, probably through the influence of false friends and the intrigues of a foreign State, had recently ill-received the counsels of Russian consuls, and had even openly avowed that a Russian protectorate was unpleasant to him, and that he desired

to be freed from it. Dolgoruky added, that of all the shortcomings of the Prince, the Czar was most disagreeably affected by the friendly relations established with the English Agent; and therefore, if he (Milosh) desired Russian support, he must immediately discontinue these, for, if he did not do so, Russia would feel it her duty to act against him.

The Russian Envoy intimated, with great tact and delicacy, all the reproaches and menaces his instructions compelled him to make. Milosh heard him quietly to the end, and then remarked that his relations with Colonel Hodges were those of simple personal friendship, and that the Colonel in all political conversation had invariably counselled him to fulfil strictly all his obligations to Russia and the Sublime Porte.

Prince Dolgoruky observed that, with respect to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the interests of Russia and England were identical; but, supposing the Czar desired to conquer Turkey, he could do that without the help of Serbia. He remarked that it was not advisable for Serbia to receive the agents of foreign States with which she had no commercial intercourse.

Milosh saw clearly how displeasing the presence of an English Agent in Belgrade was to the Russian Government, but he wrote next day to Dr. Kuniberto, desiring him to communicate all the details of this interview with the Prince-Envoy to Colonel Hodges. During the sojourn of Prince Dolgoruky in Kragujevatz, Prince Milosh published a decree proclaiming inviolability of person and property, freedom of trade, and abolition of *corvées*.

The Envoy urged the framing of a formal Constitution on the Russian "basis," but he abandoned the idea when the difficulty of making a Constitution which mentioned neither Prince nor National Assembly was represented to him.

Dolgoruky's visit seemed to have dispersed the cloud which had gathered so darkly over the head of the Serbian ruler. The relations with Russia were re-established on a friendly footing, and the personal enemies of Milosh seemed to have been effectually paralysed, if not put down.

Once, in the course of conversation, Dolgoruky had suggested the prudence of the Prince giving a complete amnesty to all political offenders, and Milosh had answered, with a good conscience, that he had forgiven them long ago, and that almost all who had taken active parts in the late disorders enjoyed now good positions in the State service.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE three chiefs, Vucsics, Petroniyevics, and Simics, were out of Serbia, but Milosh permitted their return, and Colonel Hodges took great pains to effect a sincere reconciliation between them and the Prince.

This was, however, a very difficult task, for Vucsics occupied himself especially with circulating false reports about Milosh.

Instigated by these three malcontent leaders the Senate urged, more and more earnestly, the framing of a Constitution, until Milosh, wearied out with importunity, said, rather sharply, that "it would be better to try to fulfil properly the functions it already had instead of hunting after new duties."

These words only excited the Senate to more urgent remonstrances; and thus the framing of a Constitution became again the watchword of the Prince's skilful and scheming antagonists.

In the very beginning of the resuscitated conflict the English Agent strongly advised the Prince to grant at once a Constitution, and to order the civil laws to be written out in accordance with the national customs, so as to be intelligible to all.

In general, the counsel of Colonel Hodges showed such practical good sense that one cannot but regret that the Prince did not more often act upon it, instead of so continually demanding it.

At the period of which we speak no European Power knew so well as England the real position of things in Turkey.

Apparently the English Cabinet considered the most menacing dangers to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire arose from the dissatisfaction of the various nations of which it was composed, and believed that these dangers would be incalculably enhanced were Serbia to put herself at the head of the discontented provinces.

We have mentioned that Serbia was looked up to more than ever by all the Eastern Christians after Milosh's visit to Constantinople, and the great courtesy with which the Sultan thought fit to distinguish him.

The importance of Serbia in the eyes of England induced the English Cabinet to raise the Serbian Agency into a Consulate, and Lord Palmerston communicated to Prince Milosh the fact of Colonel Hodges's appointment as Consul, adding that this was a proof of the lively interest with which England watched the development of Serbia. The dispatch said, however, that Colonel Hodges's promotion was as much due to his own personal qualities as to the confidence with which Prince Milosh had honoured him.

Lord Ponsonby, at the same time, wrote to Prince Milosh from Constantinople, saying how favourably England was disposed towards Serbia, and that she, in common with all other Great Powers friendly to the Porte, desired sincerely to see the country peaceful, prosperous, and free in her internal administration.

M. Nil Popov quotes the contents of the instructions received by Colonel Hodges from Constantinople..

According to the Russian historian the chief business of the English Consul in Serbia was to combat Russian influence there, because Serbia might be made very instrumental in forwarding the designs of Russia against European Turkey; and he says that Colonel Hodges was instructed to impress on Prince Milosh the fact that no Power in Europe had a right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, or compel him to change his form of government, so long as Serbia kept faithfully her engagements to the Porte, and did not excite the Christians in Turkey to revolt. The Serbian Prince and his advisers were to be warned against "the temptations held out by any foreign Power, as to a possible extension of territory and proclamation of complete independence, since any such promises would be nothing but a snare to lead Serbia to act as a tool in foreign hands." Some hope was likewise to be held out that England would be able to induce the Porte to abandon the nineteenth article of the Hatti-scheriff of 1830 (the institution of the oligarchical Senate).

Popov adds that this letter of instruction contained a statement that Russia was ready to sacrifice Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, and part of Valachia, by ceding them to Austria, in order to have a free hand in other portions of the Turkish Empire; but he considers this statement a pure calumny invented to further the purposes of England, and completely opposed to all Russian policy since the time of Catherine the Great. He says, too, that it was well understood in Russia that it was much more desirable for the Slavonian interests that these countries should remain under the nominal

government of the Porte, than that they should fall under the centralistic administration of Austria.

Colonel Hodges showed all these dispatches to Dr. Kuniberto, and asked him to communicate their contents faithfully to the Prince. Milosh remarked that the protectorate of Russia over Serbia could only be exchanged for that of *all other* European Powers, and that that could only be acceptable to Serbia if some certain material advantage was laid in the balance: for instance, the banishment of the Turks completely from the city of Belgrade.

To this Hodges replied that he hoped Lord Ponsonby would be able to effect this, but if so, the Serbian National Assembly ought to petition for the joint protection of the Great Powers.

The question of the Constitution being again brought forward, Colonel Hodges advised the Prince to appoint a Committee to prepare the project, and Milosh acted on the advice. At the same time he invited two learned Serbian lawyers from Hungary to write out the civil laws. As the Prince frequently consulted one of these men named Hadgics, the leaders of the opposition thought it worth while to attach him to their party, and he, a young man of liberal aspirations and great ambition, associated himself only too readily with men who claimed to be the champions of Constitutionalism. Hadgics' secession to the party opposed to Milosh was the more unlucky, as he had already gained a certain fame amongst his countrymen as poet and scholar, as well as lawyer.

One day, whilst Prince Milosh showed his unaltered

friendly relations to the English Consul by his presence at a dinner given at his house, Vucsics bribed one of the inferior officials in the Prince's bureau to give him a copy of the correspondence betwixt the Prince and the Consul.

Vucsics forwarded these papers to St. Petersburg, and the Russian Cabinet could no longer doubt that the Serbian Prince desired to free himself from the Protectorate of Russia, and exchange it for the joint Protectorate of the European Powers.

From that moment the Russian Cabinet treated Milosh as an enemy who must be removed, at all costs, from such an important position as the government of Serbia.

Vucsics was the recognised head of the party vowed to the overthrow of Milosh, and he was assured of Russian support.

A few days after the dinner given by the English Consul-General, Prince Milosh received information that a M. Vashchenko was coming as provisory Russian Agent to Serbia.

The provisory character was of itself no good omen, and the arrival of the Agent convinced both the friends and enemies of the Prince that a crisis was at hand.

All attempts to reconcile the Prince and Vucsics failed. Though as yet no particulars have transpired as to the relations of M. Vashchenko with the chief of the Serbian malcontents *before* he came to Serbia, no doubt existed as to the reality of such relations. The demeanour of the Agent from the very first proved plainly

that a bold plan of action had been previously determined on.

The first audience of Vashchenko with the Prince showed symptoms of the coming struggle. The Agent addressed the Prince in an abrupt manner, which became more and more arrogant when they were alone together. Prince Milosh was naturally impetuous and imperious, and he soon lost patience, declaring energetically to Vashchenko that he had always been willing to listen to the friendly counsels of Russia, but that he could not submit to any interference in the internal affairs of Serbia. The Agent was so taken aback by the unexpected tone of the Prince that he remained silent, and Milosh, changing the subject, asked him courteously how he had travelled.

After this audience Vashchenko met with the chief malcontents, and a proposition was made to depose the Prince with armed hand. But the Russian quieted them by an assurance that he would himself "jump on the Prince's back" (*sic*).

The arrogance of Vashchenko and his evident good understanding with the conspirators, displeased the Prince so much, that he refused to receive him again. This refusal irritated the Russian, and he yet more openly worked against the Prince, who sent thereupon a messenger to inquire if he had come to Serbia simply as an agent, or if he came, perhaps, as Governor of Serbia? Whereupon Vashchenko insolently replied, "Let the Prince read my accreditive, and he will see what I am!"

It was evident that the Prince counted much on

English support, when he braved thus the anger of Russia by his independent treatment of her agent. Indeed a circumstance occurred just then to increase his confidence in England. In Constantinople conferences were being held for the conclusion of a commercial treaty between Turkey and England, and English agents were travelling in all parts of Turkey studying the commercial circumstances of the country. Some agents of Messrs. Shaw and Co. travelled through Serbia for the same purpose, and having formed a plan to export *en gros* Serbian products, offered the Prince a participation in the profits of the enterprise.

A belief still survives in Serbia that Milosh was in treaty with some English companies for the exploitation of Serbian forests, which he offered to allow on condition of England permitting him to proclaim himself king.

M. Nil Popov states that, in order to combat more effectually Russian influence in Serbia, England suggested to Milosh the possibility of the Serbian frontiers being extended towards Bosnia and Bulgaria.

There is no doubt that the relations of Milosh with England had assumed a form in which he counted on some important material gain for Serbia. He had thrown himself completely into the hands of England. If he had succeeded in his struggle with Russia, who can say how changed might be the aspect of things to-day in the Peninsula of the Balkan!

In order that the fatal problem of the Constitution should be solved favourably to the interests of both Prince Milosh and England, Lord Ponsonby conceived

the idea of getting it made in Constantinople, and he urged the Porte to invite the Prince to send a deputation there for the purpose.

The Russian Ambassador chanced to be away from Constantinople at this moment, and English diplomacy counted on a surer success in his absence. It was not difficult to induce the Porte to send the invitation to Milosh, but it was difficult enough to decide her to explain the nineteenth article of the Hatti-scheriff of 1830 in favour of the Prince's authority.

That is to say: that the Senate should not be instituted at all; or, if instituted, should not possess the extensive powers which Russia insisted on giving it.

The decision against a Senate was more delicate because the Sultan had just appointed a sort of State Senate in Constantinople.

M. Nil Popov states that Russia at this time had also conceived the idea of having the Serbian Constitution framed in Constantinople.

It is an undeniable fact that the whole affair progressed to Russian satisfaction, since the Porte, when inviting Prince Milosh to send a deputation, recommended his sending with it Abraham Petroniyevics, who was a most thorough partisan of Russia and a very uncompromising opponent of Milosh. The Serbian Prince knew the Turks very well, and he sent, with the deputation, 18,000 ducats as a present for the Turkish dignitaries; but Petroniyevics informed Vucsics of this fact, and he communicated it to the Russian Consul and to the Pasha of Belgrade.

Thus the Porte and the Russian Embassy knew all

about the proposed presents before Prince Milosh's deputation arrived in Constantinople (25th April). Under such circumstances, the Turkish dignitaries who received the money could not do otherwise than place it in the State Treasury; and Reschid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Milosh that the days of bribery had passed by.

The first step taken by Milosh in the so long vexed question of the Constitution was ominous enough.

CHAPTER IX.

ALTHOUGH the affair had begun so awkwardly, all prospects of success were not quite lost. The British Embassy had great hopes, and Lord Ponsonby wrote to Colonel Hodges that it was very probable that the Sultan would *not* approve the life appointment of Senators, and that he would express his satisfaction with the Prince. The Serbian affairs at this time interested deeply the English Government, involving, as they did, the perplexing Eastern question, and it could not do otherwise than recommend Milosh to conduct himself more discreetly towards the Austrian authorities with whom he was in constant intercourse, so as to avoid exciting Prince Metternich against him. The state of Bosnia was apparently assuring, but nevertheless it was well to be prepared, as a good military organisation often prevents danger, and it is well to be every moment upon guard. These last hints were underlined (so M. Popov asserts), so as to give them a more emphatic signification.

Colonel Hodges went expressly to Kragujevatz to read this dispatch to the Prince, and, after his return to Belgrade, kept up an incessant communication with him, reporting to him all the information he received as to the working of the Serbian deputation.

Some time afterwards (in May), when Colonel Hodges

was summoned to Constantinople, to report more minutely on the condition of the city of Belgrade, Prince Milosh authorised him to instruct the Serbian deputies as to his (the Prince's) wishes. He took also a letter from the Prince to Lord Ponsonby, which declared that he (Colonel Hodges) knew perfectly the desires of the Prince and the disposition of the people of Serbia, and Lord Ponsonby might safely rely on the accuracy of his information about them.

Milosh had not only an entire confidence in the personal friendship of Colonel Hodges, but also a perfect reliance on his influence in Constantinople. This is evident from the fact that the Prince told the officers of his suite, immediately after the Consul's departure from Kragujevatz, that he had accepted the protection of England, as he expected to gain thereby much larger concessions from the Porte than those secured by the Hatti-scheriff of 1830. He added, prudently, that he did not intend to give up the Russian protection, but inquired, "Would it not be better that the political rights of Serbia should be guaranteed by a greater number of powerful States in this critical state of things in the East? Would that God would grant that *all* the European Powers take Serbia under their united protection!"

This frank exposition of Milosh's wishes (wishes not realised until twenty years later!) was a new weapon placed in the hands of his enemies. His incautious words passed, as on the wings of the wind, to the ears of the Pasha of Belgrade and those of the Russian Consul.

But, for all the goodwill and the good services of the

British Embassy, affairs did not make the progress desirable. Neither could they do so, since the leader of the deputation, Petroniyevics, was acting in most disloyal opposition to the Prince who had entrusted him with a mission so important. Petroniyevics was intentionally procrastinating, in order to give the Russian Ambassador, Count Butenyeff, an opportunity to return to Constantinople.

On his arrival the conferences of the deputation commenced, and Petroniyevics kept up an active correspondence with the opposition in Serbia at the very time he was systematically misrepresenting the condition of affairs to the Prince.

At that time English influence was in the ascendant at Constantinople, and (although Reschid Pasha and the Russian Ambassador framed the project of the Serbian Constitution according to the instructions they received from St. Petersburg) when the details came to be discussed by the Divan the representations of Lord Ponsonby caused the clause relative to the power of the Senate to be changed so far as it came in conflict with the authority of the Prince. The Porte, yielding to the influence of the English Ambassador, consented to give Serbia a Constitution in accordance with the views of Prince Milosh.

The Russian Ambassador was exceedingly indignant when he heard of this decision of the Divan. Not long ago the English Ambassador had caused the removal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Akiff Effendi), who was notoriously a creature of Russia; and, only a few months ago, he had decided the Porte to a

liberal policy towards Spain and Belgium. Now he had signally defeated Russia on a ground she considered exclusively her own. Butenyeff protested, in the strongest terms, against the changes the Divan had introduced in the project of the Constitution, and charged the Turkish Ministry with a treacherous violation of a solemn engagement. At the same time a rumour was industriously circulated that the Russian army had got orders to concentrate itself near Odessa.

The position of the Porte was disagreeable in the extreme. Butenyeff threatened on the one side and Lord Ponsonby courteously insisted on the other. At last Butenyeff complained personally to the Sultan of the "trick" which had been played him, and Mahmoud ordered his Ministers to comply fully, and without further delay, with the demands of the Ambassador of his "Imperial friend" Nicholas.

Lord Ponsonby had been quietly defeated by his diplomatic adversary, Butenyeff, and Prince Milosh by his personal antagonists.

The Constitution was confirmed, with the singularly politic clause which made the Serbian Senate absolutely independent of the Serbian Prince and Serbian laws.

This famously conceived and concocted Constitution was read in Belgrade, on the 25th of February, 1839, in the presence of the Prince, the Foreign Consuls, and a great multitude of people. The enemies of Milosh caused the news to be spread swiftly abroad through the nation "that the new Constitution had been made by the Sultan and confirmed by the Czar." And such clauses

as "inviolability of person and property," "abolition of corvées," and "limitation of the hitherto absolute power of the Prince," secured it speedily a multitude of zealous adherents.

But the true friends of the people were unpleasantly affected by the fact that the National Assembly, that old Serbian institution, was completely ignored.

Milosh and his personal friends were indignant to find the Prince regarded as a simple executor of the decisions of the Senate, and this the more especially, as the tacit abolition of the National Assembly made all appeal to the nation impossible.

The real meaning of the new Constitution, the real intentions and powers of the new legislative body, were soon made unmistakably plain. One of the first acts of the Senate was to abolish the dotation on the Prince's brother—and this was quickly followed by a demand that Milosh should render an account of the State expenditure during the last five years. The Prince was next requested to dismiss his private secretary, the only member of the Constantinople deputation who had dared to support his interests.

But Milosh, after twenty years of absolute rule, could not submit to be governed by men most of whom he had himself raised up.

Within a month after the proclamation of the Constitution the conflict between the Prince and the Senate approached its climax. Milosh arranged with his friends a demonstration of the people against the Senate.

The Senators, who watched with suspicious eyes all

the Prince's movements, soon saw that something serious was in preparation, and resolved to act without delay.

When Milosh, in the spring of 1839, suddenly left Kragujevatz to go, through Belgrade, to the Austrian city, Semlin, where his eldest son was lying sick, the Senators quitted Kragujevatz also, in a body, and followed him to Belgrade, where they made complaint against him to the Russian Consul.

Milosh sent, from Semlin, on the last day of April, a notification to the Pasha of Belgrade that he did not intend to return to Serbia until he had laid personally at the feet of the Sultan a protest against the new Senate.

But, a few days later, on the representations of the Russian and English Consuls, and on the invitation of a deputation of Senators either to return immediately or to abdicate, he went back to Belgrade and acceded to all the demands of his opponents. He did so because he expected every day a manifestation of the army in favour of his government and against the Senate.

On the 22nd of May the regular troops in Kragujevatz, seeing that Milosh did not return, and hearing most singular news of his having fled to Austria because he had been ill-treated by the Senators, rose up and forced their officers to lead them to Belgrade, "to free their Prince from the aggression of the seventeen new princes," as they called the Senators.

The regular troops from other neighbourhoods joined the movement, and marched toward Belgrade. The terrified Senate compelled the Prince to send two officers to meet the rioters, and order them to return to their

respective garrisons. But the soldiers refused to obey this order, and continued to advance. The Senate sent then the Archbishop of Belgrade with two bishops to advise the insurgents to return to order, and forced Milosh at the same time to give full power to Vucsics to disperse them in his name.

Exhorted to order by the bishops, and seeing that Vucsics had really orders from the Prince to disband them, the soldiers abandoned their design and returned to their stations.

Vucsics succeeded in subduing two other similar demonstrations directed against the new Senate. The fact that the leader of one of these was the Prince's brother, John, compromised the Prince himself considerably, and, afterwards, the confessions of some imprisoned soldiers made it tolerably evident that the whole affair had been concocted by Milosh himself.

The Senate, having all legislative power in their hands, and being now free from the dangers which had threatened them, contrived to separate the Prince from all his friends (so that, with the exception of his wife and his physician, he had really no one about him), and resolved to take this opportunity of getting rid of him entirely.

They convoked hastily a National Assembly in Belgrade, which was opened on the 9th of June by discourses from Vucsics and Simics. These men painted in the blackest colours all the failings of Milosh and the abuses of his government. Consul Hodges at this time was absent, being at some bathing-place in Hungary, and the Prince had no one near him on whom

he could rely. He was prevented from holding any private communication with the Assembly, being kept under the strictest guard.

On the day on which the Assembly was opened, the Senate forced Milosh to sign an organisation by which it obtained for itself still greater prerogatives than those given it by the Constitution, as well as a new military law by which the army so devoted to him would be dissolved.

After he had signed these laws, the Senate declared that he must immediately resign in favour of his eldest son, or else he should be deposed and tried by a national court of justice.


The belief is current in Serbia that the Prince was menaced with death if he did not sign the abdication demanded by the Senate. At all events, Milosh abdicated on the 12th of June, 1839, and left Belgrade on the 15th, after having taken leave, so to say, of the whole nation, since he embraced all the members of a deputation from the National Assembly.

The deposed Prince was seemingly departing in the best spirits possible, shouting to the crowds, who stood to watch his departure on the banks of the Sava, "Good-bye!" when Vucsics threw a stone into the river, exclaiming, "When this stone returns from the bottom of the Sava, you shall return to Serbia again!"

Milosh seemed even in that moment to have the same conviction he expressed continually during his twenty years of exile, that he should not die out of Serbia, his native country, and that he should die as its reigning Prince.

BOOK THIRD.

MICHAEL OBRENOVICS III.
ALEXANDER KARAGEORGEVICS.



BOOK III.

MICHAEL OBRENOVICS III.

ALEXANDER KARAGEORGEVICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE Constitution framed in Constantinople was, from the very first, unpopular in Serbia. To have the power of the Prince limited was certainly a very good thing, especially when the Prince developed such exceedingly despotic tendencies as Milosh had latterly displayed; but to do away with the National Assembly, the only peaceful way in which the people could exert their legitimate influence over State affairs, that was quite another thing.

Probably the only men quite content with the new Constitution were the patriotic senators into whose hands all the real power was committed. *They* tried, naturally, to prove how exceedingly beneficial to the country was the present system of government, and impressed the necessity and duty of a due and faithful observance of it most zealously upon the people.

But one thing the advocates of the Constitution could not avoid seeing; that no Prince of Serbia worthy of the name, certainly none having the slightest resemblance to the deposed Milosh, would be likely to submit long to a Constitution which suppressed at once his own rights and those of the nation he pretended to govern. Neither was it at all probable that the support of the people would be wanting, whenever their Prince resolved to claim it, in order to break the bonds of this strange constitutional tyranny. It was certain that Serbia had been brought to a state of greater dependency on the Porte by this new Constitution than the Turkish arms had been able to bring her to since the beginning of the century.

The Senate had power enough in their hands now, but how long could they keep it if a second Milosh came to reign? They felt so certain that the reply to this question would be to their disadvantage, that they began seriously to study how best to exclude the whole family Obrenovics for ever from the throne of Serbia.

Meantime they endeavoured to maintain this advisory state of things as long as possible. Milan, the eldest son of Prince Milosh and his rightful successor, was certainly sick (dying, indeed, slowly of consumption), but he could, nevertheless, assume, formally, the reins of government.

But the Senate asserted that he, the "hereditary Prince," could not be entrusted with executive powers until the "Berat" came from Constantinople to confirm him in his new dignity. Without even a shadow of legality, the "Defenders of the Constitution" chose their

leaders to act as "Regents" until such time as the "Berat" should come.

During this "Regency," and the sickness of Prince Milan, they sought by all means to gain influence over the people. Terrorising and flattering went hand in hand.

When the National Assembly was convoked to hear the abdication of Prince Milosh, the Russian Agent and the Pasha of Belgrade attended the first session and spoke warmly about the great benefits which Serbia would derive from the new Constitution. The Regency tried now all means to gain over the army, praised much the behaviour of the officers during the recent revolt of the soldiery, and promised to give especial attention to their welfare.

All the friends and partisans of the Obrenovics were dismissed from the State service, and many of them banished from Serbia, and this during the nominal reign of a prince of the Obrenovics dynasty!

Whilst people were still waiting for the Berat to confirm him in his dignity, Prince Milan died (end of June, 1839), and his brother, Michael, was proclaimed by the title of Michael Obrenovics III.

Prince Michael was at that time staying with his father, and the old Prince, who began already to dream of his own possible restoration, would not at first permit his son to return to Serbia. This delay was taken eager advantage of by the "Defenders of the Constitution," who invited the widow of Karageorge to come over with her son and nephew, and sent, meanwhile, a Commission through the provinces to explain to the people, officially, why Prince Michael remained so long abroad.

The Commissioners were instructed to accustom the peasants gradually to the idea of a change in the governing dynasty; to blacken, as much as possible, the family Obrenovics, and to dwell zealously on the glorious deeds of the "First Serbian Leader," Karageorge.

This agitation could not long remain concealed from the friends of the Obrenovics, and they impressed on the old ambitious Prince the necessity of his consenting to his son's coming at once to Serbia to assume his new dignity.

Milosh had kept up a correspondence with Colonel Hodges, and it appears as if England, France, and Austria were at this time combining to combat the growing influence of Russia in Serbia. Austria appeared especially to regret that she had not supported Prince Milosh in his long struggle with the Russian partisans.

Milosh, thinking the moment was come to act for himself, would not let his son Michael leave his side; he wrote to Czar Nicholas to the effect that his abdication had been compelled by a few men who were supported by the Consul of his Imperial Majesty, and not by the Serbian people. He begged that a Commission should be appointed to examine into the case. If this paper ever reached the Czar it did not seem to damage at all the Consul complained against, for, just at this time, M. Vashchenko exercised the greatest influence over Serbian affairs. It may almost be said, that from the departure of Prince Milosh until the arrival of Prince Michael, M. Vashchenko governed Serbia. Regents, Ministers, and Senators could not do anything without his counsel; men of all parties courted his

favour, and even the partisans of the Obrenovics demanded his protection against the tyrannies of the "Defenders of the Constitution."

But the yoke of Russia began soon to gall the very men who had so diligently laboured in its behalf, and Turkey and Austria could not long remain impassive witnesses of the growing danger to themselves as well as to the prosperity and liberty of Serbia. The signal for reaction came from Constantinople at the moment when Reschid Pasha, who had been sent on a special mission to London, returned to resume his duties as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The new policy of the Minister was to create a Turkish party in Serbia strong enough to subdue, or keep in bounds, the adherents of Russia, and for this end he sought to ally himself with Austria. He commenced by confirming Prince Michael as Prince of Serbia.

The same Serbian official gazette which published this decree of the Sublime Porte, contained, also, the news that the widow of the First Chief Karageorge had arrived in Belgrade with her son, and there were some who considered this incidental coincidence as a threatening omen for the family Obrenovics.

Milosh (having received no encouragement from Russia, and being importuned by the entreaties of his wife that he would not condemn the dynasty by keeping his son Michael from the position fallen to him by Milan's death) gave way at length, and Prince Michael went to Constantinople, to pay the usual homage to the Sultan before going to Serbia. He devoted more than three months to the journey, and played thus unthinkingly into the very hands of his opponents.

The "Constitution Expounding Committee" spoke boldly enough, as they travelled through Serbia, that Michael was too young to reign independently, and that his father had an immense influence over him which would be very pernicious to the country. They added, always, that the son of Karageorge was in the prime of life, and that all Serbians knew the great services that had been rendered their country by the "First Serbian Leader," Karageorge.

When Prince Michael arrived from Constantinople he found the condition of affairs sufficiently perplexing. The seeds of civil discord were alarmingly developed. The position of Serbia towards the Porte had been so greatly weakened, that he was denominated, in the Berat which confirmed him in his new dignity, as *elected* and not as *hereditary* Prince.

The Berat proclaimed the Prince of full age, and consequently the Regency was at an end; but two of the Regents were nominated by the Grand Vizier as "Cabinet Counsellors," whose office was to advise and support the young Prince.

This appointment fed yet more the fire of discord; the enemies of the Obrenovics rejoiced to see the power thus retained in the hands of their chiefs, whilst the friends of the Prince denounced it as unconstitutional, and as a virtual contradiction of the Sultan's acknowledgment of the Prince's majority. Vucsics and Petro-niyevics had intrigued successfully to get the new dignity of "Cabinet Counsellors," to which they were appointed without the consent or knowledge of the Prince himself; but he refused to comply with the

wishes of those who advised him to dispute this nomination. He declared that he would not commence his reign by an act of disobedience to his Suzerain, the Sultan.

Nevertheless it was natural that he could have no great disposition to listen to the counsels of the very men who had conspired successfully to depose and exile his father, and his first act was to give entire amnesty to all who had been concerned in the recent disturbances, and thus many enemies of Vucsics and Petroniyevics were set free.

The partisans of the Prince were not slow in spreading over the country reports how much he had to suffer under the oppressive control of his Cabinet Counsellors. No long time passed before the peasants from the neighbouring cantons came to Belgrade, to see the Prince and tell him that they wanted *one* prince and not *three*. They said that if he needed Counsellors, he should call his father back and listen to *his* counsels. They demanded that Vucsics and Petroniyevics should be tried before the Court for having been parties to the banishment of Prince Milosh.

Many of these bands of villagers Prince Michael succeeded in quieting and sending back to their homes; but the agitation did not subside. In the districts farther from Belgrade the peasants arrested, and maltreated, every one known to be a friend or hanger-on of the two Counsellors, Vucsics and Petroniyevics.

Crowds of armed men flocked daily to Belgrade from the remoter counties of Serbia, and demanded that the Prince should remove the government to

Kragujevatz, so as to be more independent of the Turks.

Vucsics and Petroniyevics considered it best to resign their posts and seek shelter in the fortress with the Pasha, but before they did so they sent a formal complaint to Constantinople and St. Petersburg. A number of Senators and other influential persons went with them into the fortress, and Prince Michael removed the seat of government to Kragujevatz, in compliance with the reiterated requests of the people. The Russian Consul, M. Vashchenko, followed the Prince very speedily. He had many reasons for this step. The demands for the recall of the old Prince grew more and more imperious, and he thought he could trace this determination of the people to have their favourite chief again amongst them to the intrigues of the English Consul. This suspicion was strengthened, if not suggested, by the "discoveries" of a man who had served in the English Consulate, and who was in reality a spy in the service of the Senate.

According to this man, the English Consul had been actively working to bring Milosh back, as no one but the old Prince had any power over the Serbs, not only in the principality, but also in the adjoining Turkish provinces, and instructions how the recall could be best brought about were daily expected to arrive at the English Consulate in Bucharest. It was asserted, too, that France would go hand in hand with England in this matter, and that Prince Metternich had likewise promised his support. The young Prince was said to approve the project, and to desire his father's return, and protests were about to

be sent from the Western Powers against the participation of the Russian Consul in the deliberations of the Serbian Senate. Finally, it was "discovered" that Serbia was going to shake off the exclusive protection of Russia, and demand to be put under the joint protectorate of all European Powers.

These extensive and important "discoveries" were more than enough to decide the Russian Consul (and, a little later, the Russian Government) to protect the ex-Counsellors and their partisans.

The Russian Court Counsellor, Chevkin, was directed to take up his residence in Orsova, from whence he could keep a watchful eye on Prince Milosh, and, at the same time, follow the movement of affairs in Serbia.

The Russian Government notified to Prince Michael that it had no intention to change its course of action, and the Grand Vizier declared that he regarded MM. Vucsics and Petroniyevics always as "Cabinet Counsellors" to Prince Michael, and that he purposed to send a special envoy to investigate the causes of the disorders, and put an end to them by punishing the instigators.

This envoy received special instructions to work with the Russian Consul on all points touching the interests of Serbia.

On the first conference that the Turkish Commissioner, Mussa Effendi, had with Prince Michael, the convocation of a National Assembly was resolved on. This met in the middle of August, and the Commissioner demanded that it should explain the causes of the recent agitation

in the country, and declare what the people desired. The Assembly answered: "that the insurrection had been caused by the disloyal conduct of Vucsics and Petroniyevics, who were openly striving to depose Prince Michael and possess themselves of all the authority; that the people were irritated because these men continually sacrificed the national rights by permitting, and inviting, foreign Powers to interfere in the internal concerns of the country; that it was evident that the Porte had infringed the Constitution it had given to Serbia by the appointment of Cabinet Counsellors to the Prince, and by sending a Commissioner to investigate the causes of internal disorders, which investigation belonged of right only and entirely to Serbian Judicial Courts."

This frank reply was, of course, very displeasing to the Commissioner, and induced him to receive only the more favourably the "explanations" of Vucsics. This man (who was now residing, with some twenty of his partisans, in the fortress of Belgrade, under the protection of the Pasha) published a reply to the complaints the Assembly had urged against him, and dwelt emphatically on his assertion that "Serbia was simply a Turkish province, and therefore its Prince and all its authorities were pledged to obey implicitly all orders of the Sublime Porte."

As answer to this, the Assembly demanded that nine of the chief leaders of the party styling themselves "Defenders of the Constitution" should leave Serbia.

This acceptance by Vucsics and Petroniyevics of the humble position of a province for Serbia, was equally

agreeable to the Turkish Commissioner and the Russian Consul.

But, on the other side, neither the Prince nor his adherents attempted to conceal the indignation with which they regarded these infractions of their national rights, or their ardent desire to see Serbia yet more independent. In this condition of affairs no one could doubt what position the Turkish and Russian Governments would take. Mussa Effendi found that the two chiefs of the Defenders of the Constitution had done nothing beyond their duty, and accordingly demanded that the Prince should reinstate them in their offices. The Prince denied the claims of the Porte to mix itself in these internal affairs, and insisted that the ex-Chancellors should leave their refuge in the fortress and submit themselves to the judgment of a Serbian Court.

M. Vashchenko supported the Commissioner, and affairs looked generally so gloomy that, when Prince Michael removed, with his Government, to Kragujevatz, the Commissioner remained in the fortress. A considerable time was spent in mutual incrimination and recrimination, and this long-continued agitation deprived the people of the quietness necessary to re-establish order, and attend duly to their business, so that the country materially suffered.

The Prince was very young; he had the best will, the purest intentions, and great decision of character; but he was quite inexperienced, and surrounded by men almost equally so, who had no great influence with the people.

Then the party attached to the dynasty Obrenovics

was divided in itself; as some desired the restoration of the old Prince. The opposition, supported by the Consul Vashchenko and Mussa Effendi, strengthened itself as the parties of the two Princes were more and more disunited in their aims. It was diligently reported throughout the country that neither the Sultan nor the Czar was satisfied with the Prince's conduct, and that a Russian army would probably be sent to teach the Serbian Government how to keep its Constitution.

The young Prince is said to have taken steps, through the medium of the Austrian Consul, toward a reconciliation with the leaders of the opposition, but they counted on being soon in a position to humiliate him by being restored to their places by Russian and Turkish agency, and so rejected his propitiatory offers.

They did more: they represented to M. Vashchenko that Prince Michael had again intentionally insulted Russia by seeking the mediation of the Austrian Consul between himself and them, and insinuated skilfully that both the Turkish and Russian Governments would soon regret having delayed so long to punish the "obstinate Prince," when they saw how the Ottoman claims and the Russian influence were weakened and despised in Serbia.

At length the tidings came to Belgrade, from Constantinople, that both Turkey and Russia considered the "refugees" innocent, and that, if the Prince still refused to receive them back into service, they must attend the Commissioner to Constantinople. The Prince repeated his first declaration, that only a Serbian Court could decide on the guilt or innocence of the refractory

Serbs, and until a Serbian Court acquitted them he would not, and could not, receive them again into State service.

The Commissioner and Consul Vashchenko had an interview with the Prince and endeavoured to induce him to submit to the decision of their Governments, but all their menaces and arguments failed.

Next day Mussa Effendi left Belgrade, taking with him the chief "Defenders of the Constitution." Before his departure a message came from the Prince to the effect that he was willing to pardon and receive back into service all the malcontents excepting seven, but this compromise was not accepted.

Freed from the presence of the Commissioner and that of the most bitter and powerful opponents of his Government, the resolute young Prince endeavoured earnestly to restore order, and strove sincerely to keep within the narrow limits of the Constitution.

He succeeded so well that the Grand Vizier wrote to him, in the autumn of 1840, to thank him for his Constitutional Government, and for the measures he had taken to re-establish peace in the so long disturbed country.

But scarcely had the nation begun to breathe freely and enjoy its unaccustomed tranquillity, when the Russian Ambassador, who had received the exiled chiefs very ungraciously on their return to Constantinople, began to treat them with attentive friendliness, and the vexed question of "Cabinet Counsellors" loomed again darkly on the horizon of Serbia. In the commencement of the year 1841 Prince Michael received information that

both the Ottoman and the Russian Governments desired that he should reconcile himself with the exiled Senators. He replied that, although these men were his avowed personal enemies, he was quite willing to forgive and reinstate in their offices all of them, excepting Vucsics, Petroniyevics, and Garashanin. He consented to allow even these men to return to Serbia if the Senate did not object to their return. He was willing to pension them also, if they pledged themselves, before leaving Constantinople, in the presence of the Russian Ambassador, to keep peace, and never again conspire against his Government. As to the less dangerous malcontents, he left open to them the possibility of being received again into State service.

But the Russian Cabinet would not hear of any stipulations, and Baron Lieven, Aide-de-camp to the Emperor, was despatched to Belgrade to reconcile the Prince with his opponents. Possibly the Baron had some less ostensible, but yet more important, mission to execute. About this time much agitation began to show itself on the Turkish frontiers, and it was rumoured that a Turkish force would be sent to occupy Serbia.

Baron Lieven had many interviews with Prince Michael, some of them strictly confidential ones, others attended by the Senators and in the presence of the Pasha. The subject of the private interviews never transpired, but the recall of the exiled Serbs was discussed at the more public conferences.

The result of these conferences was the proclamation of an amnesty to all political offenders, with the excep-

tion of Vucsics, Simics, and Garashanin, who were to remain some time longer in Constantinople. Prince Michael declared that he forgave and forgot all injuries done to himself personally, and recommended his friends and subjects to follow his example, and never to reproach the returning exiles with any of their past offences. He declared his readiness to receive all who sincerely desired the re-establishment and preservation of order, and the progress and prosperity of the country, back into the State service.

CHAPTER II.

WHILST the young Prince was doing his utmost to promote the peace of Serbia, an insurrection broke out in the Pashalik of Nissa, on its south-eastern frontier.

The Hatti-scheriff of Gulhane, which proclaimed the equal rights of all Mussulman and Christian subjects of the Sultan, had been proclaimed in all provinces, cities, and villages.

It was enthusiastically welcomed by the Christians of Bulgaria and Bosnia. They were credulous enough to believe that the Sultan, who had been bold enough to proclaim this charter of liberty, would have power to compel its execution and conservation.

But the indignation of the Mussulmans at least equalled the joy of the Raja, and the Turks knew better than the Christians how little real authority the Court at Stamboul possessed in the distant provinces of the great Empire.

The Hatti-scheriff was duly proclaimed, and remained thereafter a dead letter.

Its results were not favourable to those it professed to succour, for the newly-awakened fanaticism of the Mussulmans sought every possible pretence to manifest itself in outrage and insult to the Christians. In the north-west of Bulgaria the taxes were doubled and tripled, and the slightest appearance of resistance, or of

reluctance to pay, was punished in the most inhuman manner.

The carrying off of young Christian women to the harems of the Turkish officials was a thing of daily occurrence. At last the Bulgarian peasants in the Pashalik of Nissa rose to resist their oppressors, and to reclaim the privileges and liberties the Hatti-scheriff had conferred upon them.

The Pasha sent an infantry force against them, but it could do nothing, as they occupied too strong a position. So artillery were sent, and succeeded in speedily dispersing the insurgents. Many of them took refuge in Serbia, as the conflict had been not far from the frontier.

The Turkish soldiery burnt down 225 villages, and completely devastated that part of the pashalik which joins Serbia. The Bulgarian refugees sent a petition to Prince Michael, and another to Czar Nicholas, imploring succour, and there arose a strong feeling in Serbia against the Turks in consequence of this cruel treatment of the Bulgarians.

The Turkish Government was much occupied at this time by similar disturbances in Syria and Crete; nevertheless, Prince Michael thought it prudent to maintain a strict neutrality, as Serbia was so exhausted by the long-continued internal dissensions.

The garrisons on the frontiers were strengthened, and the Prince used his influence to induce the Bulgarians to accept the amnesty offered by the Sultan, and return to their villages, as the Porte had promised to assist them to repair the damages they had sustained.

It appeared at this time that the Government of the Prince entertained the most amicable relations with the Porte.

An insurrection of Bulgarians in the Pashalik of Vidin broke out, but was put down quickly by the Pasha, who found letters from Prince Milosh on the persons of the insurgents, which seemed to place beyond doubt the share the old Prince had taken in the rising.

The enemies of the Obrenovics availed themselves of this circumstance to excite the Porte against Prince Michael, whom they asserted to be acting in connection with his father.

As at this crisis a complot to bring Milosh back to Serbia (a project in which his wife, the mother of Prince Michael, was concerned) was discovered, the Porte gave credence to the assertions that the young Prince had connived at the affair.

Prince Michael ordered the conspirators to be tried in the Court of Justice, but this did not suffice to lull the aroused suspicions and fears of the Porte, especially as a rumour arose of the proposed marriage of Prince Michael with the daughter of Count Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Porte espoused openly again the cause of Vucsics and his party, and detained in Turkey all such Serbs as had accepted the Prince's pardon and were returning home.

Prince Michael was informed that the simple amnesty was insufficient: he must fix a time for the return of the malcontent chiefs, and receive them back at once into the State service.

This seemingly insignificant circumstance turned out one of great moment to Serbia in 1841.

The Russian Embassy in Constantinople was greatly surprised by this step of the Porte, as it considered the question as already definitely settled. The fact that the Porte had acted without previously consulting Russia, gave the affair additional importance in the eyes of the Ambassador. He declared that in his opinion the Serbian Prince had done everything in his power to settle the matter, and took sides openly with the Prince against the ex-Senators.

This embittered Vucsics and his associates extremely; although they owed their importance chiefly to Russian influence, they served Russia only so long as it was to their personal interest to do so. Seeing now that she seemed disposed to turn against them, they resolved to seek more zealously support from the Porte, and looked even towards such other foreign Powers as were capable of furthering their plans.

Vucsics represented to the Grand Vizier that Russia proposed to make a Slave State on the Danube strong enough to overthrow Turkey, and asserted that Serbia was the hotbed of all the machinations against the Porte. He said that Prince Michael was allured by a promise that he should be king of the new State—which would comprise Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovine, Bulgaria, Albania, and Montenegro—and was thus made a simple tool of Russian policy. The insurrections in Bulgaria and Bosnia were alleged to be only premature results of the intrigues of Russia and Prince Michael, and he confessed that even he, Vucsics, and his col-

leagues had received money from Russia to promote these disturbances.

These assertions were implicitly believed, and Turkey resolved at all events to replace those men in power who had every reason to work for the overthrow of Prince Michael, and whose heartiest desire was to banish the dynasty Obrenovics for ever from the throne of Serbia. Another prince of less resolute character must be chosen, one who would be more loyal to the Porte and more docile in the hands of these self-named "Defenders of the Constitution."

Meanwhile, as the Porte claimed for these men full reinstatement in their positions, and Prince Michael did not choose to place himself in decided opposition to Turkey at this disturbed time, he acquiesced in their return, although against the advice of the Russian Embassy.

How Austria discovered the new line of policy Russia had adopted toward the Serbian Government is uncertain; but there were men enough in Constantinople whose interest it was to draw her attention to the change. She sent now an extraordinary, non-official Agent, General Hauer, with open instructions to survey the rivers Sava and Danube, but whose real object was to confer with the Pasha of Belgrade how best the plans of Russia could be foiled, so as to keep Serbia in the hands of Turkey and Austria.

General Hauer resided in Semlin, but visited the Pasha regularly. He sent communications to various German papers attacking the policy of Russia in Serbia, and proposed once frankly to the English Consul, Mr.

Fonblanque, that Austria, France, and England should unite to defeat this policy. When the "Defenders of the Constitution" returned to Serbia he openly espoused their party, and invited them frequently to his house.

At this time the Porte claimed from the Serbian Government a large sum, said to have been expended for the expenses of the exiled leaders during their sojourn in Constantinople and their travelling expenses back to Serbia.

The Treasury could not meet this new burden without the levying of a direct tax, and, at first, both Prince and Senate were opposed to this. Instigated by General Hauer, the Pasha pressed very much the payment of this claim, and took every opportunity of upbraiding the Prince with his devotion to Russia.

The Prince, at last, consented to pay the travelling expenses, which amounted to 137,000 piastres, but refused to pay the sum, nearly five times as large, demanded for the expenditure of the exiles whilst in Constantinople. It was evident that the Pasha sought every plausible pretext to come into collision with the Prince, and, unhappily, pretexts just then were abundant enough.

A claim had been raised by some Turks to some lands on the Bosnian frontier, and, as the Serbian Government refused to acknowledge these claims, the Pasha accused Prince Michael of encroaching on the prerogatives of the Porte. Once he forgot himself so far as to tell the Prince that his Ministers were ignorant men, and he himself far less popular in the country than he

fancied himself to be, and totally wrong in trusting so much to Russia's support.

The Prince had bought in Austria a quantity of cannon-balls, and the Pasha protested very strongly against this purchase, and denied the right of Serbia to import ammunition. He took advantage of this occurrence to represent the state of things in the principality in the darkest possible colours in his next dispatches to Constantinople.

In consequence of this, the Porte demanded, formally, the dismissal of the Ministers, and insisted on the appointment of Vucsics and his friends to the (to be) vacant places, those men being known as "loyal subjects to the Sultan."

Affairs became yet more complicated when, in consequence of the fanatical persecution to which they were subjected, the Christians in Bosnia and Bulgaria began to emigrate in large numbers to Serbia.

The Serbian Government considered that it could not, in common humanity, forbid the settlement of the unhappy emigrants in the country; but the Grand Vizier found the occasion exceedingly favourable for the consideration of the charges that Prince Michael had excited the subjects of the Sultan to insubordination and insurrection.

The conferences in the fortress between the Pasha, the malcontent leaders, and General Hauer were very frequent, and it was notorious that combinations against the Prince were the object of these meetings. On the advice of the Russian Consul, therefore, he dismissed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, and appointed in his

stead Abraham Petroniyevics, one of the ex-Counsellors and the ablest of the opposition leaders. Prince Michael thought, doubtless, that this magnanimity towards one of the most bitter of the enemies of his house would disarm the animosity of his antagonists, but he was speedily undeceived.

No sooner had his opponents one hand on the reins of government, than they began to calumniate him in the most odious and ungenerous terms.

They could not reproach him with not governing according to the Constitution, for, as the English Consul, Mr. Fonblanque, said, when defending him against the ill-will of the Pasha, "it was evident that he abided but too faithfully by it." But they reproached him with his youth, his inability to choose wisely his advisers, and also with embarrassing State affairs greatly by his inexperience.

At this time the Government was in reality in great trouble on account of a deficit in the custom receipts.

Austria and the Porte had contrived to turn the transit trade from Serbia by granting peculiar concessions to merchants who, avoiding the usual way through Serbia, conveyed their wares from Constantinople and Adrianople by way of Vidin to Pesth and Vienna. Consequently the Serbian custom receipts were considerably lowered, and the deficit thus occasioned had to be covered by heavier taxation on property, and this, of course, caused great dissatisfaction in the country.

The opposition made the most of the thus prevailing discontent, and dwelt continually on the incapacity of the Government and the threatened ruin of the country.

Just at this crisis the widow of Karageorge died, and Prince Michael, who had always been an enthusiastic admirer of the chief of the first Revolution, ordered that the funeral of his widow should be one of great pomp, and attended with all princely honours.

The Princess Lyubitzza, Prince Michael's mother, accompanied the coffin from Belgrade to Topola, the burial-place of Karageorge.

This decision of the generous young Prince, which ought to have strengthened his claim on the respect and affection of his subjects, was exploited by his enemies to his detriment.

They took advantage of the deep impression the solemn pomp of the convoy made upon the people, to rehearse, in glowing phrases, the glorious deeds of the dead leader, and, by the coffin of the mother, to direct looks of hope and expectation towards the son.

Altogether the state of things began to look so threatening, that the Senate thought fit to recommend the Prince to acquiesce in the demands of the Porte and dismiss all his Ministers.

This he refused to do, as it would seem that he admitted thereby the right of the Porte to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, and his refusal was approved by both the Russian and English Consuls.

When this refusal was communicated to the Porte, an extraordinary Commissioner, Shekib Effendi, was sent at once to Serbia. This agent had been actively employed in Bucharest, where he had caused the deposition of the reigning Prince, and therefore people thought his being sent to Serbia at this time an evil

omen for the existing Government. The Prince's opponents, however, made a pretence of leaving the country, alleging that their residence in it only served to agitate the people. Indeed, Petroniyevics and Simics actually left and went to Valachia, and Vucsics himself, the day before the arrival of the Commissioner, crossed the river suddenly to Semlin. The day after he went, (in a Turkish boat attended by a Turkish officer and a servant of the Pasha of Belgrade,) down the Danube to Semendria. He spent a night there with the Turks in the fortress, and rode hurriedly next morning across the country to Kragujevatz, the centre of the prepared revolution.

We must go back a little to examine somewhat more closely into the preparations for this new revolution.

The ex-Cabinet Counsellors had succeeded in convincing the Porte, during their long stay in Constantinople, that it was necessary for the safety of the Ottoman Empire that the family of Obrenovics should be excluded entirely from the government of Serbia.

Austria appears to have coincided with this opinion, and the first step towards the fulfilment of the project was the return of the opposition chiefs to Serbia. We have seen how the Prince was induced to recall them, and, in a measure, to reinstate them in positions of influence and authority. But the people had to be prepared for the banishment of a popular family, and money was needed to carry out the plans of the revolutionists. It is true they were mostly rich men, but they had not the slightest intention to sacrifice their wealth to satisfy their ambition, so long as other ways

were open to obtain the requisite supplies. So they found a man who had been in the confidence of Prince Milosh, and sent him over to the ambitious ex-Prince to ask money from him, on the pretence that he could thereby work so upon the people that they would demand his recall and restoration. The old man fell into the snare, and gave some 15,000 ducats. The money was, in fact, used to organise a rising in Serbia to depose Prince Michael, but not to bring Prince Milosh back again.

Besides the lavish distribution of money, the conspiring chiefs were yet more lavish in promises. The direct tax, which was five thalers per head, was to be lowered to four thalers; and by a variety of inducements like this the peasants in the cantons round about Belgrade and Kragujevatz were persuaded to rise.

Prince Michael had just consented to dismiss his Ministers and replace them by the protégés of the Porte when he heard that these very men were in open revolt against him. He left Belgrade at once, at the head of a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry, to put down the insurgents. The people in the country he passed through joined him readily, and a conflict with the *avant-garde* of the rebels was decided in his favour. In this fight old Lukas Garashanin, one of the most powerful of the Prince's opponents (and the uncle of the future Minister, Elias Garashanin) fell.

Seeing that fortune in the first encounter was against them, many insurgents sought shelter in the Belgrade fortress. The Prince demanded that the Pasha should not receive the rebels, and, finding his demands not

attended to, surrounded the castle with a line of guards. But this act the Pasha considered as an offence against the Sublime Porte, and protested against it accordingly.

The body of insurgents had chosen a good position on a hill behind Kragujevatz and strengthened it with mud ramparts, on which were posted cannon taken from the city arsenal. Vucsics knew the necessity of speedily forcing the Prince to risk a general battle, as every day might be expected to increase the Prince's forces, more especially now the first fortune of war had shown itself in his favour.

To attain this end Vucsics sent a number of his men as deserters to the loyalist troops, and these represented to the Prince the advantages he would gain by a speedy attack on the insurgents. The Prince followed the insidious counsel, and moved against the encampment, but was received with a shower of cannon-balls, whilst the pretended deserters commenced firing in the rear. This brought his soldiers into disorder, and they were obliged to retire. The effects of the artillery, together with this ill-luck, demoralised quite the little army; so that, when Vucsics came upon it behind by the village of Jabaré, and attacked it with artillery, the ill-disciplined troops ran away and the day was lost.

The Prince, who had been present at the engagement, finding how little he could count on the steadiness and courage of his soldiers, determined to relinquish the contest and leave the country. He reached that night his summer residence on the Sava, near Belgrade, and summoned the Russian Consul, to apprise him of his decision. The Consul recommended his seeking refuge

in the Belgrade fortress until he could make some arrangements with the insurgents; but this suggestion the Prince indignantly refused to entertain. He said that, as the revolt had been brought about by the intrigues of Austria and the Porte, in coalition with Serbian traitors, there could be no sufficient guarantee either for the peace of the country or for his personal safety.

After this interview Prince Michael, accompanied by several members of his family and some of his Ministers, and attended by some gentlemen of his Court, crossed the Sava on the night of the 25th-26th of August, 1842 (O.S.), and landed in Semlin.

The same night the Pasha nominated a partisan of Vucsics as provisory prefect of Belgrade. The next day the Russian Consul presented a formal protest to the Pasha against all the late proceedings, and declared he could hold no intercourse with the rebels. The French and English Consuls made similar protests, and even the Austrian judged it wise to join with them. The Pasha told these gentlemen politely that they were simply commercial and not political agents; but he thought it prudent, nevertheless, to endeavour to persuade the Russian Consul that Vucsics was a patriot, acting for the best interests of his country, and no rebel.

The Austrian Consul (who had been annoyed by the Pasha's refusal to work with him when he had been on such confidential terms with the non-official agent, General Hauer) interrupted him with the angry remark, "that he had proofs that Vucsics had not acted in compliance with the wish of the Serbian nation, but in the

service of the Turks in Belgrade, who had escorted him to Semendria."

Two days after the departure of Prince Michael, Vucsics came with 7,000 men, mostly cavalry, to Belgrade. The Pasha received him with marked distinction, and a salute of cannon announced his departure from the fortress.

Prince Michael had sent a protest to the Pasha and the different Consuls before he left Semlin for Neusatz; but the insurgents having formed a Provisional Government, with Vucsics and Petroniyevis at its head, this was recognised by the Pasha without delay.

The first act of the Provisory Government was to cause all influential persons known as partisans of the dynasty Obrenovics to be arrested. Crowds of men were brought in daily, who were suspected of being friendly disposed to the young Prince. There being no room in the prisons for these people, Vucsics ordered a deep pit to be dug in the middle of a field, and into this hole the poor creatures were thrown, pell-mell.

A National Assembly was hurriedly convoked for the 1st of September to proceed to the election of a new Prince, and the deputies met, armed, on the Vratchar (a plain commanding in a great measure the city of Belgrade). Vucsics made a violent harangue against the Princes Obrenovics, and the mob, declaring that they would not permit either Prince Milosh or Prince Michael to return, proclaimed Alexander, the son of the First Chief, Karageorge, as Prince of Serbia. This election was at once communicated to the Pasha and to the extraordinary Commissioner, Shekib Effendi, and these came

immediately to the camp and congratulated the people on their choice. The Commissioner assured them that the election was certain to be approved and confirmed by the Sultan.

The Russian Consul made a formal protest against all these proceedings, and said he should hold no communication with the new Government.

Alexander Karageorgevics* and his Ministers showed themselves so servilely submissive to the Porte, that the Pasha of Belgrade may be said to have governed Serbia after the departure of Prince Michael. Vucsics avowed publicly that he had acted all along in obedience to the instructions he had received from the Porte.

The Berat for the confirmation of the new Prince arrived without delay, and was read publicly in presence of the Turkish and Serbian populations. It declared that the Sultan had found it needful to depose Prince Michael Obrenovics because he governed in a manner contrary to the will of the Sultan and in opposition to the laws his Imperial Majesty had given to Serbia. It ended by proclaiming Alexander Karageorgevics Prince of Serbia.

The public offices, and all places of trust and influence, were speedily filled with adherents of the new Government, and the number of claimants was so great that fresh places had to be created to satisfy them. Petro-niyevics was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Vucsics Minister of the Interior, with Garashanin as Under State Secretary.

* Kara George : Black George. Karageorgevics: the son of Karageorge.

The friends of the Obrenovics were silenced by threats of imprisonment (which implied in most cases something worse); but as many as could manage to escape crossed the Danube or Sava and joined Prince Michael in Hungary.

The prospects of the successful revolutionists seemed promising enough, and, after Vucsics and Petroniyevics had had an interview with the newly-appointed Turkish Ambassador to the Court of Vienna, who had arranged a meeting with them on his way thither, very little anxiety was felt about the reluctance which the Russian Consul evinced to have any communication with them.

But their peace was soon rudely disturbed by the intelligence that the Czar had written an autograph letter to the Sultan, protesting against the recent coalition of the Porte with the Serbian rebels, which coalition he regarded as an infringement of his prerogatives as recognised Protector of Serbia. He said that if the Serbs considered they had cause of complaint against Prince Michael, the matter ought to have been duly investigated, and, in case the complaints proved well founded, another Prince elected in the manner prescribed by the different Hatti-scheriffs, and for the fulfilment of which he, the Czar, had guaranteed. He declared that he could not consent to recognise the Prince whom the rebels had elected, and he hoped the Sultan, on a more thorough investigation of the question, would see fit to recall all late orders incompatible with the dignity of the Porte, and which could only serve to encourage rebellion in the future. At the same time,

Baron Lieven was sent to Serbia by the Russian Government, with instructions to examine duly the position of affairs, and then go on to Constantinople. No sooner had the Baron arrived, than a number of persons, mostly officers and tradesmen, sent in to him a written protest against the deposition of Prince Michael, and although these men were immediately imprisoned, the soldiery already began to show their sympathies for the overthrown Government. Thereupon Vucsics hastily disbanded them, and summoned a number of armed peasants to keep order in Belgrade.

Many movements broke out in favour of the ex-Prince, but were all energetically put down. During the Baron's sojourn in Belgrade the Russian Consulate was flooded with anonymous letters and pasquilles against the new Government. Even some Senators, who had at first encouraged the revolutionists, began now to denounce them to the Russian Envoy.

Multitudes of men, of different ranks, passed through the chain of sentinels Vucsics had set to guard the banks of the Danube and Sava, and crossed the river to join Prince Michael. Vucsics exhibited at this time extraordinary energy to keep down any demonstration of the people, because the Pasha assured him that the Porte would not accede to the Russian demands, unless the Serbs themselves openly manifested their sympathy with the deposed Prince. Vucsics contrived to induce the Senate to send large presents to the most influential people round the Sultan, and even managed to have pecuniary recompenses given to such Serbs as had most distinguished themselves by their activity in favour of

Karageorgevics. Much money was taken from the public Treasury to defray the expenses of Prince Alexander's visits to the houses of different Senators, and in order to gain over the peasants. But, notwithstanding all these efforts, complot after complot was discovered, all having for aim the restoration of the exiled Prince. Even in Belgrade, in defiance of the severity of the measures taken to repress all movements against the Government, some three hundred persons combined to bring back the Obrenovics. The boldness of these plots induced the new Ministry to propose that Prince Alexander should go into the interior of Serbia by the way of Schabatz and Valyevo. But, as news came that agitations in favour of the exiled Prince were rife also in those places, the project was abandoned; and Vucsics, as a precautionary measure, dismissed the rest of the regular army and replaced them in Belgrade by Turkish soldiers from the fortress.

Vucsics ascribed all these agitations to the refusal of Russia to recognise the new Government, and, more particularly, to the instigations of the Consul, Vashchenko. So he, in understanding with the Pasha, complained to the Porte against the Consul, and the Porte endorsed the complaint and sent it to St. Petersburg.

But as this did not appear immediately to affect the position of Vashchenko, a bolder and more open attack on Russian influence in Serbia was made by the new Ministers and their party.

It was rumoured officiously that Serbia would be placed under the joint protection of the Western Powers, England, France, and Austria.

A Polish emigrant, known as Louis Leonard, was about this time in Belgrade, and frequented much the office of M. Petroniyevics. It was supposed that he induced the Serbian Ministry to send a representation to the French Government as to the desirability of Serbia being placed under the protectorate of the Western Powers.

A communication from Prince Czartoriski in Paris was read before the Senate, in which he said he had given over to the French Cabinet the Serbian memoir, and the three great Western Powers were willing to protect Serbia, and support her against the undue pressure of Russia.

But a powerful party in the Senate had still a firm belief in the overwhelming power of Russia, and looked distrustfully on all these projects of the new Government. This distrust showed itself in fresh agitations against the Ministerial policy, and in repeated complaints about it to the Russian Consul.

Affairs looked yet gloomier when the Serbian Agent wrote, from Constantinople, that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg again categorically demanded of the Porte that the election of Karageorgevics should be declared void, and that another election should take place under Russian auspices.

Russia felt herself challenged to prove at once to the Western Powers and the Eastern Christians that her authority was unquestionable, and her protection a powerful and positive fact. She felt herself challenged to assert her long-claimed vaunted influence in the East in the face of all Europe.

The chief of the Polish emigration in Paris sent, meanwhile, various communications to Serbia, tending to encourage her to resist the encroachments of Russia, and boasting liberally of the material support France and England would lend Turkey in case the Czar waged war with the Sultan. Probably similar assurances from more weight-giving quarters were sent at this time to Constantinople, for the Porte declined resolutely to acquiesce in the demand of Russia for a new election. It declared that the Sultan, as Suzerain of Serbia, had already confirmed the election of Karageorgevics, and would rather lose Serbia than violate his pledge.

But Russia knew what these assertions of the Porte were worth, and reiterated her demand, with the additional stipulation that two of the chiefs of the revolutionist party should be banished from Serbia.

The Government was in exceeding consternation when the news came from Constantinople that the Porte had yielded to the Russian demands, and a new election, under the joint auspices of Turkey and Russia, was to take place. Alexander Karageorgevics was inclined to give in his resignation, but decided, before doing so, to travel through the country and see if he could sufficiently gain over the people to make his candidature probably successful.

The Ministers naturally exerted all due, and undue, influences to induce the people to re-elect Karageorgevics, with whom they themselves would stand or fall. It appeared almost, as if Russia and Turkey had combined to assist a plan which was to satisfy both parties—Russia was to have her claims as protecting Power fully

admitted and honoured, whilst Turkey was to be quieted by the exclusion of the Obrenovics from the throne of Serbia.

The semi-official Serbian journals interpreted thus this second election to the people, and asserted that the Princes Obrenovics were formally excluded from the candidature.

As the Russian Consul did not see fit to contradict this declaration, affairs did not look at all hopeful for the parties of the exiled Princes. It was officially admitted afterward, that the Czar desired the exclusion of Prince Michael from the list of candidates, and, indeed, every possible precaution was taken, by the Governor of the fortress and the minions of the existing Government, to prevent the young Prince's landing in Serbia. Bodies of armed men were stationed in different places, and the need of the greatest vigilance was impressed on all persons in authority, so that any sudden rising could be instantly put down.

The Senate held a secret session, in which it resolved to resist, with all means, the return of both the Princes Obrenovics to Serbia, and instructions were given that if any number of men, during the meeting of the National Assembly, collected together who were known to be partisans of the exiled Princes, such a crowd should immediately be fired into without waiting further orders.

On the eve of the election a private session of the National Deputies was held, and all arrangements taken to ensure the re-election of Karageorgevics at the Public Assembly next day. Alexander was so con-

vinced of being rechosen, that he waited, during the holding of the Assembly, in a cloister distant only about half an hour's drive from the place where it was held.

The National Assembly commenced its public sittings in the presence of Hafis Pasha, the Governor of Belgrade Fortress, and the Russian Extraordinary Envoy, Baron Lieven. These declared that, as Prince Michael was excluded from the throne and Prince Alexander had resigned, a new election must be made by the Serbs, in compliance with the joint decision of the Sultan as Suzerain, and the Czar as Protector, of Serbia. Then the Governor and Envoy passed among the deputies, demanding whom they desired as their Prince. The deputies, who had been arranged in groups according to their different cantons, answered unanimously, "Alexander Karageorgevics."

Thereupon the Turkish and Russian Commissioners congratulated the Assembly on their choice, and the election was recognised as valid, and proclaimed.

Prince Michael, being much troubled at this time by the death of his mother, the high-minded Princess Lyubitza, and seeing himself so shamefully deserted by Russia, contented himself with making a public protest. The officers and civilians who had followed him from Serbia, about 300 persons, also protested against the late proceedings.

Baron Lieven left ; but, before going, he represented to the new Government how impolitic and inhuman had been the orders it had, out of servility to the Porte, given to the Bulgarian emigrants to leave Serbia ; and obtained from Prince Alexander a decree permitting

these poor people to remain or to return. But, before he had got to St. Petersburg, he received orders to go back to Serbia, and see that Vucsics and Petroniyevics were sent out of the country. The Czar could not forgive these men their rebellion, though he accepted its results.

Baron Lieven, on his arrival in Belgrade, showed his instructions, which were to the effect that, in consideration of the Czar's desire, the Sultan's Berat, confirming the new Prince, would not be sent to Serbia until these two men, Vucsics and Petroniyevics, were banished from the country. The Serbian Government protested, and the National Assembly, on being convoked, was about to do the same, when the Senate suddenly decided that the will of Czar Nicholas must be obeyed. The exiled chiefs received from the Government each a yearly pension of 5,000 thalers ; and, having taken a formal leave of the Assembly, left Serbia in August, 1843. Their departure looked more like that of honoured guests than of rebellious subjects being sent into exile.

CHAPTER III.

THE new Prince, Alexander, was a man of feeble character ; and he left the Government at first entirely in the hands of the Ministers and Senate, occupying himself with experiments in economy and the acquisition of wealth.

All embryo agitations were kept down harshly ; the frontier opposite Austria was guarded still with the same care as immediately after Prince Michael's departure, and a severe law was passed against political offenders.

The finances were in a very bad state, owing to the late extraordinary expenses, and some attempt was necessarily made to place them on a better footing. The revolutionists had lowered the direct tax 20 per cent. to make themselves popular, and also, for the same reason, had diminished the toll on the exportation of cattle, so that the average custom receipts were very low. It was necessary now to reintroduce the former rate of taxation, in order to keep a due balance between national income and public expenditure.

The people were disappointed enough with this short period of low taxation ; but the agitations of the last two years had worn them completely out, and they were content, if only left at peace.

This reaction came very seasonably to aid the pur-

poses of the Government, who were thus at liberty to please themselves, as long as they flattered the nation with high-sounding praises of the benefits of the Constitution.

The Ministers (chosen by the Senate from among its own members, and submissive to the suggestions of the Porte) renounced entirely what had been called the "Serbian Mission" under the government of the Obrenovics; that is, the emancipation of the rest of the Serbian people from the immediate government of the Porte.

When Prince Karageorgevics went, in the year 1845, to pay his personal homage to the Sultan, Abdul Medjid, he declared, very humbly, that he and all his people were most devoted subjects of his Imperial Majesty, and anxious only to prove themselves worthy of his magnanimity. This servile submission to Turkey characterised the whole government of Alexander Karageorgevics.

In a certain degree, this sinking of Serbia to the level of a mere Turkish province coincided well with the policy of Russia; and, as a mark of his Imperial satisfaction in the restored tranquillity of the country (tranquillity which was, in fact, only the necessary reaction from long-continued agitation), the Czar complimented Prince Alexander with a "St. Anne's Order," accompanied by a flattering letter from Count Nesselrode.

For some years the monotony of Serbian political life was broken only by the festivities attendant on the appointments of new Consuls and Pashas, or by some faint movement, suppressed as soon as commenced, in

favour of the Obrenovics, and instigated by the old ambitious Milosh. Vucsics and Petroniyevics were permitted to return after a year of exile, and, to all appearances, a genuine reign of peace had begun in Serbia.

But political intrigues were as active as ever, only now they were chiefly confined to the walls of the Senate House.

The thing most worthy of notice during the first years of the reign of Karageorgevics was the altered position of Serbia *vis-à-vis* to Austria and Russia.

Neither Alexander nor his advisers could forget the obstacles Russia had put in their way, and we have already mentioned how Vucsics and Petroniyevics changed their behaviour to Russia during their stay in Constantinople. They had then begun to denounce Russia as the instigator of all agitation against the Porte, and the position taken by her in the conflict between Prince Michael and themselves had served to deepen and embitter their antipathy.

The nearer relations to Austria, brought about by General Hauer, were yet more developed when the residence of the Princes Obrenovics in Austrian territory enabled that State to control their movements, and thus render essential service to the existing Serbian Government. Then the Vienna Cabinet promised to support at Constantinople the claim of Karageorgevics to be recognised as hereditary Prince, and Turkey seemed content to find in the extending Austrian influence a counterpoise to that of Russia.

The Russian Consul, however, always took the first

place at all festivities of the Court, and the Czar was mentioned specially, as Protector of Serbia, in all public prayers.

But the Government evidently grew daily more submissive to Turkish and Austrian counsels, and, as a natural consequence, less docile to those of Russia.

After having renounced all independence in external policy, the Government organised a bureaucratic system of internal administration utterly fatal to all individual initiative. Serbia was quieted, indeed, but it was an unnatural, lethargic quietude, diametrically opposed to national progress and public morality. The enervated nation had need of some great shock to reawaken it into energy and life.

But nothing could be farther from the desires of the ambitious oligarchy now ruling Serbia than such an awakening of the people.

The year 1848 brought with it the revolution in Hungary, and some sparks of the flames there raging fell into, and disturbed the lethargy of, Serbia.

It is not our province to dwell in detail on the causes and results of the Hungarian Revolution. The Magyars, whilst demanding from Austria their own rights, were strikingly unjust to the rights of the other nationalities in the empire. Their attempts to Magyarise created them abundance of enemies at home. The Croats could not but remind them that Croatia, as a free and independent kingdom, had voluntarily united itself to the crown of St. Stephen, and did not hesitate to assert their resolution to maintain their autonomy unfringed.

The Serbs in Hungary protested against the violent proceedings of the Magyarising Government, and demanded the rights guaranteed to them by so many decrees; they desired the re-establishment of their own autonomous Administration, and their freely elected Voyvode (political chief) and Patriarch.

The Hungarians answered these demands by directing the bombardment of the place where the Serbs held their Assembly, and thus the signal for civil war was given, and the whole country burst into flame.

The Serbs were successful in the earlier conflicts, until the Magyars called to their aid larger bodies of soldiery and experienced generals. In this crisis the Hungarian Serbs demanded help from their brethren in Serbia, and a great number of volunteers responded to the call. This placed the Serbian Government in a very difficult position. The Hungarian Serbs were in arms, not only for their national autonomy, but also for rights the Government of the Principality was not disposed to concede to its own people, and yet it could not restrain the impulsive sympathy which hurried so many Serbs across the Danube to aid in the desperate struggle for liberty.

To attempt to stay the tide of popular feeling would unquestionably deprive the Government of Karageorgievics of its hardly-won popularity, and yet the Porte, at the instigation of the French Ambassador, made it clearly comprehend that Serbia must maintain the strictest neutrality. In this dilemma a National Assembly, the first for a long time, was convoked, and this Assembly proclaimed the neutrality of Serbia, and so removed

the stigma from the Government, or, at least, incurred a share of the unpopularity of the step. But this proclamation was only an ostensible compliance with the orders of the Porte, for the Ministers did not venture to stop the departing Volunteers, and their anxiety was increased by the news that the Princes Milosh and Michael Obrenovics were actively assisting the Hungarian Serbs, and, by their generous pecuniary succours and patriotic bearing, were winning general sympathy.

There was even a rumour that Prince Michael would be chosen Voyvode, and anxiety for the eventual result, if this young resolute Prince came into contact with the Volunteers from the principality, induced the friends of Karageorgevics to demand from the Austrian Government his banishment from its territory. A similar demand was sent to the Serbian Central Board of Defence in Hungary, and material help promised if the request was acceded to.

The better to counteract the dreaded influence of the Princes Obrenovics a Senator, named Kneechanin, resigned his office and crossed into Hungary to put himself at the head of the Volunteers. Kneechanin showed great courage and skill, and the men under him fought brilliantly against a corps of regular Magyar soldiers. But these were in much greater force and commanded by excellent generals, so that, after the defeat and retreat northward of the Austrians, with whose fortune their own was so interwoven, the Serbs found themselves in a very precarious and desperate position.

But now Russia came to the help of Austria, and, by simultaneous diversions of the Croatian and Serbian

forces, the Magyars were obliged to capitulate. Kossuth and other of the chiefs passed into Turkey, and thus the Hungarian Revolution came to an end.

But the Serbs, also, had gained nothing in return for all their sufferings and sacrifices in the years 1848 and 1849. Those in Hungary lost, after the war, what little political freedom they had really possessed, as the Vienna Government found their liberty incompatible with its policy of centralisation.

Having escaped the risk of being Magyarised the Hungarian Serbs came into the more fatal, because more subtle, danger of being Germanised.

The Serbs of the principality had also not gained anything. There was little probability that they would be able to inoculate their Ministers with liberal principles at a time when anti-liberalism had just reached its acme in the neighbouring empire, and when Russia was busy abolishing the liberal Constitution of Valachia. In fact Turkey never found Serbia more docile than after the Serbs had fought so gallantly on the plains of Hungary.

The attempts at insurrection in Bosnia and Bulgaria found no longer an echo in Serbia; on the contrary, the Government volunteered at this time a contribution of money to the Porte, and hinted that those ancient opponents of Turkey, the Princes Obrenovics, were probably at the root of the disturbances.

Omer Pasha put down resolutely the Bosnian insurrection, and Turkey, after a long diplomatic conflict, refused to expulse the Polish and Magyar refugees. So Serbia, throwing herself into the arms of Austria and

Turkey, ventured openly to act in opposition to Russia. The relations with the Russian Consul had been very cool since the Government, in 1850, had declared that the place of honour in the diplomatic corps belonged of right to the English Consul, Mr. Fonblanque, as being the oldest member of the corps. Notwithstanding the aspect of external tranquillity which the severe repressive measures of the Government had imparted to the country, innumerable intrigues were carried on in secret.

The Senate and Ministry were never more disunited, and the officials in the different offices were broken up into cliques devoted entirely to one or other of the many party leaders. Almost every Senator had his separate partisans and his personal ambitious aims, and his adherents intrigued for his advancement because, through him, they reckoned on individual gain. There were, besides the parties of the two Princes Obrenovics, those of Russia, Austria, France, and Turkey.

Until the end of 1851, Vucsics and Petroniyevics were at the head of the Government, and the influence of Austria and Turkey was in the ascendant. But when Petroniyevics, who was, as we have said before, unquestionably the most capable of the Serbian statesmen, died, M. Garashanin took his place in the Foreign Office, and then the, so-called, French policy gained ground. This party, looking for French support, distinguished itself by more patriotic measures and aspirations, and combatted equally the influences of Russia and Austria. Russia accordingly protested against Garashanin's nomination, but did not succeed in annulling it.

This fact impressed deeply the Serbian people, and when, shortly after, the new Minister dealt a bold blow at Turkey by causing the removal of Vucsics from his high office of President of the Senate, great agitation began to disturb their apparently lethargic apathy.

The partisans of Russia made overtures to the friends of the Obrenovics, but could not yet determine what course of action would best serve their common cause.

Just at this moment an event occurred important enough to force into the background all these insignificant and egotistic rivalries.

Russia's high-handed policy had reached a climax which compelled the Western Powers to declare their intention to support Turkey against it. Serbia, also, was obliged to define clearly the position she would take in the struggle. This was a delicate task for the Government, in face of the complicated condition of home affairs, and the vital importance of the decision to be taken to the country. Then came the quick Russian occupation of Moldavia and Valachia, and the sudden and complete destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, which caused such a panic of indignation in Western Europe. Naturally Serbia was one of the first States to be affected by this victory.

The Russian Consul had hitherto protested in vain against Garashanin's appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; but when Prince Mentschikoff, from Constantinople, imperiously demanded his dismissal, and threatened Prince Alexander that Russia would break off all diplomatic relation with Serbia within twenty-

four hours if his demand was not complied with, Karagegevics gave up Garashanin.

This concession of the Prince did not please the people, for M. Garashanin was very popular on account of his resolute character and his bold resistance to the undue influence exercised over the other members of the Government by Austria and Russia, as well as by the Porte. But the concession, though so displeasing to the nation, was not satisfactory to the St. Petersburg Cabinet. Russian policy required that all influential posts in Serbia should be occupied by its partisans, and the Russian Consul, M. Tuminski, was instructed to demand from Karagegevics the dismissal from the State service of all men known to be unfavourably disposed to Russia.

The Senate, however, protested, in an address to the Prince, against this demand as being unconstitutional. Karagegevics, urged on by friends of the men whose dismissal was required, and encouraged by the Austrian and other foreign Consuls, sent a memoir to Constantinople complaining against the tyranny of Russia.

In consequence of this step of the Prince, the Russian Consul broke off all relation with the Government, and the opposition seized the opportunity thus offered to canvass the nation in favour of Prince Michael Obrenovics. The peasants were told that Karagegevics had broken up all relations with the Czar, and intended, in the approaching war, to help the Mussulmans against the orthodox Russians. These representations wrought greatly on the innate religious reverence

which the Serbs have shown at all times for the Greek Church ; but Prince Michael hastened to suppress, by means of circulars addressed to his friends, all agitation in his favour at such a critical time. He declared that he would not step through the blood shed in a civil war to the position of reigning Prince of Serbia. Austria, not wishing that so supple a tool as Karageorgevics should lose a position so favourable to the promotion of her interests as that of ruler of Serbia, advised him to endeavour to satisfy Russia's demands by the dismissal of the Anti-Russian party. The Vienna Cabinet took this occasion to hint to the Government in St. Petersburg how greatly the position of Prince Alexander Karageorgevics was endangered in Serbia, by the displeasure of Russia, as shown so openly in the interrupted diplomatic relations ; it suggested also the probability of a revolution in favour of the Obrenovics.

Czar Nicholas, no lover of revolutions, sent an extraordinary agent, M. Fonton, Chancellor of Legation at Vienna, to travel through the agitated cantons of Serbia, with instructions to explain explicitly to the people that the Czar did *not* wish Prince Karageorgevics to be removed. The agent had likewise secret instructions to sound the Serbs as to their real feelings toward Russia, and ascertain what might be expected from them in the event of a war breaking out. He was to flatter them with skilful and fulsome recognition of the great services men so renowned for bravery could in such case render the Czar. M. Fonton made many warlike speeches, and adroitly re-established the shaking authority of Karageorgevics among the people. On the tomb of the

First Chief, Karageorge, he made a highly-coloured eulogium on that great Serbian Leader.

M. Fonton had hardly left Serbia before the Russian army invaded Moldavia and Valachia. The peasants were told that the Czar was determined to free all Eastern Christians from the Infidel yoke, and make them into independent nations. The Western Powers, knowing well the influence of such representations on the impressible Serbs, urged the Government to proclaim immediately a strict neutrality. Austria especially exerted her influence in this direction, and Serbia, finding the step advantageous to her own interests, proclaimed herself neutral.

This was in reality a greater blow to the policy of Russia than it appeared at first. The Slaves in the Ottoman Empire, particularly those in Bosnia, North Albania, Bulgaria, and Herzegovine, looked to Serbia for a signal; and, had she declared for Russia, they would all at once undoubtedly have arisen. Then the Russians could not include a neutral territory in their operations, and thus could not invade the Balkan Peninsula by the west of Bulgaria, where they knew they would find a friendly population. They were thus compelled to withdraw their forces from West Valachia, and, moving eastwards, tried to cross the Danube at the point where the Mussulman element of the population of Bulgaria is most strong.

The neutrality of Serbia was accepted, and sanctioned, by the Porte in a firman confirming and recognising all the rights and privileges given to her in understanding with Russia.

Meanwhile Austria had concentrated an army on the Danube, round about Semlin, and this force increased so rapidly that the Serbs became quite alarmed, notwithstanding the assurances of Austria that it was merely a corps of observation, and that the neutrality of Serbia would be strictly respected, unless Russia saw fit to throw an army into the country.

The Government, under the pressure of this menacing danger, thought it prudent to prepare for all contingencies, and directed, therefore, the arming of the people. Each of the seventeen cantons was ordered to equip and train 6,000 men, and keep them ready to march at any moment.

A Swiss engineer, Colonel Orelli, was invited to direct the manufacture of cannon, and ammunition was fabricated with all possible speed, whilst arms were imported from Belgium notwithstanding the preventive measures taken by Austria. The roads were put in good condition, and a large quantity of provisions accumulated in different places throughout the country. In short, Serbia was earnestly preparing to repel any invasion. It would seem that Austria really proposed to occupy Serbia, though Prince Karageorgevics, in an interview with the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, candidly declared that the Serbs would resist to the utmost any invasion, be it Russian or any other: he added that he and his Ministers could guarantee the tranquillity of the country, and would willingly listen to any friendly counsel proffered by the Vienna Cabinet.

The Governor of the Belgrade fortress evidently suspected some hostile demonstration on the part of

Austria, for he told Karageorgevics that he, with his Turkish soldiers, would unite with the Serbian forces to repel any attempt at invasion.

The Serbian Government was so disturbed by the aspect of affairs that it sent a note to Constantinople, protesting against the threatening behaviour of Austria. The excitement was not quieted until the withdrawal of the Austrian army from the frontiers of Serbia to those of Valachia.

Fearing no longer Austrian occupation, and hearing of the defeats of the Russians in the Crimea, the Government began to submit again to the influence of the Vienna Cabinet, especially when that capital was chosen as the scene of the Peace Conference between the Western Powers and Russia.

The position of Serbia towards the Porte was to be defined and settled at this Conference, and her rights confirmed by, and placed hereafter under the joint protection of, the great European Powers. It was thought that the hereditary rights of the Princes Obrenovics would likewise be discussed at this Conference, and Austria availed herself of this report to strengthen her power over Karageorgevics, promising him to support his claims if the hereditary rights of Serbian Princes came really under discussion at the Conference.

Altogether, the fact of the great European Powers meeting together in Vienna strengthened the growing influence of Austria over the simple Serbian people, although the Conference ended without any results so far as the peace it proposed to treat of was concerned.

CHAPTER IV.

THE Treaty of Paris, signed 30th of March, 1856, restored peace to Europe and guaranteed to Serbia all her earlier acquired rights and privileges. Two incalculable and exceedingly important gains were the results of that treaty. In the first place, she exchanged the exclusive and often oppressively arrogant protection of Russia for the joint protection of all the great Powers; in the second place, the Conference resolved that no armed intervention in her affairs could take place without the unanimous consent of all the Great Powers.

Prince Karageorgevics made these gains known to the people by a proclamation, in which he congratulated himself on the good results of his policy. He hoped thus to place himself and his government in a bright light before the nation, and this was greatly needed, for he had lost almost all his popularity, in consequence of the known weakness of his character and the palpable faults into which this precipitated him.

Old Vucsics, having lost his place, spoke openly of the incapacity of the ruler he had been one of the chief instruments in electing, and tried all means to raise up opposition to the Prince. This opposition became more decided as the Prince fell more under the influence of the Austrian Consul. Karageorgevics attempted to neutralise it by bringing some of his relations into the

Senate, and appointing some of his wife's relatives Ministers. But this policy had the contrary effect, as the Senate became yet more obstinate and bitter in its opposition.

Prince Alexander began now to think, with old Prince Milosh, that a Senate so constituted could not co-exist with the position of a constitutional Prince. Accordingly he sent a petition secretly to Constantinople, praying for the abolition of the present Constitution, and submitting to the Porte the outline of a new Constitution which would confirm the hereditary right of succession in his family. This project proposed to abolish the Senate, and substitute instead of it two houses, of which the members were to be chosen for life, and which should have no right to propose new laws, but only that of discussing and accepting, or rejecting, the laws proposed by the Government.

When this proceeding of the Prince came to the knowledge of the Senate, a complaint against him was sent to Constantinople. The Senate demanded the deposition of Alexander Karageorgevics as an incapable egotistical man, who governed contrary to the laws of the country and in opposition to the interests of the Ottoman Empire.

At the same time, and in order to give their representations a greater weight and gain the people over to their side, the Senate petitioned the Sublime Porte to fulfil the following "national desires":—1, As an acknowledgment of Serbia's neutrality during the late war, the Porte should declare solemnly that no Ottoman or other army should hereafter be allowed to pass through Serbia: 2, That the Turkish garrisons should evacuate

the Serbian fortresses, and that these strongholds be demolished: 3, That the Hatti-scheriff of 1830, which ordered that all Turks should leave the Serbian cities, should be fulfilled, and only such Turks be allowed to remain in the open cities of Serbia who consented to submit to the Serbian laws and jurisdiction; in which case freedom of religion and all the privileges of Serbian citizens would be guaranteed to them: 4, The commercial relations between Turkey and Serbia should be settled on principles of reciprocity: 5, All the treaties of the Sublime Porte, which had been concluded without the consent of, and contained clauses detrimental to the right of autonomy of the principality, should not be binding on it: 6, All foreigners resident in Serbia, with the exception of the diplomatic agents, should come under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Courts: 7, Serbia should have the right of keeping diplomatic agents at all European Courts: 8, The frontiers of Serbia should be rectified, that is to say, some little districts on the south and south-east should be annexed to the principality.

These bold stipulations, which really represented the desires of the nation (and which were afterwards, in a great measure, secured by the energy of Prince Michael), surrounded the Senators with a halo of patriotism that could not fail to excite powerfully the sympathies of the nation in their favour, and made the Prince look, by contrast, more egotistical than he was in reality.

The Senate sent, at the same time with these stipulations, the project of a Constitution which limited the legislative power to the Prince and Senate, to the

exclusion of the people; in fact, a Constitution no more liberal than the one which was already in force.

As the Porte, however, appeared disposed to ignore these documents, the Senators urged the convocation of a National Assembly to decide their dispute with the Prince, and counted evidently on the opinion of the people being in their favour. This determined the Prince to object to the calling together the Assembly, and the Porte, probably on his suggestion, endorsed his refusal.

But the Prince's reluctance to appeal to the people only served to extend the agitation, and the discontent reached a climax when Karageorgevics appointed one of his sons-in-law, who was not a Senator, Minister. The Senate considered this appointment a breach of the clause of the Constitution which declared that Ministers should be chosen from its body, and a rumour gained ground that the Prince intended to change all Senators who were partisans of Russia.

The dissatisfaction of the nation was so palpable and threatening, that Prince Alexander thought it prudent to make a tour through the provinces, in the vain hope that his presence would revive his popularity.

Two days after his return to Belgrade, several Senators were arrested on the charge of conspiring against his life.

The evidence proved, in fact, that some members of the Senate had plotted to depose the Prince; some of these with the hope of restoring Prince Milosh, and others with the ambitious idea of establishing a triumvirate, of which each secretly hoped to be one of the elected three. .

An escaped prisoner came forward to witness that he

had received forty-eight ducats to kill the Prince on his travels through Serbia. The accused Senators all denied an intention to murder, but acknowledged their desire to depose the Prince, and were condemned accordingly to death.

But the Pasha, Governor of the fortress of Belgrade, acting on instructions from Constantinople, officially demanded a mitigation of this sentence, and Prince Alexander, to show his submission to the Porte and afraid, perhaps, of the sensation the execution of so many public men would make among the people, changed the capital sentence into one of perpetual imprisonment in the prison of Gurgusovatz—a keep dating from the earlier period of Turkish supremacy, and notoriously damp and gloomy.

The convoy of Senators, loaded with chains and dressed in the rough garb of convicts, created an extraordinary sensation among the peasants who encountered it on its way from Belgrade to Gurgusovatz, which is situated on the south-east frontier of Serbia.

People seemed to feel that a great crisis was approaching, and looked forward sullenly to the overthrow of the Prince whose Government afforded them spectacles so singular and sad.

The parties of the opposition were all alert, though working for many different ends. The French Consul, Dezessard, did not affect to conceal the wish of his Government that the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Garashanin, should be elected Prince of Serbia, and the Serbian millionaire, Captain Misha, canvassed already the different foreign Courts for his son-in-law, a

major in the Russian service and the nephew of Karageorgevics.

Meanwhile, the adherents of the Obrenovics dynasty looked hopefully for the recall of one of the exiled Princes, and, bearing in mind the advanced age of Milosh, considered that it mattered little which.

All these otherwise divided parties united to demand that the Porte should order an investigation of the cases of the convicted Senators.

In compliance with this call an extraordinary Commissioner was despatched from Constantinople, to examine the evidence which led to the condemnation of the Senators, and to investigate the general condition of affairs in the principality.

The anxiety of Karageorgevics' partisans, already excited by the arrival of this Commissioner, Ethem Pasha, was heightened exceedingly when a number of influential Serbs, as well as those men who had during the late years lost their positions, presented to the Pasha memoranda representing the injustice done them by the existing Government.

Seeing that no voice was raised to defend the Prince, the Commissioner recommended him to resign, and Karageorgevics personally had no objection to do so; but his family, and some members of his Court, declared that it was a shame for a reigning Prince of Serbia to resign at the request of a Turkish Pasha, and so induced him to reject the counsel.

Meanwhile, instructions arrived from Constantinople which prevented the Commissioner from insisting on the resignation, and led him to attempt to bring about a

reconciliation betwixt the Prince and Garashanin, Vucsics, and the other leaders of the opposition.

The reconciliation was effected on the Prince consenting to release the imprisoned Senators. Vucsics was nominated President of the Senate, and Garashanin (Home Secretary) Minister of the Interior, and to these two the formation of a new Ministry was entrusted, as the Prince saw no other way to escape from his difficult and precarious position.

Other parties, compromised in the late conspiracies, were also liberated on condition that they left the country.

But the apparent peace which followed these proceedings was too superficial to endure long. Karageorgevics had not gained thereby any sympathy from the people; who were, on the contrary, humiliated by this fresh interference of the Porte in their domestic affairs, and believed that the real cause of the interference was the incapacity of their Prince.

The Convocation of a National Assembly was loudly demanded, and all parties, excepting the small one yet attached to the Prince, joined in the popular clamour. Every party chief expected to gain something by pleading for the cause he had espoused before the thoroughly disgusted and disappointed people.

The majority of the nation desired the return of the Obrenovics; the so-called "French party" hoped Garashanin would be chosen Prince; the wealthy merchant, Misha, with his court of small tradesmen, worked diligently to ensure the election of his son-in-law (who was, as we have said, the nephew of Prince Alexander); and

a certain bureaucratic clique dreamed of a triumvirate consisting of Garashanin, Vuicsics and Misha. But all these divided parties had one ardent wish in common—the deposition of Alexander Karageorgevics. Such was the condition of things on the eve of the 30th November (O.S.), 1858, the day for which the National Assembly was convoked.

Prince Karageorgevics, after having been in a manner compelled to convoke the Assembly, did his utmost to lessen the possible ill-consequences to himself, by taking advantage of the new election law and choosing as deputies many of the higher priests and State officials on whose loyalty he thought he could depend.

But, notwithstanding all his precautions, the first step taken by the Assembly was to demand his resignation. He requested to be allowed twenty-four hours to consider the matter, but the same night secretly left the palace and placed himself under the protection of the Governor of the fortress.


The next day, when the flight was announced, the indignant Assembly proclaimed at once that Alexander Karageorgevics was deposed from the dignity of Prince of Serbia, and that the dynasty Obrenovics, in the person of old Prince Milosh, was restored to power, with all the rights and privileges formerly guaranteed to it by the Hatti-scheriffs of the Sublime Porte.

These proclamations were made in the midst of the enthusiastic rejoicings of the people, and without any serious opposition from any side. A party of soldiers, instigated by the family of Karageorgevics, attempted, indeed, a feeble demonstration on behalf of the deposed

Prince, but were quickly disarmed without any blood being shed.


The foreign Consuls did their utmost to prevent any disturbances, and persuaded the Ministers of the ex-Prince to restrain the soldiers from hostile demonstrations.

A Provisory Government was immediately formed, to conduct State affairs until the return of Prince Milosh, which took place in the latter part of January, 1859.



BOOK FOURTH.

**RESTORATION OF THE DYNASTY
OBRENOVICS.**



BOOK IV.

RESTORATION OF THE DYNASTY OBRENOVICS.

CHAPTER I.

THE return of Prince Milosh to Serbia was the signal for general rejoicing.

Old men, who had fought side by side with the great chief in his glorious struggles for independence, recounted their past perils and victories to their sons, and these, in their turn, looked hopefully forward to a future in which they saw *his* sons work with them for the prosperity and glory of their common country.

Milosh was very old and suffering from an organic heart disease, but he retained still in great measure his marvellous energy.

The young men, accustomed to the ceremonious etiquette imported from Austria, were astonished to hear the old Prince address the people familiarly, in church, in the streets, before his palace; in fact everywhere where a crowd assembled to see and greet him.

A freer and healthier atmosphere seemed to diffuse itself round about the old Prince, somewhat too patriarchal, perhaps, for the recently developed bureaucratic Administration, but unquestionably fortifying and invi-

gorating. Men felt that the magistrates were there for the sake of the people, not the people for the sake of the magistrates.

It seemed, too, as if the very name of Milosh raised Serbia to her old position in the eyes of the other Christian populations in Turkey. She became again the centre of their hopes, and their acknowledged natural leader in the path to religious and political freedom.

The old Prince was not long before he proved that his self-reliance and resolution were unchanged. He made at once a decided resistance to the encroachments of Austria and Turkey. During the feeble Administration of Karageorgevics, the Pasha of Belgrade had sent Turkish soldiers to act as guard in the principal streets of the city. Prince Milosh very soon requested the Pasha to withdraw these soldiers, and, as he refused to do so on the ground that when he came into office he found it was customary for Turks to keep the watch, the old Prince retorted that *he* had not left such an institution in Serbia, and could not suffer it. The Pasha was obliged to give way, as the Prince had unquestionably the right on his side, whatever infringement on that right might have been permitted by the late weak Government.

Again, Austria, during the government of Karageorgevics, had stopped a large transport of arms destined for Serbia. Prince Milosh demanded these arms, and, to avoid dispute with the resolute Prince, the Austrian Government gave them up.

These things, insignificant in themselves, but showing

the people that their old chief yet retained his well-known and characteristic resolution, made him amazingly popular.

Nevertheless, it was soon pretty evident that the virtues and failings of the old Prince were almost equally discordant with the new institutions. It was his custom, and he considered it his duty, to care for every branch of the State service, and he expected to be consulted on the smallest details. He believed that his patriarchal way of governing was the one the best suited to the country; and, indeed, the mass of the nation liked it, and the peasants came in crowds to Belgrade, to see their Prince and ask, personally, his advice and help in all their petty troubles and disputes. But during his twenty long years of exile a new class had formed itself, and this class, priding itself on its intelligence and "book knowledge," considered the patriarchal simplicity of the unlettered but genial Prince as derogatory to the dignity of Serbia.

As might have been expected, familiar counsellors of the old Prince abused their influence over him to the detriment of some of their former personal antagonists, but their intrigues were frequently counteracted by Prince Michael, who, as heir to the princely dignity, now resided in Serbia, although not in the same house with his father.

Unhappily, however, he was not always at hand, and the old man thought he had a right, as Prince, to deplace according to his pleasure the State servants, whenever he saw, what he deemed, sufficient reason to do so.

Thus it happened that the personal adversaries of the

people about the Court were always exposed to the risk of losing their situations without any previous warning, which would have allowed them an opportunity of explanation or exculpation. This uncertainty had the one great advantage of forcing the State officials to be circumspect and diligent, but it was felt as none the less galling and unjust.

However, the popular respect in which the old Prince was held, and the conviction that his reign could not, in the nature of things, be very long, made people submit patiently to the many minor evils incident to the government of a man who belonged, alike by his character and opinions, to a past generation.

The indulgence of the nation was not put to any long-continued proof. In the spring of 1860 Milosh Obrenovics died, and, in his stead, his son Michael became, for the second time, reigning Prince of Serbia.

CHAPTER II.

WITH the proclamation of the new Prince a different epoch commenced in the history of Modern Serbia. His noble device, "*The law is the supreme will in Serbia*," was welcomed by all who desired earnestly the progressive prosperity of their country; and his promise to "faithfully endeavour to redress all injustices or grievances of the preceding reign," was one of good omen for his people. A new spirit seemed to inspire the new Administration, and its influence spread quickly from rank to rank, until it might almost be said that a higher life had been breathed into the nation.

When the Commissioner of the Porte brought the usual Berat of confirmation, Prince Michael declined to go to hear it read, according to former custom, on the field before the fortress; he invited the Pasha to bring the Berat to his palace, and, when it was given to him, he declared that he should fulfil loyally his engagements as Prince of Serbia to the Sultan, his Suzerain, but he should also guard jealously and unceasingly against any infringement on the rights of the Serbian people.

The policy of the Prince was actuated by distinct and consistent principles. Already, during the first year of his government, it became evident that he was resolved that no foreign influence should be permitted to interfere with the internal affairs of the country. He sought to reconcile the different parties, and showed an extra-

ordinary generosity and magnanimity in his treatment of his most bitter personal enemies. He studied incessantly the best means to improve the public finances, and devoted himself assiduously to the organisation of an effective military force.

Such of the partisans of Karageorgevics and former opponents of his and his father's government, whom he could not, in conscientious fulfilment of his duties as ruler, replace in positions of influence and authority over the people, he pensioned munificently and showed a noble pleasure in welcoming to the graceful festivities of his Court. *Garashanin himself was entrusted with the formation of the first Cabinet.*

But it must be admitted that this conduct of the Prince was too much above the general moral of the people, and many faithful partisans of the Obrenovics dynasty were exceedingly angry and disappointed. It must be remembered that they had suffered unspeakable hardships, had been relentlessly persecuted during the last twenty years; they had greeted the return of the Obrenovics as the certain forerunner of their personal triumphs, and now the means of retaliation were taken from their reluctant hands by the very Prince they had hailed as the surest champion of their cause.

They could not dispute, and were yet unwilling to accept, the assertion of their Prince, "that Serbia was so small a country, and had so great a mission, that he could not look at the colour of the men he employed in the State service." He held it as his unmistakable duty to look only at their ability to fill the places assigned them.

This undoubtedly generous and, apparently, farseeing policy estranged from him too many of the earlier adherents of his family, and induced them to join, more or less openly, the party of the ex-Prince Karageorgevics. But this desertion did not turn the resolute Prince one iota from the path he had laid down. Personally he had always evinced a sincere and ardent respect for the First Chief Karageorge, and he never suffered any to speak disrespectfully in his presence of the degenerate son of the great Chief. Indeed, the brothers-in-law of the ex-Prince were continually invited to the Palace, and frequented the Court balls—sometimes, as it was proved afterwards, with loaded revolvers in their pockets. Not that *they* feared any disloyal attack from their princely host, but as a prudent precaution in case anything *might* occur to remove him from their path. In case of his death, they thought, as he had no direct heir, the star of Karageorge might, and probably would, rise again in Serbia, where, as we have seen, the people cherished an almost superstitious traditional loyalty for the families of their first chiefs.

The earliest act of the foreign policy of Prince Michael was his demand for the full fulfilment of the Hatti-scheriff of 1830. It will be remembered that this contained the declaration of the Sultan, that no Mussulmans should remain in Serbia except as garrisons of the fortresses. Nevertheless, half the city of Belgrade was inhabited by Turks, who formed a distinct and independent community, and had their own magistrates and police. The Turkish population was poor and ignorant; the Serbian, progressing in every respect. Collisions

betwixt the Mussulmans and Christians were very frequent, more especially in the dark and narrow streets of the Turkish quarter. Equally frequent were disputes betwixt the Turkish and Serbian magistrates. All measures taken by the Serbian police for the order, security, and health of the people were obstructed, or frustrated, by the fatalistic indolence of the Turkish authorities. This condition of affairs could not possibly last long, and it was no marvel that the intercourse of two such different populations grew constantly more bitter and perilous.

In this crisis Prince Michael sent Minister Garashanin to Constantinople, to urge the execution of the Hattis-scheriff, or, at least, to induce the Porte to order the Turkish population in Belgrade to submit to the Serbian authorities. The Porte refused to do justice to the Prince's complaint, and this refusal rendered at once the Mussulmans more arrogant and the Christians more susceptible. At last the expected explosion came. A Turkish soldier killed a Serbian boy at a public fountain, and the Serbian police commissioners, who went to demand the arrest of the murderer, were fired upon by the Turkish soldiers and killed. Then the Serbs rose instantly as a man, attacked the fortified guardhouses of the Turks, and drove them all, soldiers and citizens, into the fortress.

Two days later, 17th of June (N.S.) 1862, when the foreign Consuls and Minister Garashanin were actually on their way to the fortress to ratify a Provisory Convention for the maintenance of order, Asheer Pasha, the commander of the fortress, yielding to the importunities

of the angry refugees, bombarded the city.* The Serbs formed a belt round the fortress, and desired the Prince to declare war against Turkey, who was at this time aggressing also Montenegro.

Prince Michael was greatly inclined to act on the avowed wish of the people, and, when his Ministers urged the insufficiency of the State finances to support such a burden, he surrendered at once his civil list, and declared his readiness to devote all his immense personal property to the purposes of the war. But he recognised the necessity of first having the assurance that the European Powers would remain neutral during the struggle, and accordingly sought indirectly to discover if they were disposed to be so. They resolved, however, to bring the matter before a Conference of the Representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople.

Prince Michael demanded that the Turkish garrisons should evacuate immediately all Serbian fortresses, and apparently believed that this demand would be complied with. But the Conference went only half way. It decided that the Hatti-scheriff of 1830 ought to be executed; that the Mussulman population should leave the Serbian cities; and that the Porte should give up some unimportant, more than half-ruined castles in the

* The whole Consular Corps drew up an indignant protest against this treacherous and inhuman act, and Mr. Longworth, the English Consul-General was, strangely enough, censured by Sir Henry L. Bulwer, the then English Ambassador at Constantinople, for having signed this protest.

interior of Serbia (those of Uschitza and Sokol); but left all the stronger forts (those of Schabatz, Semendria, and, the most important of all, *Belgrade*) still in the possession of Turkish garrisons.

The Turks were to receive indemnities for the property they left in the Serbian cities, and, as the fortress of Belgrade was held to be endangered by the too near proximity of Serbian houses, it was resolved that a certain space about it should immediately be cleared.

This arrangement was far from satisfying the Serbian demands, and it was generally believed it would be rejected. That it was not, must be ascribed to the representations of Sir Henry L. Bulwer, who came expressly to Belgrade for the purpose, and had many conferences with Prince Michael and Minister Garashanin.

Finally, the Government declared its willingness to comply with the wish of the great protecting Powers.

But it was understood that the English Cabinet had given some positive promise to Prince Michael, as he evidently considered the question of the fortresses delayed but not resolved. (At this time, too, the long residence of the Princess Julia, the wife of Prince Michael, in London, induced the Serbs to hope much from the increasing sympathy of the English, as it was well known how well their Princess was received, and how sincerely she was devoted to the cause to which her noble husband had dedicated his life. Now, for the first time, eloquent and earnest speakers stood up in the English Houses of Parliament to plead the rights of Serbia.) The movement which followed the bombardment of Belgrade served to prove that, though every

Serb possessed firearms, they were for the most part of inferior and primitive construction. The people, too, however prompt to take up arms, could certainly never count on permanent success if confronted with disciplined and well-armed soldiers.

The Prince resolved to remedy, as soon as possible, all this. He commanded the purchase of some 200,000 rifles of the new construction (Belgian). The Porte, and some other Powers, protested against this, but the arms were nevertheless brought into Serbia through Russia and Roumania. They were sold to the people at a merely nominal price, so that in the same year every Serb capable of bearing arms possessed a Vincennes rifle. Meantime, a law was passed ordering the organisation of a national army, by which all Serbs from twenty to sixty years old were divided into three classes; each class numbering 70,000 men; the infantry were recruited from the country, and the cavalry and artillery from the cities.

In addition to the ordinary training, the soldiers were ordered to meet twice a year in a large camp, where they passed from eight to twelve days, and practised diligently the more difficult and complex military movements.

The organisation and training of the national army were pursued with such diligence that, in 1867, Prince Michael thought the time had come when he might safely insist on the evacuation of the fortresses.

We must go back a little to see what reforms the Prince had, meantime, been making in other branches of the State service.

One of his first cares had been to reorganise the Senate. During the last twenty years, the seventeen men who composed this body had virtually governed Serbia; electing and deposing the princes at their good pleasure, or as the intrigues of the one party were better planned, or better carried out, than those of the rest.

The Senate had been at the bottom of most of the disorders and insurrections that had so long torn and maimed the poor country, which seemed really to have escaped the Scylla of Mussulman tyranny to fall into the all but equally unhappy Charybdis of civil discord and domestic treachery.

From the earlier days of Milosh's government the Senate had been unpopular, and its revolt against Prince Michael in 1842 had served to estrange from it the few sympathies it had succeeded in acquiring in the country. It had made itself, in everything but the name, an oligarchical clique, and the people resented the treason by which they had been deprived of their rights of being represented in a National Assembly.

That interpretation of the Constitution which assumed that the Senators could not be removed without the express permission of the Porte, had emboldened the Senators to make all kinds of disloyal opposition to the measures, however salutary, proposed by the Prince, whom they seemed to regard as their natural enemy. We said the interpretation which assumed the right of the Porte to be a sort of Court of Appellation to the Senators was undeniably an infringement of the guaranteed autonomy of Serbia.

In reorganising the Senate, Prince Michael left it its

legislative power, but its members could be removed, when Serbian courts of justice found them guilty of felony, without any reference to the decision of the Porte. This reform passed without any opposition worthy the name. Merely a few antiquated, egotistical Senators opposed this diminution of their privileges, and their protests were scarcely heard amidst the animated self-congratulations of the nation.

After this reorganisation of the Senate, the Prince directed a law to be prepared for regulating the national representation. During the long term of nineteen years, whilst Alexander Karageorgevics was Prince of Serbia, the Assembly had been convoked but twice; once in 1849 and again in 1858, when Alexander was deposed and Prince Milosh re-elected. This Assembly (called popularly the Assembly of St. Andrew, because it met on that day, 30th November, O.S., which is a great national festival) took advantage of the power being in its hands (for, as we have seen, Prince Milosh did not actually return until the latter end of the January following) to pass a very liberal law assuring the rights and privileges of National Assemblies. This law endowed the House of Representatives with the entire legislative power, without permitting any participation of the Senate. As to the Prince, it regarded *him* as the simple representative of the executive power. The law encountered, of course, the greatest opposition from the Senate and Bureaucratie, and failed, besides, to meet the views of the majority of the nation. The Serbs had passed too quickly through the disordered scenes of the two revolutions to have much leisure allowed them to

make good the backwardness in civilisation which was the natural consequence of four centuries of Turkish oppression. They had been freed from the patriarchal rule of Prince Milosh only to fall under the more egotistical despotism of the government of Karageorgevics, and, as yet, could not reconcile their experience with the idea of a Prince who did not take the predominant share in the administration.

It is true that a small minority, known under the name of "the intelligence of the country," did not share this traditional prejudice; but these men (lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen, who had studied or served in Russia, France, or Austria) were, on most points, in disaccord with the people, who contemptuously held them as "exalted" heads.

Prince Michael was accustomed to say, "that no one would be happier than he to see the Serbs in possession of a Constitution such as England has, could he but believe that they were sufficiently developed to comprehend and value it. But he dared not flatter himself that such was the case—as yet. Serbia had an arduous task before her if she aspired to reach the western countries of Europe in the march of civilisation."

To return to the law relative to the House of Representatives. Every third year the Assembly was to be convoked to discuss such measures as the Ministry was prepared to lay before it, and to communicate to the Government, in return, the wishes of the people. These last were submitted to the Prince with an accompanying address, or, more usually, collected together at the dissolution of the Assembly and left for the future con-

sideration of the Government. The Budget was left still in the power of the Senate.

Prince Michael tried to introduce an important reform in the taxation, but the attempt was unsuccessful. At the time of the Prince's second election there was only one direct tax levied in the country. Each man paid £1 per head, without regard to his ability of paying. The poorest Serb paid as much as the richest: in taxation, at least, there was perfect equality, though not equity.

Prince Michael thought it equitable and practicable to replace this primitive tax by one on income; the National Assembly complied with the Prince's wish, and an income-tax was accordingly resolved on. But no sooner had the investigation of property begun, than it was evident that the measure would turn out a failure. The declarations were so palpably false, that in many districts the notoriously richest men represented themselves as the very poorest of the poor. So the income-tax was given up, and, instead of it, as a provisional measure, a repartition tax was introduced; that is, each community was taxed by the Government for a certain sum, to be regulated by the number of able-bodied men in it, and the municipal, or communal, boards had the task of levying this sum on the members of the communes, according to their relative ability of paying.

This system turned out at once simple and applicable. The weight on the people is not heavy; the highest sum paid by the richest person not exceeding £10 per year; and the Governmental receipts from this source are continually increasing. (*See Appendix.*)

We will delay a moment to relate an incident which proved to be but an experimental essay of the bloody drama played out afterwards in 1868.

Ex-Prince Karageorgevics retained always a wavering hope of one day returning to Serbia, and he thought the reforms Prince Michael was intent on introducing could hardly fail to be ill received by a people so wedded to old customs and traditions as the Serbs. Especially the attempt to change the form of taxation, and the new military duty imposed on each man, seemed peculiarly adapted to his purposes. So he paid newspaper writers liberally to spread the rumour that the enormous sums which were being spent on the army were exhausting the national treasury. Karageorgevics concluded—after a few feelers put out to ascertain the state of the capricious thermometer of popular opinion—that the moment was propitious for a bolder step, and, counselled and encouraged by his revengeful and ambitious wife, formed a plot to compel Prince Michael to resign. The materials for the conspiracy were worthy of it and its head: the conspirators were chiefly bankrupt tradesmen, or officers who had been dismissed from the State service. Now, for the first time in Serbia, a spice of Republicanism mingled with the old ambitious leaven which had cost already so many princes their thrones. A few men, whose arrogant pretensions to be masters in the science of government Prince Michael had ignored or rejected, thought well to assume to themselves the characters of martyrs for their country, and resolved to make use of the instruments that the wealth and ambition of Kara-

george placed at their service, for their own personal ends. They joined in the conspiracy which was to force Prince Michael to resign, but they hoped, in the critical moment, to be able to proclaim a Republic, of which each believed himself individually the only one fit to be President.

The plot was discovered in time, and the conspirators arrested and tried (1864). The First Court of Justice condemned them (as it could not avoid doing, the evidence was so clear), and the Court of Appellation confirmed the judgment. But in the Court of Cassation, the highest Court in Serbia, the sentence was annulled, and all the persons concerned in the conspiracy were set free. This was done because some members of the Court of Cassation were personal friends of the accused, and also because the whole Court was in opposition to the existing Ministry, and this reversal of sentence was considered the surest way to overthrow it.

But the Ministers would not submit to this defeat, and induced the Prince to form an extraordinary Court to try the judges who had, in so shameful a manner, permitted their personal friendships, or enmities, to prejudice their judicial judgments, and set free undeniably guilty men.

This Special Court condemned the judges to three years' imprisonment.

Of course the opposition availed themselves of this unusual measure to represent the Government in a very bad light to the people. Indeed it was the scandal this process occasioned which induced Prince Michael

to postpone the thorough investigation of the complot of 1868 until it was too late.

The dark shadow this affair had cast over the nation was dispelled by the celebration (1865) of the fifty years jubilee of Milosh's rising against the Turks. This commemoration was fêted with the greatest enthusiasm by the nation : so many battles had to be fought over again, and so many victories re-won.

The Prince saw, in the revived warlike ardour which revelled in dreams of past successes, the assurance that any action he might see fit to take for the extension of the national rights would be heartily welcomed and supported by the people.

This decided him that the moment was come for the advance for which he had so unweariedly prepared the way. Serbia possessed a regularly organised military force, supplied with good arms ; the national finances were in a prosperous condition ; the sympathy of the nation was assured, and now—in the spring of 1867—Prince Michael wrote to the Grand Vizier, requesting him to present to the Sultan his humble petition that those Serbian fortresses which were still in Turkish hands should be given up or demolished.

The Porte could hardly have been taken by surprise, for the Prince had not attempted to conceal his various preparations to support such steps as he deemed necessary for the peace and stability of his State. It may, perhaps, have been pleasantly astonished by the moderate terms in which the demand was couched, or by the Prince's preferring a direct understanding with it to any interference of foreign Powers. Still Turkey did not

seem at first disposed to surrender quietly the fortresses. The fortress of Belgrade was the chief cause of the Porte's reluctance, as it had been that of the Prince's demand; not only because of its strategical importance, but on account of the many historical reminiscences which it recalled.

Indeed the so-called "Old Turkish" party in Constantinople opposed very strenuously the very idea of its surrender, and, though the insurrection in Crete gave the Turks enough to do just then, the news which reached Belgrade from Constantinople was the reverse of peaceful.

But Serbia participated unmistakably in the desire and the resolution of her Prince, and both Austria and England recommended the Porte to satisfy this desire.

Many croakers in Serbia believed that, if Turkey *did* yield to Prince Michael's demand, it would be on conditions so costly, or difficult, that no real advantage would result from the concession. But they were speedily and completely put to shame. Having once earnestly decided to recognise the justice of the Prince's demand, the Sultan made the concession in a truly royal and generous spirit. He surrendered the fortresses to Prince Michael almost unconditionally, since he stipulated only "that they should be kept in good condition (which was in fact more for the good of Serbia than that of Turkey), and that, on great days and festivals, the Imperial flag should be hoisted on one of the bastions of each fortress."

When this decision was communicated to Prince Michael he resolved to go at once to Constantinople to

return thanks to the Sultan in person. He went, and was received with unwonted distinction by the Sultan, his Suzerain. His return was the signal for general public rejoicing, and all Serbia seemed to dispute the privilege of welcoming and congratulating its Prince.

Certainly never did the loyal affection of the people to the House of Obrenovics show itself more warmly and unanimously than then. But the success which had crowned the Prince's policy, together with his increasing popularity with his people, worked up the hatred and envy of his enemies—that is, of the family and the hangers-on of the ex-Prince—to such a point that the explosion could not long be delayed.

In the year 1867, that in which Prince Michael and his subjects rejoiced together over the first full Serbian possession of the Serbian capital, the Prince went to Paris, it being the year of the Great Exposition. On his way back to Serbia he passed some time at his estates in Hungary, and it was proved afterwards that all his movements there were dogged by a wretch (in the pay of Karageorgevics) employed to murder him.

No opportunity occurred there, however, for the committal of the intended crime, and Prince Michael, all unsuspecting of the danger he had so narrowly escaped, came back quietly to Belgrade.

The murderous project was delayed but not abandoned, and, nine months later, all Serbia was convulsed with indignant horror when the news spread like wildfire through the land that its first thoroughly unselfish and patriotic Prince had fallen under the cruel and treacherous weapons of hired assassins. But as yet the

great blow had not fallen, and Prince Michael returned, as we have said, in safety from the west. But it appeared that his visits to the Courts of France and Austria had been heard of with displeasure in St. Petersburg. The diplomatic relations of Russia with Serbia were perceptibly cooled, and, in the same ratio, the warmth of the relations betwixt Austria-Hungary and Serbia increased. Especially was this the case after the appointment of a Hungarian, M. Kallay, to the post of Consul-General in Belgrade.

Meanwhile the military preparations were prosecuted more zealously than ever. Within a few months 70,000 National Guards were to be supplied with uniforms and furnished with new breech-loaders.

The people believed that the Prince had been promised that France and Austria would support him whenever he saw an opportunity to bring Bosnia under his administration without violation of his engagements as vassal to the Sultan. The rumoured visit of Prince Napoleon to Belgrade, and his proposed review of the Serbian forces strengthened materially this popular belief.

It was said that the Prince intended to comply with the demands of the "Liberal" party by the promulgation of a law on the free press, and another extending the rights of the National Assembly.

The most sanguine expectations were raised as to the progress of the nation, at once in liberal institutions and political character, when M. Garashanin, now an old man and a partisan of Russia, was dismissed, and M. Ristic was called from his post as Serbian Agent at

Constantinople (where he had skilfully carried out the instructions of Prince Michael with respect to the required surrender of the fortresses) to fill the vacant post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Prince Michael committed, for him, a most fatal mistake when he stopped half way in the bold path he had entered. Instead of changing the Ministry he changed only the First Minister. Nevertheless, all the other Ministers were deeply imbued with the same opinions as their late chief,—they all dreaded equally the slightest concession to the demands of the “Liberals.” Undoubtedly, however, though so superstitiously attached to their Conservative policy, they had done good service to the country.

The Minister of War, without troubling himself with political questions, had succeeded in raising the Serbian forces into a tolerably effective condition, but he had done this rather as the confidential adviser of Prince Michael than as a member of the Garashanin Ministry. His services were duly appreciated by Prince and people, and, in the most unpopular days of the Garashanin Ministry, he retained the good opinion of all parties by his frank and unswerving fidelity to the duties of his responsible position.

The finances of the country were flourishing, and the measures taken for the preservation of tranquillity had been effectual without being really oppressive. Still the Ministry was most decidedly unpopular. More particularly had the Minister of the Interior, Nicholas Chrystics, by his strict and reactionary proceedings, incurred the extreme dislike of the people. His colleagues were

included in the general condemnation, but the Prince would not consent to dismiss them; partly because he wished to wean the country from the bad habit it had acquired (under Karageorgevics) of changing the Ministry on the slightest pretence, and thus impeding materially the national progress; partly because the most fanatic opponents of the Ministers were, notoriously, also his own unscrupulous personal enemies, and sworn partisans of the ex-Prince, Karageorge.

But it was evident, afterwards, that he erred in not changing the whole Ministry when he dismissed its chief. M. Ristics had not yet arrived from Constantinople, and the members of the Garashanin Cabinet had time enough to combine to overthrow their new colleague. The details of this intrigue are not known as yet, but it is supposed that M. Ristics was accused of entertaining somewhat too intimate relations with what was called the "Young Serbian" party, but which was, in fact, nothing but the worn-out remnant of the old opposition, led by personal enemies of the Prince, and reorganised and strengthened by new recruits in the persons of students, and other violent and inexperienced young men, who arrogated to themselves the character of statesmen.

M. Ristics, on his arrival in Belgrade to assume his new post, submitted to Prince Michael his programme, and demanded that most of the remaining members of the old Cabinet should be dismissed. He declared that, if the Prince declined to dismiss them, he, M. Ristics, would be obliged himself to resign. The Prince, unaccustomed to be thus dictated to, accepted at once the offered resig-

nation, and M. Nicholas Chrystics, the very unpopular Minister of the Interior, was nominated Premier.

M. Ristics, "having resigned rather than sacrifice his liberal principles," became at once exceedingly popular, and with the increase of his popularity increased also the unpopularity of the Ministry.

The "Moderate" party, the strongest in Serbia, though always personally devoted to the Prince, could not resist joining the popular clamour against the Cabinet. The partisans of Karageorgevics found the moment favourable for the fulfilment of their so long concocted plan, and all the real, or pretended, adherents of the ex-Prince agreed that so good an opportunity to "remove" the reigning Prince must not be suffered to escape. But to attempt an insurrection would have been madness; however unpopular his Ministers, the Prince had, by his unselfish and high-toned patriotism, as well as by the brilliant success (the evacuation of the fortresses) which had crowned his policy, established himself too firmly in the affections of his people.

It would have been insanity to suppose that any *free* National Assembly could be induced to demand his resignation, as it had done in the case of Prince Alexander. So nothing remained, in the opinion of Karageorgevics and his followers, but to take advantage of the general confusion and terror, which the murder of Prince Michael would unfailingly produce, to seize the reins of Government. Once possessed of the power, everything would be easy, as the Prince had no children by his wife, the Princess Julia.

Signs of the coming horror were very legible to

observant eyes in the months of March and April, 1868. Notorious leaders of the Karageorgevics party were seen in and about Belgrade, holding frequent and but half-concealed intercourse with the known enemies of the Prince. The organs of the opposition (some of them notoriously in the pay of Karageorgevics) charged the Ministry with inventing the "fable of a conspiracy existing, in order to deceive the Prince and prolong their miserable existence as a Government."

The Ministry had, however, positive proof of the existence of this conspiracy, but the Prince (although he received many anonymous letters warning him of his danger) ordered his Ministers to take "no steps in the matter until they had more convincing evidence, as he did not wish to have the history of the complot of 1864 repeated."

Within a half-hour's drive of Belgrade there is a park belonging to the nation, called Topschidere. Here is the summer residence of the Prince, and also a State Prison containing some 500 or 600 criminals. Topschidere lies between low hills, and is watered by the small river, or brook, from which it derives its name. The surrounding heights are covered with a thick growth of oak and linden, and a large space is enclosed as a deer-park. Prince Michael had caused a narrow path, some three feet wide, to be cut through a part of these woods, and the dark, shadowy walk became his most favoured summer resort. On most summer afternoons he walked there with two or three members of his family, and attended only by one adjutant and a footman.

This custom of the Prince was well known to the con-

spirators (as it was, indeed, to the majority of the citizens of Belgrade), and they resolved to avail themselves of it in the accomplishment of their murderous design.

The chief of the conspirators was a certain Paul Radowanovics, the attorney of Alexander Karageorgovics. His younger brother, also a lawyer, was confined in the prison, having been condemned for forgery. Svezozar Nenadovics, a cousin of the wife of the ex-Prince, being Director of the prison and park of Topschidere, greatly facilitated the execution of the complot: tempted, it is said, by the promised reward of a large estate. This Nenadovics and the two brothers Radowanovics (in conjunction with another prisoner convicted of wife-murder) arranged all the details of the proposed assassination. Three of the boldest conspirators were to meet the Prince suddenly as he walked in his favourite wood-path. The deed done, they were to notify it, by signals prearranged, to Paul Radowanovics, who would have a carriage waiting, and would hurry to Belgrade with the news. Some of his associates were to wait for him before the barracks on the Topschidere road, and, on his coming, hasten to put to death some of the more resolute Ministers, and take the government into their own hands. A list of the persons who were to replace the higher State officials was drawn up in readiness, and, also, the project of a new Constitution which was immediately to be proclaimed in the name of Peter Karageorgovics, the son of the ex-Prince.

The 29th of May (10th of June, N.S.) dawned bright and sunny, and in the afternoon Prince Michael drove out, as usual, to make his favourite promenade in the

deer-park. With him were his old aunt, Madame Tomaniya, and her daughter and granddaughter, Madame Anka and Mademoiselle Catharine Constantinovics.* He was attended by one adjutant (a son of ex-Minister Garashanin) and a lackey.

When already far advanced on the narrow wood-path, the Prince and Madame Constantinovics being followed at a short distance by old Madame Tomaniya and her granddaughter, they were abruptly met by four men—Radowanovics, the convicted forger; Marics, the wife-killer: a third brother Radowanovics, a notoriously ferocious man; and a desperate fellow named Rogics, who had been formerly in the State service, but of late without any definite occupation.

These men moved aside, with apparent deference, as the Prince advanced, and, when he had passed, fired simultaneously their revolvers at him. All the shots told. Prince Michael fell forward and died almost instantly. Madame Anka was mortally wounded and died, still insensible, about two hours later. Her daughter was also wounded, but able still to escape, and recovered after a lingering illness. The adjutant, Svetozar Garashanin, was lightly grazed by a ball on his sword wrist, and fainted with the pain. The Prince's aunt, Madame Tomaniya, ran away, shrieking for help, and the lackey followed, if, indeed, he had not preceded her.

The deed done, the preconcerted signal was given, and

* This young lady became, some six months after the Prince's death, the wife of the former War Minister, Milcevoy Petrovics Blaznavatz, afterwards First Member of the Regency.

Paul Radowanovics hastened to the city to carry the news to his fellow-conspirators, and follow up the Prince's murder with those of the Ministers already resolved on. But the assassins, to make themselves quite sure of the Prince's death—maddened, as such ferocious beasts are said to be, with the sight of blood—had lost minutes, invaluable to the successful completion of their scheme, in cutting and slashing the dead bodies. Some forty knife-wounds were counted on the corpse of the Prince. Then the carriage of Paul Radowanovics broke down on the way to the city, and thus time again was lost, so that the news of the terrible deed had reached Belgrade before him. When he, at last, arrived he found the whole city in horrified and indignant excitement; the garrisons were under arms; artillery and cavalry were ready to start at a moment's warning to any suspicious place. The War Minister, M. Petrovics Blaznavatz, was master of the position, and he had been the familiar friend of Prince Michael, and his confidant and counsellor in all his plans for the new military organisation. To his prompt resolution the country is indebted for its escape from the shame of seeing hands yet red with the guiltless blood of the dead Prince grasping the reins of Government, and from the probable consequences of this, a relentless and embittered civil war.

The conspirators* (that is to say, a great number of them, for their nets were widely spread, and, probably,

* One of the most active amongst them was Simeon Nenadovics, a brother-in-law of the ex-Prince Alexander. He was tried, condemned, and executed, with the other convicted conspirators.—

some participators in the crime will pass scatheless until all secrets are revealed) were caught and imprisoned the same evening, and a Provisory Regency, in accordance with the law provided for cases of emergency, assumed the government, and convoked at once a National Assembly. Meanwhile, Milan, the son of Milosh Obrenovics, (who was the son of Prince Milosh's brother Yephrem,) was proclaimed Prince of Serbia.

The Assembly met only to express the deep regret of the nation for its late generous and patriotic Prince, and its loyalty and sympathy for the young Obrenovics, who was called, so suddenly, to so difficult a post. A law was passed, to guard against possible future catastrophes, securing the hereditary dignity of Prince of Serbia to the male descendants of the family Obrenovics. In case of a failure of direct heirs in the male branch, the succession was to pass to the male descendants of the daughters of Prince Milosh. The Assembly unanimously decreed, also, that Karageorgevics and his descendants should be excluded for ever from the throne of Serbia.

Prince Milan was very young, scarcely fourteen, so a Regency of three was appointed by the Assembly to conduct the Government until the Prince's majority. The Regents chosen were M. Blaznavatz, the War Minister; M. Ristics, who was at St. Petersburg at the time of the Prince's murder, having been sent there on a special mission; and M. Gavrilovics, a gentleman of

His brother Mladen, an officer in the Serbian service, was tried by Court-martial, and shot, for having known of the complot to murder the Prince and not giving information to the proper authorities.

great literary attainments, high moral character, and well experienced in State service.

Prince Michael was interred in the cathedral of Belgrade, amidst the sobs and tears of a whole people ; amidst execrations also, not loud, but deep, lavished by his sorrowing subjects, on his murderers and their accomplices.

During his life his quiet, and somewhat stern, demeanour had prevented any demonstration of enthusiasm when he came among his people ; (except, indeed, on two or three extraordinary occasions, such as his taking possession of the fortress of Belgrade, when the popular excitement was so great that the oldest and sternest men were moved to tears,) but the whole long-compressed devotion of his subjects broke out when his death was known. No Prince was ever buried with more unmistakable signs of being passionately and deeply lamented by his people than was Michael Obrenovics III.

All Serbia may be said that day to have endorsed the solemn words engraved, by the will of the widow of the dead Prince, on his tomb—

“Your thought shall not perish.”

CHAPTER III.

THE task which the three Regents—MM. Blaznavatz, Ristic, and Gavrilovics—undertook was extremely difficult. The material order had not been disturbed ; but the effect the murder of the Prince had produced on the moral feeling of the nation was deep and lasting. The bitterness with which the mass of the people regarded Karageorgevics appeared to increase rather than decrease as the days went on. It seemed that the poignant sorrow caused by the deed at first had stupefied their just anger against the doers ; but, as the sharpness of the grief softened down, the flood of indignation rose and deepened until it could hardly be restrained.

The partisans of Karageorgevics in Serbia were really few and insignificant ; but they were the more dangerous, because, disappointed in their aims and reviled by the people, they were driven, so to say, to desperation.

The Regency had the arduous task to soothe the general exasperation, and prevent any disturbance of the public peace.

Almost equally difficult was the work they set themselves : to reconcile, outwardly at least, the Conservatives and Radicals, so that both parties could unite to further the real progress of the country.

The Conservatives thought that the late terrible

catastrophe was a proof of the truth of their theory: that the people were not yet sufficiently prepared to appreciate and use the privileges of a thoroughly parliamentary form of government, and, consequently, should be ruled by a strong, but enlightened and patriotic, Government, and have themselves no active share in the legislation of the country.

Of course the Radical theory of government was quite the opposite to this. They spoke lovingly of a Republic, but confessed, at the same time, that a Constitutional Government, such as in Belgium, would content them "for the present." The leaders of this party were mostly young men who had studied two or three years in Germany, Switzerland, France, or Russia, at the expense of the nation. They had gained a position of some influence by organising the Serbian youth, attending the higher schools in Serbia and Hungary, into a kind of corporation, called the "*Omladina*" (young Serbia), which combined the ostensible pursuit of literature with an ardent promotion of advanced political opinions.

The "*Omladina*" was, in reality, only an organised band of ultra-Radicals, which derived importance from the fact that it diffused itself through all Serbian lands, in all circles, and almost all households. And this not only in Serbian countries; for its clubs were formed in St. Petersburg, Paris, Vienna—everywhere where young Serbs were to be found.

The Conservatives charged the "*Omladina*" with folly in hoping to transplant Belgian, or American, institutions among the exceptionally situated nations of Eastern Europe. They pointed to the results of such a

speculative policy in the ever-returning disorders of Roumania, and the total demoralisation of that wretched country. They appealed to the undisturbed tranquillity and prosperity of Serbia, and its increasing ability to defend itself from any attempt at foreign aggression, though it had neither American nor Belgian institutions.

After the black tragedy of Topschidere, the 'Conservatives accused the "Omladina" with having participated in the conspiracy; and, indeed, there appeared some ground for this accusation, since several of its members were tried for having connived at the complot, but were liberated from insufficiency of evidence. Then Peter, the son of Karageorgevics, had joined the society about a month before the murder of Prince Michael, and dedicated to it, at the same time, a translation of Stuart Mill's work, "*On Liberty*."

The breach betwixt the Conservatives and Radicals was so wide, that the Conservative majority, in the National Assembly which appointed the Regency, went so far as to delegate to the Government perfect freedom of action in case any disturbances broke out among the people. The Regency were not prepared to accept altogether the opinions of either of these rival parties, and yet no compromise appeared possible.

Russia did not attempt to conceal her dissatisfaction with the choice Serbia had made of provisional rulers. M. Blaznavatz had forfeited her good opinion by daring to counsel Prince Michael to establish a military arsenal, a cannon foundry, and a weapon manufactory. The dissatisfaction deepened into displeasure when he aided the Prince to carry out successfully his idea of a national

army. His suggestion to arm, and drill, all the male population of from twenty to sixty years was designated as "simple madness" by the Russian General whom the Cabinet of St. Petersburg sent to Prince Michael, in 1864, to dissuade him from attempting to carry out the project, and to demand the dismissal of the War Minister. M. Blaznavatz had openly denounced the policy of Russia in the East, as one tending only to keep the nations half way in their progress towards liberty, and had asserted, that both Hungary and Serbia would be gainers by a mutually friendly policy. In the crisis which followed the Prince's murder, he had cut short the intrigues of Russia, in favour of the Prince of Montenegro, by proclaiming at once "the rightful successor of Prince Michael, Milan Obrenovics the Fourth."

Serbia was fortunate, in the midst of her misfortunes, since she possessed, in the friend of her dead Prince, a man strong enough, by position and character, to keep down the elements of discord, and proclaim fearlessly the young grand-nephew of Milosh as hereditary Prince of Serbia.

M. Ristics was one of the most, if not *the* most, independent statesmen of Serbia. He had studied at the Universities of Paris and Heidelberg, and did not attempt to conceal his admiration of the civilisation of Western Europe. He admitted frankly the great services France had, during the last years, rendered Serbia. He recognised, also, the past services of Russia, but would not engage himself as a partisan of any of the Great Powers: then his avowed opinions on the sound

policy of upholding amicable relations with Austria-Hungary were anything but agreeable to Russia.

It was fortunate for the members of the Regency that the majority of the nation was entirely devoted to the dynasty Obrenovics, and believed that the interests of the young Prince were safe in their hands. The confidence reposed in them by the people smoothed over the many "stones of stumbling" which lay in their path. Then the finances of the country were in such a prosperous condition as materially lightened the burden of government.

When the announcement of Prince Milan's accession was made to the Porte, the Regents urged the desirability that the long, and unjust, contest as to the right of the dynasty Obrenovics to the dignity of Hereditary Princes should now finally be set at rest.

The Porte, with a happy display of that tact which sometimes distinguishes her statesmen, responded without delay to the expressed wish of the Regency, and sent, with the Berat of confirmation, a recognition of the right of the line of Obrenovics to the title of Hereditary Princes of Serbia. The Sultan declared that he was impelled to this by his sincere desire for the consolidation of Serbia, and this language made a very favourable impression on the people. Once firmly settled, the Government undertook the grateful task of establishing a more liberal Constitution.

Serbia still had the Constitution framed in Constantinople in 1839 by the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. Its results in Serbia had been almost identical with those of that

Russian Charter called, courteously, by the Valachians their "*Constitution*"; viz. intrigues, concocted by the Senators in Serbia and by the Boyards in Valachia, against the ruling Princes; constantly recurring conflicts betwixt the legislative and executive powers; changes of princes and dynasties; no peace; no possibility of consolidation.

Prince Michael did not abolish the Turco-Russian Constitution, but obviated its effects by special laws, as we have seen. The Senators could no longer appeal to the Porte from the decisions of Serbian Courts, and the people had the privilege of discussing, every three years, in the National Assembly the measures of the Government.

The Regency resolved to do entirely away with this old Constitution, and accordingly, in December, 1868, invited the more intelligent and educated men of all parties and professions to propose, and discuss, the groundwork of a new Constitution. Thus initiated into the real wishes and wants of the nation, they laid the project for the Constitution, in 1869, before the National Assembly for examination and approval, and it was, with some insignificant modifications, accepted and promulgated.

It was feared that the Porte would remonstrate against this independent step of the Government; but the courteous communications the Regency made of the necessity Serbia had felt to prepare for herself a new Constitution were quietly accepted by Turkey, and, on the suggestion of England and Austria, the matter was passed over without discussion.

We must explain a peculiarity of the new Constitution before we give its most important clauses.

An overwhelming majority of the Serbian population (some 95 per cent.) are agriculturists.

The National Assemblies under Prince Michael's Government were chiefly composed of small land proprietors and mayors of villages; there were but few tradesmen, and still fewer priests. The law declared State officials to be ineligible for members of the Assembly.

The Regency (desirous that the education and intelligence of the nation should be more largely represented in the Assembly, and knowing that almost all the more cultivated Serbs find, unfailingly, occupation in the State service) proposed that no class of citizens should be debarred from the office of people's representative. The eligibility of the candidates should depend, in future, solely on the degree of confidence the nation reposed in them, and this would best be evidenced by the number of votes. But the Assembly did not accept this proposition of the Government. It feared that, once declared eligible for election, the State officials would speedily find means to fill all the seats in the Assembly, and thus, instead of being an expression of the national wishes and aims, it would become the simple instrument of the ambitious, or mercenary, desires of a small and privileged class.

The incessant intrigues, which had torn to pieces the country, had notoriously been the results of official chicanery, and the people had become deeply imbued with a suspicious dislike of everything appertaining to the Bureaucratie. They disliked, also, in an almost equal

degree, the lawyers and advocates; and these men had in reality fairly merited the popular detestation by their unprincipled extortion.

Nothing could induce the Assembly to consent that lawyers and State officials could become candidates for election as deputies. The people began even to doubt the honesty of a Government which could make such a proposition, although they were obliged to confess that the continued exclusive representation of the agricultural interest was neither favourable to the general development of the nation, nor strictly just in principle.

At length a compromise was agreed on, by which the want of men of culture in the Assembly would be remedied, and, at the same time, a due respect shown to the opinions, or prejudices, of the people.

The new Constitution vested all legislative power in the hands of the Prince and National Assembly. No measure could become law until it received the approbation of the majority of the Representatives, and the signature of the Prince.

The Assembly was to meet every year, but the members were to be elected for three years. As a rule, an Assembly must consist of 120 deputies; but, in the event of any question of extraordinary national importance arising, an extraordinary so called "Great National Assembly," to consist of 480 members, was to be convoked.

Ninety members of the ordinary Assembly were to be chosen by the nation, and its choice could fall upon all Serbs not State officials or advocates. The remaining thirty members were to be chosen by the Prince from

all classes and professions; he was free to nominate also lawyers and officials. The members of the "Great Assembly" can only be chosen by the people.

This combination was received by some with considerable anxiety, and some astonishment. But two years' experience of its working has conciliated many theoretical critics. Any one who is acquainted with the stubbornness of the Serbian character will see that this measure cannot, possibly, earnestly imperil the national interests.

As yet the Government has shown great prudence in the choice of its members, and exactly the Prince's nominees are those who most pertinaciously oppose the Government. In fact, a great relief was felt by the people's deputies when they found their inexperience, in the many difficult financial questions recently submitted to the consideration of the Assembly, assisted and enlightened by men of knowledge and experience.

The new Constitution once accepted, the Government laid before the next National Assembly (that of 1870) a series of laws for regulating the liberty of the press; the proceedings at elections; and the deliberations of the Senate and House of Representatives.

The Assembly of 1871, besides many new edicts relative to national education and finances, passed also a law on juries.

The standing questions of the three last years have been—the Capitulations; and the Railway question.

The Treaties concluded by the Ottoman Government, so far back as the middle of the last century, with the Great Powers of Europe, assured to their subjects, living

in Ottoman territory, the privilege of being tried and condemned exclusively by the Consular Courts of their different countries. In Serbia, for instance, if legal measures are to be taken against an Austrian subject, the complaint must be made before the judge of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate, though the offending party may have been born, or finds his means of living, in Serbia.

Some clauses of the "Capitulations" exempt foreigners from every public duty to the Government of the countries in which they live; and also from all State and Communal taxes—that is to say, that the foreign colonies in Serbia, and other countries more or less dependent on the Ottoman Empire, form actually a State within the State.

This condition of things is, in the highest degree, disagreeable to the Serbian people, and is, in its very nature, fraught with elements of discord.

Prince Milosh attempted in 1860 to ignore these "Capitulations," and tried by a simple edict to compel all foreign tradesmen and artisans resident in Serbia to pay Communal taxes. But the resident Consuls protested against this, and the Prince was obliged to submit.

Prince Michael thought he could, in a more diplomatic fashion, induce the Foreign Cabinets voluntarily to relinquish the exceptional privileges they possessed—privileges which had, undoubtedly, a good reason to plead for their existence in the middle of the last century, and in an Asiatic State like Turkey, but were no longer tenable in a Christian State which had

already, young as it was, given sufficient guarantees for its administrative ability. For this purpose the Prince sent M. Ristics to the different European Courts, and this gentleman had just received assurances of the readiness of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to concede the obnoxious clauses in the Capitulations, when the news of the *Topschidere* tragedy reached him.

The Regency pursued the policy Prince Michael had commenced. As the majority of foreigners resident in Serbia are Austrian or Hungarian subjects, it was more especially desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet should be won over. Count Andrassy, for the Hungarian Government, consented, under certain conditions, but the Vienna Cabinet, and more particularly Count Beust, still continued to object.

At length it appeared that the Vienna Ministry were also willing to comply with the wishes of the Serbian Government, on the condition that Austro-Hungarian subjects could hold lands in Serbia.

The Government proposed this arrangement to the National Assembly of 1870, but it was rejected by a large majority of votes. The deputies were afraid that, once having a right to possess lands in Serbia, the Hungarian magnates and Austrian bankers would, by degrees, expropriate the land. So the Government was defeated in its attempt to do away, diplomatically, with the "Capitulations."

The "Railway Question" was another bequest from the Government of Prince Michael.

The projected net of Turkish railways left Serbia, it would seem intentionally, out of the grand commercial

routes. The main line was to run from Constantinople, over Prishtina, through Bosnia, to Brod on the Sava, where it would have its junction with the South-Austrian line. This line must have immense strategetic importance to Turkey, since it guards against possible Serbian aggression.

The Serbian Government could not pretend, of course, to prevent the Porte from making as many railway lines as she chooses on Turkish territory; but it pressed earnestly that a point of junction should be conceded to a Serbian line, which would run from Belgrade to some point on the south-eastern frontier.

A compliance with this wish of Serbia would expose Turkey to some strategetic, and more serious financial, disadvantages, as the line "Salonica-Belgrade-Hamburg (or Ostend)," would make a redoubtable competition to the Bosnian line. Consequently the Porte was not willing to concede the junction. But the Serbian Government insisted, and its representations were vigorously supported by the Hungarian Government (which threatened not to allow the junction of the Bosnian line with the Austrian), and at last it was resolved (at the Conference held in the summer of 1871 in Vienna) that the Porte should declare, within six months, at what point of the south-eastern frontier of Serbia she intends to permit the proposed junction.

The Regency has made the extension of national education, and the economical development of the country, the objects of particular study.

A great number of national schools have been opened in different villages, and middle-class schools in various

cities. The material condition of teachers has been improved, and an Institute opened for the especial preparation of them. An Agronomical and Forestry school has also been established.

Financial Associations have been formed, for the first time, in Serbia during the Regency. Associations, on the co-operative principle, have been organised all over the country for different products and purposes.

But, notwithstanding the many important reforms which it has introduced, and the incessant care it has devoted to all things likely to conduce to the national welfare, the Regency has had a hard battle to fight.

The Constitution, as well as the new laws on juries and the press, were, undoubtedly, more liberal than any previously known in Serbia; but they were far from liberal enough to satisfy the "Radicals," and far *too* liberal for some Conservatives.

Thereupon, a number of Conservatives and a multitude of Radicals combined to form a party of opposition to the Government. This party, finding no support in the Assembly, and even less sympathy in the people at large, ranged itself under the Russian standard.

The liberal tendencies of the Regency were not likely to dispose in its favour the St. Petersburg Cabinet.

There was not a single member of the opposition capable of directing any important movement against the Government; but, in a mass, it could make itself felt, especially acting, as it did, on the inspirations of Russia. In Belgrade it was no secret that the Russian diplomatic agent was working, in concert with old ex-

Minister Garashanin, to stir up disaffection among the people.

It is hardly necessary to say that the opposition to an Eastern Government is quite a different sort of thing to the Parliamentary opposition of the West.

In the East (even in Serbia, who sometimes indulges in a fond fancy that she is an Eastern England), all intrigues are considered good if they only lead to the desired end; to wit, the overthrow of the existing Government. Calumny of the coarsest sort is a weapon often resorted to, and still not inefficient. All sorts of chicanery were tried to introduce dissension among the Regents, but, happily for Serbia, all attempts of this kind signally failed.

M. Blaznavatz was accused of aspiring himself to the dignity of Prince of Serbia; M. Ristics was said to dream of being President of the first Serbian Republic; M. Gavrilovics alone (who concerns himself chiefly in the direction of the interior administration) escaped unsullied and unassailed.

The scandal-mongers, finding that the ambitious charges against the two first members of the Regency gained no credence among the people, changed their tactics, and accused both gentlemen of being in the pay of Austria. Every step, every measure of the Regency was, thereafter, interpreted by a certain party in the light of this suspicion, and the "Capitulations" and "Railway" questions became fruitful sources of accusation to the Government's enemies.

Besides the many obstructions and perplexities which Russia created for the Regency in carrying out its

Home policy, she effectually prevented the advancement of the "Serbian idea"; that is, the preparation of the Serbian nations under Turkish rule for the day of liberation.

Between Serbia and Montenegro lie Bosnia and Herzegovina, and these two provinces expect their liberation from Mussulman rule to be accomplished by Serbian and Montenegrine princes.

A treaty existed between Prince Michael of Serbia, and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, by which the latter Prince acknowledged the former to be the chief leader of the "Serbian movement," and bound himself to execute any plan he (Prince Michael) might form for the delivery of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

But when the Regency was established in Serbia, the Montenegrine Prince, on a hint from St. Petersburg, declared that this engagement was no longer valid, since the death of Prince Michael had restored to him full liberty of action.

Thus a sort of estrangement arose betwixt the Serbian and Montenegrine Governments which prejudiced extremely the cause of the Serbs in Turkey, and, in some measure, even the position of the Serbian Regents.

And no complete good understanding between these Governments was possible so long as Russia held it for her interests to keep them estranged.

The inability of the Regency to maintain uninterrupted friendly relations with Montenegro exposed it to somewhat over-severe censure from the Hungarian Serbs. These, as well as the Croats, were offended by the Austro-Hungarian policy of Serbia, and by her

refusal to support them in their conflicts with the Hungarian Government.

At the very time when the Serbian Government was contending with the external and internal difficulties which Russia, on account of the friendly relations with Austro-Hungary, laid in its path, this last State carelessly played into the hands of her rival.

Austro-Hungary thought it well to avail herself of the occasion afforded by the Black Sea Conference (held in London in January, 1871) to obtain from Europe the right to do away with the "Iron Gates," and to levy herself a navigation tax to cover the expenses of the work. Now, both the cataracts known as "the Iron Gates" lie close to the shore of Serbia, and Austro-Hungary demanded, therefore, that Europe should surrender to her a part of Serbia. This demand greatly astonished the Serbian Government, and placed it in a peculiarly delicate position *vis-à-vis* the nation.

About this time, also, the Hungarian Supreme Court released Karageorgevics, who had been condemned to twenty years' imprisonment by the Second Court of Hungary as the instigator of the murder of Prince Michael. It was generally believed that political motives had the chief voice in determining the First Court of Hungary to annul the sentence that the Second Court had seen right to pass on the convicted criminal. The indignation of the Serbian nation, when it heard of this liberation of the man who had so long planned and finally, by his relatives and paid assistants, carried out the untimely death of its Prince, was yet more heightened when Karageorgevics was permitted to publish, in the Austro-Hungarian semi-official papers, a manifesto in

which he threatened to revenge himself on the men at the head of the Serbian Government. For a moment, in the spring of 1871, the position of the Regents was more than difficult.

Through their friendly relations to Austro-Hungary they had excited Russia against them, and now Austro-Hungary, without any sufficient cause, had contemptuously thrown down a gauntlet, so to say, to the whole Serbian nation. An Austro-Hungarian policy became, thus, an impossibility in Serbia. France lay bleeding at the feet of conquering Germany, soon to bleed far more shamefully and mortally from the parricidal wounds inflicted by her own infuriate sons. Germany coquetted with Russia, and Russia was omnipotent at Constantinople. England, it is true, had shown herself, of late, very amicably disposed to Serbia (more especially during the discussion about the Iron Gates), but then England had looked on quietly whilst Denmark was dismembered, and had, altogether, latterly exhibited a remarkable genius for economising and a frank disinclination for war. In short, England was "far off," and hardly to be relied on in case of need, while Russia was very near, and could be, if she would, a very formidable enemy to Serbia. What course could the Serbian Government be expected to take under these circumstances?

On the 10th of August (O.S.) 1872 (this year), the young Prince attains his majority, and the Regents had voluntarily and solemnly pledged themselves to the National Assembly which appointed them, "*to give back the responsible and difficult charge they had accepted, with the conviction (to be confirmed*

by the people) that the country had in no way deteriorated under their rule." They had engaged themselves to give back the Serbia they had undertaken to guard, "*at least as large in territory, as rich in friends, as peaceful and prosperous,*" as she was at the moment when her great head had been struck down by sacrilegious hands, and her palpitating heart had turned to her next best and ablest sons for guidance and counsel.

With lukewarm friends too distant to sympathise in anxieties they cannot see; with allies turning into open rivals, or, worse still, into treacherous foes; what course could Serbia be expected to take? She had, as we have seen, opposed successfully in London the Austro-Hungarian project relative to the Danubian Cataracts, and in doing this she had widened the breach that Austro-Hungary had herself begun to make between the two countries.

Russia had watched with displeased eyes the mutually friendly policy of Austria and Serbia; she greeted now, as a good omen for the restoration of her ancient influence, the estrangement which grew up, day by day, between Serbia and her powerful neighbour and recent ally.

And we had hardly laid aside the pen, believing that, for the present, nothing of importance could be added to this simple and faithful "History," when the news came that young Prince Milan had gone, accompanied by the First Regent, M. Blaznavatz, to the Crimea, to assure the Czar of his grateful respect to one of the protectors of Serbia, and to receive, in intimate association with the Imperial Family, impressions likely enough to revive again in Serbia the prestige of the traditional Russian influence. *Qui vivra verra!*

APPENDIX.

The Present Condition of Serbia, as shown by statistics.

VERY soon after the restoration of the late Prince Michael, in 1860, he established a Statistical Bureau as a special department of the Finance Ministry.

Since the establishment of this bureau, it has published five volumes of statistics, and the information we are about to lay before our readers has been collected, partly from these volumes, partly from the Reports which the Ministers are accustomed to lay before the National Assembly showing the condition of affairs in their respective departments.

The last published Ministerial Reports supply us with dates up to September, 1871.

Population.

The Principality of Serbia is now usually calculated to extend over an area of 900 square geographical miles.

The last Census was taken in 1866. At that time Serbia contained altogether 1,215,576 inhabitants; 626,220 males and 589,356 females.

All the inhabitants of Serbia are Serbs, with the exception of 127,000 Roumanians, 25,000 Gipsies, and about 6,000 Jews.

We may reckon 1,350 inhabitants to each square mile.

At the time of the Census there were 201,056 houses in Serbia; so each house contained, on an average, six persons.

It will be seen that the proportion of men to women in the Serbian Principality is somewhat remarkable, as there are on an average throughout the whole country 1,062 males to 1,000 females. This proportion increases, if we take the inhabitants of the cities only into account, as there we find 1,274 men to 1,000 women.

During the last twenty years the population has increased in the ratio of 1·42 per cent. per annum. It is believed that since 1866 the ratio of the annual increase is rather stronger. About 90 per cent. of the whole population are agriculturists.

The land is very much divided and subdivided: estates which comprise more than 500 acres are quite exceptional.

Measures have been taken by the Government to have a new Census taken at the end of this year (1872).

Political Division of the Country.

The principality is divided into seventeen districts (*Okrug*); each of these is, again, subdivided into a certain number of cantons (*Sres*), varying from two to seven, according to the extent of the districts. There are now altogether sixty-six cantons or *Sres*.

There are 1,200 communities: comprising 40 cities or market towns and 2,200 villages. Some communities are formed of two or three villages.

Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, has about 25,000 inhabitants.

National Defence.

There is a regular army, numbering about 4,000 men. These men are raised by conscription, and after serving four years are dismissed and return to their homes.

There is also a national army, in which every Serb from twenty to fifty years of age is obliged by the law to serve. This army is divided into three classes. The first class, which comprises the men from twenty to thirty years, numbers about 70,000, and is always ready for active service. The men of this class are well drilled, well armed, and well clothed, and are called in twice every year—in spring and in autumn—for the exercise of the more intricate and difficult military manoeuvres, which are concluded, as in England, by a grand review.

With the three classes of her national army Serbia can muster 200,000 men exclusive of her little "regular army."

The country is divided into five military districts.

In Belgrade there is a Military Academy for the education of young men desiring to be officers.

Most of the young officers, on leaving this school, are sent for some time abroad to pursue their military studies at Government expense. Many of them go to Austria and France, but the majority go to Prussia.

In the chief place of each Military District there is now a kind of military dépôt. But the great gunpowder manufactories are in Stragare, in the midst of the old forests of Central Serbia; and the common foundries and rifle manufactories are in Kragujevatz. In this city, which lies almost in the middle of Serbia, is, also, a well-furnished arsenal.

The communications made by the War Minister to the National Assembly as to the amount of ready military stores are, of course, kept secret, but it is generally believed that in the arsenal of Kragujevatz there are, at present, some 150,000 to 200,000 rifles of the new construction, and about 500 cannon; most of them of small calibre.

National Education.

There is a special Ministry of National Education. A law, passed during the reign of the late Prince Michael, obliges the Government to supply and pay a good master for an elementary National School to every community which declares itself ready to send about thirty boys as scholars, and prepares, at the same time, a building suitable for a school.

In 1871 there were in Serbia 484 National Schools, with 605 teachers paid by the Government. These schools were attended by 25,270 boys and girls.

From the National Schools the boys can pass to the Middle Schools; to the Gymnasium which gives a more general and classical education (such as Mathematics, Geography, History, Ancient and Modern Languages, &c.), or to the Real School which supplies more practical instruction (such as Geometry, Chemistry, Mechanics, Drawing, Modern Languages, &c.).

Last year there were in different places—two Gymnasiums with six classes, and five with four classes; one High Real School, with six classes, in Belgrade; and seven Real Schools, with three classes, in different districts.

There is in Belgrade a Girls' High School which was frequented last year by 236 girls. This superior school furnishes female teachers not only to the principality, but also to the neighbouring Bulgarian and Serbian provinces.

For special instruction there are a Theological College in Belgrade, and a Teachers' School and Agricultural School in Kragujevatz. The Theological College was instituted by Prince Miloah before his exile; the Teachers' and Agricultural Schools have been established during the Regency.

Last year the College was frequented by 292 young men, of whom 91 were from Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Old Serbia.

A higher and more thorough education is supplied by the "High School," or University of Belgrade, which consists of three Faculties, or Colleges—Philosophical, Juristical, and Technical—and was attended last year by 229 young men. The High School building is a large and imposing structure presented to the nation by the rich Serbian merchant, Misha Anastasijevics.

The Mineralogical Cabinet, and the Herbarium collected by the eminent Serbian botanist, Dr. Pancics, the Rector of the "High School," are deserving of special remark.

Among the means of National Education must be counted the Public Library in Belgrade, which comprises about 25,000 volumes, and also an interesting collection of old Serbian manuscripts of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries.

The National Museum possesses some curious Roman antiquities, and a large collection of coins of the old Serbian kings. The Numismatical department of the Museum has also some 6,113 Roman or Byzantine coins (of these 166 are of gold) and more than 1,000 old Greek coins.

The Government supports, by monetary contribution, the Serbian "Learned Society," the "Agricultural Society," and the "National Theatre."

Besides supporting a great number of good students at the Middle and High Schools in Serbia, the Government keeps a certain number of young men (last year thirty-eight), after they have finished with honours the "High School" of Belgrade, at different Universities in Germany and Switzerland.

National Finances.

The chief sources of the national income are the direct tax and the custom tax.

The direct tax is a peculiar combination of personal and income tax.

The Government computes that each able-bodied citizen has to pay 12s. personal tax per annum, and if he possesses, besides his working power, some property, or capital, or trade, he has to pay, on an average, also, about 12s. per annum as income tax.

But this computation only serves the Government to measure the annual sum total of tax imposed on the communities. In reality the Communal Boards dispose the sum on members of the Commune. The law has fixed only the maximum of direct tax which can be imposed on a citizen. For the richest man in the villages that maximum is £6 per annum ; for the richest man in the cities, £12. Servants who have not more than £30 per annum, do not pay this tax but a lower one, which is called the "servants' tax." Gipsies pay a certain tax per head, which retains the Turkish name of "Haratch."

The tariff of import and export duties is a highly liberal one. Serbia, being an essentially agricultural country, has no rising industry to protect, although, latterly, a certain party has urged zealously the introduction of a protective tariff as a means of creating a national industry. At present the average duty on importation does not exceed 5 per cent. of the value.

The receipts of the State's Exchequer were as follows in 1870 :—

	Tax-piastres.*
Direct Taxes	18,264,761
Duty on Import and Export ...	5,332,318
Consumption Taxes on Salt, Sugar, Tobacco, and Coffee	2,070,032
Tax for Registration	1,662,304
Carried forward ..	27,329,415

* 1 Tax-piastre equals 4d.

			Tax-piastres.
Brought forward	27,329,415
Post and Telegraphs	569,060
Special Tax for National Schools	1,359,999
Income of the State's Property	1,395,761
From the Sale of Lands	976,584
Various other sources	2,440,804
Total amount of Receipts			34,069,623

The State's Expenditure for the year 1870 was :—

			Tax-piastres.
Civil List to the Prince	1,200,000
Tribute to the Sublime Porte	1,176,255
National Assembly	60,000
Senate	329,200
Pensions	870,360
Credit for Ordinary Wants	1,233,499
Credit for Extraordinary Wants	1,348,000
Expenditure of the Ministry of Justice	3,361,881
" of Home Ministry	5,470,203
" of Ministry of National Education	3,135,666
" of Ministry of Foreign Affairs	825,651
" of Ministry of Finance	1,692,046
" of Ministry of War	9,457,740
" of Ministry of Public Works	1,686,403
Sum Total of Expenditure			30,849,907

A general idea of Serbian State Finance can be gathered from the following table :—

Year.	Receipts.	Expenditure.	Surplus.
	Tax-piastres.	Tax-piastres.	Tax-piastres.
1867	29,197,960	28,536,172	661,788
1868	37,516,762	35,256,985	2,259,777
1869	34,877,262	29,847,097	5,030,165
1870	34,069,623	30,849,907	3,219,716

The following table, showing the Receipts from Direct and Custom Taxes during the last years, may be also found interesting :—

Year.	Direct Tax. Tax-piastres.	Custom Tax. Tax-piastres.
1866 ...	16,383,081 ...	3,918,912
1867 ...	17,170,170 ...	4,649,285
1868 ...	17,550,183 ...	6,379,308
1869 ...	17,820,481 ...	5,626,658
1870 ...	18,111,708 ...	5,332,318

The value of the importations for the last four years has been computed at an average of one million pounds sterling per annum.

The value of the exportations for the last four years has been, on an average, 147,130,500 current piastres, or £1,177,044, per annum.

In 1868, in consequence of an extraordinary export of wheat, it amounted to £1,520,000.

The chief articles of export are : Swine, cattle, wool, hides, fat, tallow, dried prunes, brandy (to Bosnia), and, in the last years, Indian corn and wheat, although until 1865 Serbia was one of the corn importing countries.

The export of swine appears to be on the decline, since in

1868	426,861	head of swine were exported
1869	424,783	" " "
1870 only	386,400	" " "

It should be said that in Serbia there is no *transit duty*, and although the transit trade is at present somewhat dull, it is hoped that it will receive before long a great stimulus from the construction of the railway line Belgrade-Alexenatz-Salonica.

Justice.

In the chief city of every district there is a Court of Justice (of first instance) for civil and criminal cases.

Appeals against the decisions of these Courts must be made to the Court of Appellation, and, again, appeals against the decisions of this latter Court must be made to the Court of Cassation. Both these latter courts are in Belgrade.

Besides the district Court of first instance in Belgrade, there

are also a city Court for civil and criminal cases, and a commercial Court.

Last year the Government laid before the National Assembly a bill for the introduction of trial by Jury in certain cases, and the bill was passed, after submitting to a few unimportant amendments.

There are three prisons in Serbia: one in the fortress of Belgrade (transferred from Topeschidere subsequent to the murder of Prince Michael), one in Cupria, and a third in Posharavatz for female convicts. The number of criminals undergoing sentence has been about 800 during the last five years.

The Church.

The Serbian Church belongs to the family of the great Eastern Church, but is independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The bishops are chosen by the Synod and consecrated by the Serbian Metropolitan. The Metropolitan himself is chosen by the Synod.


The country is divided into four dioceses: those of Belgrade, Schabatz, Negotin, and Ousheetza. The Archbishop of Belgrade is also Metropolitan of Serbia.

Last year (1871) the number of priests belonging to the Serbian Church was 742, and the number of monks 135. There were also 347 churches, 32 chapels, and 42 monasteries.

Most of these monasteries are small, but some are of very great architectural beauty. The most interesting are those of Studeniza, built by the first Serbian king, Nemanya, about the end of the twelfth, and Manassia, built by the despot Stephan Lazarevics in the beginning of the fifteenth century.


The Government pays only the archbishop, the bishops, and the rectors, or protas. The other priests are paid for their services by the people.

The Government supports also, by a certain annual contribution, the (German) Protestant preacher and (German) Protestant school of Belgrade; the Jewish Rabbi, and the Imam of a Mosque reserved for such Mahomedans who come on business to the Serbian capital.





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